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Abstract
This dissertation examines the influence of authoritarianism and gender on the
political behavior of white Americans. Authoritarianism and gender are two prominent
variables in the formation of political preferences. Authoritarianism is regarded as a
dynamic psychological disposition toward order and structure in social relations.
Meanwhile, gender reflects external cultural markers attached to sex to indicate
appropriate social behavior. Environmental factors like resource disparities and social
conventions contribute to the production of gender. Both gender and authoritarianism
have become increasingly contentious subjects in the context of contemporary
partisanship. Scholars believe that each variable uniquely contributes to polarization, and
have studied the effect of each variable separately on partisanship.
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by examining the interactive effect of
gender and authoritarianism on political behavior through the lens of social identity
theory. In recent years, scholars have increasingly understood partisanship through the
psychology of social identity. This shift in emphasis away from purely rationalist
assumptions of political behavior reflects the contemporary need to explain the personal
dimension of politics. Gender and authoritarianism both impact identity. Given the
expansive scope of party affiliation to affect preferences in the context of polarization, it
is hypothesized that gender and authoritarianism interact to influence political behavior
as the norm.
This dissertation relies on Miller and Shank’s casual process model to develop
hypotheses (1996). The casual process model predicts that internal psychological factors
weigh heavier on political preferences than external environmental factors. One posits

DiMariano vii

that gender influences political beliefs more forcefully in the absence of authoritarianism
influences. The rate of change in preferences due to the effect of authoritarianism will not
be the same for men and women as conventional gender norms socializes men to prefer
more authoritarian social arrangements. Regression models test for this proposed relation
across three relevant domains of partisanship: cultural issues, economic issues, and
affective evaluations. The results offer limited, qualified support for the thesis. The
interactive relation manifests as expect in cultural preferences related to social
arrangements, but partisanship outweighs the influence of individual gender and
authoritarian preferences elsewhere.
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Introduction
The events of January 6th, 2021 will forever be remembered as a singular,
infamous day in American history. For the first time, a violent, domestic mob sacked the
Capitol with ambitions to assassinate elected officials in order to steal the presidency for
Donald Trump (Graham 2021). Its novelty lacks comparable events to register its
shockwave and comprehend the gravity of the situation beyond the Civil War itself. The
Founding Fathers often compared the United States to the Roman Republic to understand
their historical moment. Likely, they would have compared the events at the Capitol to
the assassination of Tiberius Gracchus. In that situation, a violent mob had brought
weapons into the sacrosanct core of Rome to exact extra-constitutional ends for the first
time. This assassination set in motion the political storm before a storm of civil wars,
which ultimately led to the collapse of the Roman Republic. This analogy conjures a
bleak outlook for American democracy. One cannot, therefore, understate the magnitude
of the attempted coup.
This type of event is unfathomable to Americans because it does not occur in the
United States; so, it is a novel exercise to account for what happened. Anyone who seeks
to understand the events of January 6th must understand the tectonic forces that resulted
in the rise the of Trump. The most prominent explanation is found in an article from the
2016 election cycle presciently presaging the rise of the Trump coalition and the
dynamics of the politics to follow. This piece found that one trait alone could predict
whether someone would be attracted to support Trump: authoritarianism.
In his research, MacWilliams found that authoritarian voters bolstered the Trump
campaign, and represented his core supporters (2016). They provided Trump the initial
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fuel to exploit a disunified Republican Party. His strongman rhetoric allowed him to
consolidate support among other discontented Republican factions who may not have
been authoritarians. For instance, his popularity soared among blue-collar white men,
many of whom were previously Democratic voters (Williams 2016). Ultimately, his
authoritarian support secured Trump the presidency in 2016 and the leverage of a
political party to challenge the 2020 election results through violent means.
Authoritarianism is essential to understand this political moment. Typically,
authoritarianism is a psychological concept used to describe one’s need for authority to
structure one’s life (Altemeyer 1981). The need for structure in the authoritarian leaning
voter manifests as a desire for social conventionalism, strong leadership, and aggression
toward nonconforming groups (MacWilliams 2016). This specific type of voter rallied
around Trump’s bravado and appearance of strength. He made his campaign evocative
and intelligible through a lack of nuance in discussions of policy matters. His framing of
political conflict in us-versus-them terms encouraged the simplistic thinking.
Authoritarians have difficulties with nuance, and are acutely sensitive to threats. Trump
benefited tremendously from the fact that fear of terrorism from decentralized groups like
ISIS had reached its highest point in the United States since 9/11 in December 2015
(MacWilliams 2016). This anxiety coincided with the beginning of the primary season.
Trump solidified support for his demagoguery in this atmosphere. His strongman persona
captured authoritarians along with other Republicans who perceived imminent threat in
the world.
MacWilliams cited the key central qualities of Trump that pressed authoritarian
voters into his campaign (2016). However, he missed a critical aspect of Trump’s appeal
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to authoritarians. Despite an encompassing list, he omitted the fact that Trump is a white
man. The significance of this point may not be immediate. However, the untraditional
nomination of a woman for president in the Democratic Party appears to have repulsed
authoritarians as much as Trump’s machismo attracted them. The traditional mold for a
president is a white man. Only Barack Obama has bucked the trend in the course of
American history. His victory symbolized a breakthrough in race relations, yet
simultaneously racialized mass politics in both parties (Schaffner et al. 2016; Tesler
2016, 145). Authoritarians looking to make white men president again despaired at both
Obama’s victories and Clinton’s nomination. Obama’s race hurt his standing among
authoritarians, and Clinton’s sex would appear to have hurt her fortunes with them, too.
This inquiry fills a gap in the literature by launching a comprehensive analysis of
the relation between gender and authoritarianism in the partisanship of white Americans.
The omission of Clinton’s sex as a factor in authoritarian decision-making was not an
intentional oversight in MacWilliams’ piece. In fact, scholars have only recently
produced the first piece of research finding an interaction between gender and
authoritarianism (Lizotte 2019). The failure to combine both topics exists despite the
increasing use of authoritarianism and gender in the literature of political psychology in
recent decades as a lens of analysis. The centrality of each theme to the outcome of the
2016 election and subsequent toxic partisanship adds further intrigue. One can account
for the oversight of scholars to analyze the two topics together given some context. The
two concepts have remained unconnected due to the longstanding prominence of
ideological, rationalist assumptions to explain political behavior. The window has only
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recently opened to link gender and authoritarianism in the milieu of theories of social
identity thanks to these heterodoxic psychological perspectives.
The theoretical approach to the study of mass political behavior is undergoing
conceptual modification. Scholars are abandoning sanitized economic axioms of rational
choice, and are gravitating toward analysis through social identity theory instead. This
approach reevaluates citizens based on a more complete iteration of political life in terms
of social motivations. The focus of this approach centers on how psychological
attachments anchor behavior in mass politics. Identity takes a central role in belief
systems in lieu of economic considerations and material self-interest. This new outlook is
not to discredit rational choice theories. It is to broaden the perspective of those theories
through the lens of intergroup behavior (Huddy 2018). The focus on political psychology
opens new avenues to reinterpret both the motivations of the mass electorate and secular
changes in the development of modern partisanship.
The surging emphasis on identity has resuscitated the use of the psychological
concept of authoritarianism in political analysis. Authoritarianism refers to individuals
who are averse to uncertainty, and require order to structure their lives. Authoritarianism
has a checkered history in the literature as a theory, but has regained prominence in the
past two decades. It is now one of the leading psychological theories of behavior that
arrays individuals based on their propensity for autonomy or conformity (Feldman 2003).
These individuals have difficulty living in a liberal democracy. The rehabilitation of
authoritarianism to explain political phenomena can enlarge the collective understanding
of political behavior within social identity theory.
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The integral nature of the concept of authoritarianism to the social identity
approach has been demonstrated recently. Luttig demonstrates that strong authoritarians
are strong partisans, and readily conform to elite cues (2017; see also Johnston 2018).
The spectrum of authoritarians thus helps to explain mass partisanship. Additionally,
researchers have tied it to racial identity; however, researchers are limited to studying the
concept in white Americans for reasons of methodology. Currently, a Likert scale
measuring child-rearing values proxies as the measure for the authoritarian dynamic. The
proxy is only valid for the attitudes of white respondents since the metaphor of head of
both the household and of society only applies to white Americans (Pérez and
Hetherington 2014). A Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale alternatively exists, yet
it is faulted as being a tautology of what it is measuring (Stenner 2005). As a result, the
findings of studies that use the RWA scale are flawed and are unreliable.
Curiously, the focus on identity and authoritarianism has overlooked any potential
relation to gender despite the importance of gender to identity. In all human societies, sex
and age form the only two non-arbitrary distinctions between human beings (McDonald
et al. 2011). Individuals inform their behavior based on considerations of one’s sex.
Consequently, gender is of concern to this political analysis. It is the cultural differences
applied to the sexes that create gender (Huddy et al. 2008, 32). Gendered distinctions
between the sexes inform self-interest. Political conflict magnifies these distinctions
when they form the basis of policymaking, and make them a matter of investigation for
political scientists (Magnussen & Maracek 2012). The failure to link authoritarianism and
gender within the nexus of social identity theory presents an opportunity to produce a
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more developed understanding of the concept of authoritarianism and its role in
contemporary politics.
The thrust of this inquiry will center on answering how authoritarianism and
gender interact in the context of social identity to affect political behavior. This
investigation will probe the extent to which the impact of authoritarianism on political
behavior is conditioned by gender distinctions. It is argued that authoritarianism is a
prime mover of political preferences as a psychological mechanism whereas gender
results from interactions with one’s environment through the use of causal pathway
models (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller & Shanks 1996, 192). Gender is less
consequential to preference formation than authoritarianism, but still matters. One
expects gender to exert its strongest effect on political behavior in the absence of
influence from authoritarianism. The central thesis is that the influence of gender and its
interaction with authoritarianism will be different depending on one’s sex. One expects
this result due to the importance of party affiliation to one’s social identity.
Party affiliation is central to substantiate the thesis. One should expect this
relation between gender and authoritarianism across political issues due to the rise of
affective polarization in modern partisanship. Affective polarization is the process
whereby elite ideological polarization induces mass partisan affiliation to assume a social
dimension (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Policy issues are not distinct and judged on
separate considerations in this context, but matter insofar as they benefit one’s party.
Individuals treat their party affiliation as a social identity, and evaluate objects through
personal identity instead of rational reflection (Mason & Wronski 2018). Consequently,
this process generates strong emotional attachments to fellow partisans and derogation of
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opponents. The basis of social identity in affective partisanship ties the mechanisms of
authoritarianism and gender to political preferences. Elite polarization intensifies the
relation between gender and authoritarianism in partisanship. Party elites frame their
policies in the trappings of gender. Elite stances on tolerance and other social
arrangements have also induced authoritarians to sort between the parties (Hetherington
& Weiler 2009).
One expects in the context of extreme partisanship that gender and
authoritarianism will interact across issue domains. This predicted outcome will not
manifest as expected in the results of hypothesis testing. The tests attempted to
demonstrate that gender moderates preferences across the authoritarian dynamic on issues
of cultural preferences, partisan competition, and economic redistribution. One finds that
authoritarianism and gender interacted as expected in relation to abstract issues of social
arrangements and cultural preferences. The intelligibility of these issues to respondents is
assumed to have produced the anticipated results. Yet, intelligibility cannot explain why
the results did not manifest as expected with regard to economic issues. In this situation,
one concludes that the influence of partisanship outweighed the influence of gender and
authoritarianism. The overriding impact of partisanship helps explain the lack of a
relation between authoritarianism and gender in questions of affective evaluations of
politics. It is no surprise that partisanship matters to position staking, yet it is surprising
how its influence prevailed over psychological influencers like authoritarianism. The
results direct one to reconsider the operationalization of these tests broadly and the
expansive conception of authoritarianism narrowly.
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Chapter 2: The History and Applications of Authoritarianism
The central focus of this study is authoritarianism. Therefore, one must articulate
a concept of it before all else. Customarily, scholars will note only a few characteristics
of authoritarian behavior before advancing to their experimentation (Hetherington &
Weiler 2009, 36). The discussion of the MacWilliams article introduced broad
characteristics of authoritarian voters. Additionally, one has discussed the wider political
context in which popularity for the use of authoritarianism as a theoretical lens has been
revived. A lot more intimacy with the concept is required before being able to formulate
hypotheses.
Definitions of authoritarianism vary because scholars disagree on a construction
of the concept (Altemeyer 1988; Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). This lack
of consensus complicates the matter. In many cases, models are reduced to their
methodology (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003). Despite a large empirical literature,
authoritarianism is still somewhat controversial for this imprecise theoretical conception
(Lavine et al. 2005, 220). Indeed, foundational questions remain in dispute on how to
properly understand authoritarian motivations in a narrow psychological sense and in the
broader human experience (Shuman et al. 1992). It is crucial to any inquiry of the
political effects of authoritarianism to therefore articulate a conception. Stenner notes the
cost of theoretical permissiveness to date in the literature:
Without careful distinction among the causes, essential elements, and
consequences of authoritarianism, we risk mistaking one component for
another or for the whole, and deceiving or confusing ourselves regarding
its nature and dynamics (2005, 5).
One must take stock of the looseness of received theories. The advantage is that it
has allowed researchers to innovate. However, it is critical to arrange a working
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definition before analyzing data in conjunction with other influences on preference
formation like gender. A solid foundation is especially important for political analyses in
relation to public opinion surveys to understand the electorate. One must compare and
discuss different concepts of authoritarianism with the goal of evaluating the models
based on the most thorough and logically defensible studies of authoritarianism. To this
end, one will take the approach of deconstructing models into component parts (Allison
& Zelikow 1999). The emphasis of this focus evaluates premises, inference patterns, and
the methodology. One must compare the theoretical distinction, predicted characteristics
of the behavior, and the experimental designs of models to gauge them. This exercise
produces only one theory of authoritarianism fit for the rigors of experimentation.
This account intends to go beyond other academic discussions on authoritarianism
by briefly examining the philosophical roots of the concept to aid in evaluating modern
theories. Scholars rarely cite the history of ideas in which authoritarianism was formed in
defense of their understanding, but this tradition directed the original pioneers of
authoritarianism. If scholars do cite the philosophy aspect, it is in passing (Feldman &
Stenner 1997, 741). The sloppiness of this first empirical study of authoritarianism
estranged scholars from its philosophical endowment, yet one can draw guiding insights
by exploring its intellectual development. This process is a worthwhile first step to
introducing various theories of authoritarianism, and goes beyond the aim of this inquiry
by distinguishing authoritarianism from other quite similar concepts like prejudice and
intolerance.
Authoritarianism became a popular concept in psychology due to the efforts of
Theodore Adorno and his colleagues (Van Ijzendoorn 1989). It was a core concept of
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philosophers and sociologists in the Frankfurt School tradition before then, but Adorno
and his colleagues undertook the first academic inquiry of the idea in the late 1940s. The
School was a clearinghouse for progressive sociologists during the interwar period. In
many ways, authoritarianism is one of many ideas to emerge from the School. In other
ways, it is a culmination of multiple strands of its thought. The road toward the inception
of the School begins with the upheaval of the First World War. The War shattered faith in
the promise of the Enlightenment to deliver human progress through reason. The social
turbulence also contributed to the rise of fascism, and the violence associated with
totalitarian regimes. The Frankfurt School incorporated to understand why the prevailing
trust in reason had misled society to ruin. These academics sought to account for the
decline of bourgeois liberal-democratic regimes, and the apparent loss of individuality
associated with advanced, capitalist societies (Hammer 2006; Wolin 2006).
Adorno’s philosophical corpus reads as an indictment of the developments of his
day. Adorno is a cultural Marxist with Freudian psychological views who held an
existentialist outlook on ontology and aesthetics (Hammer 2006). Authoritarianism is, by
nature of affiliation, submersed in a perspective of struggle and becoming. One
characterizes the Frankfurt School itself as a continuation of Marxist thought. Marx
argued that history necessarily unfolded according to stages in the conflict between
economic classes. Frankfurt scholars sought to understand why Marxist predictions had
yet not come to fruition (Arato & Gebhardt 1978).
They search to understand what was missing from their ideologies. Marx
documented how the bourgeois exploited their privileged position in control of capital to
legitimize their economic hegemony, but he and his adherents overlooked how capitalist
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institutions affected culture. Frankfurt scholars like Adorno realized this oversight, and
the need to enlarge the critical scope of their subject-matter (Wolin 2006, 52). The
bourgeois entrenched their position in economic relations by manipulating culture in a
given society. The levers over cultural power allowed them to perpetuate their selfinterest in the maintenance of capitalism (Friedman 1981, 65; Tar 1977). It was argued
that the bourgeois mobilized the institutions of state and civil society to inculcate false
interests among the populace.1 Mass media, in particular, ensconced subservience in
society by eliminating independent artisans and propagandizing art to normalize
exploitation.
Adorno followed this Marxist critique of culture. He believed that advanced
capitalism eventually eliminated all unregulated aspects of human life, and thus the idea
of private sphere for individuals. The public and private needs of individuals in
developed capitalist societies were collapsed into one dimension through the
standardization of production, and left meaningless outside the interests of capitalist
contexts (Tar 1977, 76; 162-166). Production in these types of states established a
pernicious conformity through standardization at the expense of human originality and
initiative.
The focus of the Frankfurt School gradually shifted in the 1930s away from
totalitarian systems towards the individuals within them. The growing hostility of Nazi
Germany particularly motivated persecuted members of the Frankfurt School, nearly all
of whom were Jewish, to understand individual endorsement of totalitarian regimes.
Their psychological reasoning drew its philosophical inspiration from existentialism.

1

This nascent critical theory would, in fact, continue to influence social reformers like those in the feminist
movement decades later.
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Existentialist ontology is the belief that existence precedes essence. One makes who they
are to become. The existentialist aesthetic is therefore the will to live authentically
(McDonald 2017). Authenticity comes from living deliberately without losing oneself in
the finite of conformity or the paralysis of the infinite. However, the freedom to become
one’s own self is considered dreadful and plagued with anxiety. Philosophers from
Augustine to Kierkegaard to Camus have consequently concluded that it is often easier to
seek refuge in the safety of conformity by outsourcing one’s self to the shelter of group
affiliations (Ferreira 2009, 119).
A consequential figure in German philosophy at the time, Nietzsche echoes these
themes of becoming in his discourses on freedom and morality. He believed that the
success of the Enlightenment had made it incompatible to be reasonable in Modernity
while holding mystical beliefs in so-called true-world theories (Young 2010, 366).
Nietzsche’s views inspired the famous lamentation that God is dead, and that men must
become gods simply to console themselves for the greatest of all losses. The destruction
of metaphysical claims leaves individual free to will their own existence in life.2
Nietzsche recognizes that people will still need to believe in something, however
(Friedman 1981, 63). Individuals will flock toward divined real-world theories to
compensate for the loss of God and thus metaphysical certainty. These theories range
from economic ideology to racial bigotry Conformity for Nietzsche eventually becomes
fanaticism.
“What opposes Nietzschean freedom of spirit is fanaticism, understood as
a vehement commitment to some faith or value-set given from without,
2

The existential concept that people exist before they create who they are influenced early discourses on
authoritarianism. Fromm encapsulates this concept in his work (1941). His discourse mirrors this synopsis.
He argues that people who do not seek authenticity will instead try to escape from freedom. This escape
means that they abscond by hiding behind authoritarian directives of who to be.
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which is motivated by a need to believe in something because one lacks
the self-determination to think for oneself” (Anderson 2017).
Frankfurt scholars enmeshed the existentialist outlook with their project to
rehabilitate Marx. Their philosophical synthesis adopted Freud’s psychology to account
for conformity in the nature of the human condition (Adorno et al. 1950, 5; Friedman
1981). The development of thought in the later years of the Frankfurt School heavily
incorporated psychoanalysis to describe social phenomenon (Wolin 2006, 46). Freud
popularized the concept of the subconscious, which opened the theoretical space to study
false consciousness. He argued that individuals require a sense of meaning and of an
authority in charge. Without these goods, individuals ameliorate their condition through
the sublimation of the self by way of group immersion (Arato & Gebhardt 1978, 120).
However, certain individuals are more prone to conform than others. Freud explored
childhood experiences with discipline to explain conformist propensities and other
personality syndromes. This basis of authoritative parental pedagogy pervades Frankfurt
School thinking (Horkheimer 2002, 100). The modern iteration of this idea heavily
influences experimental designs in certain iterations of authoritarian theory.
These philosophical currents intersected in the social milieu of the Interwar period
to result in the idea of authoritarianism (Arato & Gebhardt 1978, 96). They culminate
with the first empirical study of authoritarianism as a personality (Adorno et al. 1950).
The purpose of this study was to determine if Nazis still existed in post-war Germany
despite the defeat of Nazism. The collaboration attempted to construct personality types
of intolerant individuals based on a battery of questionnaires known as the F-scale. The
scales tapped items like anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, beliefs about hierarchy,
aggressiveness, concern about the behavior of others, and tradition. They were devised in
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response to in-depth interviews with tolerant and intolerant individuals. They conclude
that “stereotyped, hierarchical, and dichotomous thinking and behavior in terms of
ingroup-outgroup relationships and superordinations and subordinations is characteristic
of the authoritarian personality—the origins of which go back to the parent-child
relationship” (Tar 1977, 108-109).
The brief exegesis of Frankfurt School philosophy highlights the importance of
conformity with regard to original conception of authoritarians to distinguish it from
mere intolerance. The dour inaccessibility of metaphysical truths will lead certain
individuals to suffer ontologically without seeking affiliation with some divined group.
Conformity is an essential component to understand the origins of authoritarianism. This
perspective need not carry the particular biases associated with the original concept like
Marxism or Freudianism. The act of conforming in and of itself is what appears to
matters. It is perhaps the most fundamental trade-off in a person’s life and politics: how
much autonomy should one sacrifice to the larger society (Miller 2003, 20). In this light,
authoritarianism becomes a matter of political interest. Therefore, one can deploy it to
study the electorate with a proper theoretical basis.
Toward An Academic Theory
Authoritarianism is characterized as the “union of Germany theory and American
empiricism” (Tar 1977, 102). One has skimmed the philosophy behind the idea to present
some essential meaning to the term. This search for roots gives rise to a conception of
authoritarianism as conformity for protection amidst unknowns. It suggests that
individual decisions to relinquish autonomy are not so much deliberate as they are an
underlying psychological mechanism. The next step is evaluating how this mechanism
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operates. The matter of what parts to expunge and what parts to retain in the theoretical
model is the goal of this section. The sophistication of research studies and national
surveys has forced scholars to inductively revise the mechanics of authoritarianism as the
study of public opinion matured. Scholars identified new avenues for its application at the
same time. Any theory must withstand the demands of scrutiny and applicability against
this development.
A theory is critical for authoritarian studies in isolation and along other concepts
that influence preference formation. The popularity of the concept has generated an
extensive literature, so there are choices of models available. Authoritarianism met with
instant acclaim in the post-war academic scene (Van Ijzendoorn 1989). The expanse of
the literature offers multiple ways to conduct a review moving forward. A chronology
through the major revisions to prevailing models seems to be the most logical procedure
to cover 70 years of material. In the chronology, one will evaluate the varying
psychological motivations underpinning authoritarianism. These psychological aspects
engender how one perceives the mechanics of conformist behavior. The intended purpose
is to critically introduce the various models, and to compare and contrast them along the
way.
It is only sensible that one commences this discussion with Adorno and his
colleagues’ Freudian concept of authoritarianism. The consensus on this model is
resounding: the proposal of an authoritarian personality left outstanding theoretical and
methodological concerns for the lasting viability of the original model. Critics
immediately aspersed the integrity of the study (Martin & Westie 1959, 521). The idea of
a personality syndrome, in which an individual derogated other people from different
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groups due to misplaced affect from childhood, did not produce uniform results across
similar populations (Allport 1960; Singer & Feshbach 1959, 404). Scholars could not
reproduce the results with different subjects in different environments (Masling 1954).
Observed fluctuations in the aggregate of number of authoritarians and their preferences
pointed to the fact that a problem existed at a fundamental level (Altemeyer 1988, 22-24).
This problem would continue to plague models of authoritarianism. Personality should
not change readily for its role as an essential identity in an individual. Preferences should
also remain similar if they are characteristics of a personality type. The Freudian
psychology that imbued the concept also sabotaged its viability.
The fault in the original work on authoritarianism is that the reasoning was not
based on any inductive method. The application of psychoanalysis carried with it a
distinct non-falsifiable property in interpreting results (Altemeyer 1988). One did not test
to negate the claim that core concepts like childhood trauma or other psychological
illnesses led to authoritarian personalities. Conversely, any outcome could be explained
after the fact as having an ulterior psychological basis, and could not be empirically
linked to an underlying authoritarian personality directly (Titus & Hollander 1957, 62).
The focus on personality limited analysis in the face of changing environmental
conditions, and left the model unable to account for variations in observation. Moreover,
the dubious construction of the F-scale left scholars uncertain of what they were
measuring in subjects (Christie & Jahoda 1954). The F-scale had internal consistency, but
lacked validity and uni-dimensionality. The wide reach of the questionnaires for the scale
tapped too many other latent concepts besides the nebulous concept of authoritarianism.
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Despite its flaws, the concept seemed irresistible to shelf. Scholars applied it to
contemporary political events through the middle of the 20th century. The original
publication introduced psychology to the study of ideologues, which was in vogue during
the Cold War (Tar 1977, 62). The novelty of the concept generated speculation about the
links between personalities and private, intolerant, interpersonal behavior in the new
domain of public research. The application quickly moved beyond the focus of racial
bigotry and anti-Semitism. The looseness of the theory meant that it was applied in
variety of other places. For instance, scholars attempted to find a link between
authoritarianism and leftist ideologies of socialism and communism (Eysenck 1954;
Shills 1954; later Ray 1983, Stone 1980). Lipset attempted to link class status with
authoritarianism by noting that poorer individuals tended to have higher levels of support
for illiberalism (1959). Yet, the search for left-wing authoritarianism fizzled for the same
methodological reason that failed to link right-wing authoritarianism to personality. The
F-scale did not access an underlying personality syndrome. The questions regarding
specific intolerant preferences instead left the methodology open to the criticism that it
measured political attitudes (Stenner 2005, 16).
This initial translation of authoritarianism from philosophical idea to
psychological model would arrest its maturation in the literature. The tainted construction
of its research program led a generation of serious researchers to discredit the theory
(Duckitt 1989, Wolfe 2005). Fortunes changed for the viability of authoritarianism with
fundamental alterations to its underlying structure. The rehabilitation of the concept has
generated two contemporary models. Altemeyer formulated the first of these new models
with the adoption of a different psychological basis and methodology (1981). In the first
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instance, he re-imagined authoritarianism as an attitude. He accomplished this end by
removing personality as the basis for the model. The replacement of the personality
component de-essentializes the underlying mechanics of authoritarianism in individuals,
and makes it a reaction to social conditions instead. One is no longer thought of as being
authoritarian but of becoming authoritarian. The attitudinal model reestablished the
concept by placing it in the domain of social learning theory, as a result (1988, 62-65).
This model is problematic. One can understand the defects of understanding
authoritarianism as social learning by disaggregating the model and reviewing its
features. Altemeyer’s model rests on three co-varying components: attitudes on
leadership, social customs and traditions, and different social groups. The extent to which
one is authoritarian is operationalized in terms of net preferences for each of these three
categories (Altemeyer 1981). Scholars commonly typify authoritarian behavior by way of
these categories. However, they disagree on how authoritarianism interacts with the
external world to produce those attitudes. The inference pattern for personality was that
individuals held authoritarian attitudes because those attitudes are part of their intrinsic
character. The inference pattern for the social learning theory is that a person is
authoritarian because they developed motivated responses to external stimuli over time.
These attitudes are capable of changing. Conformity results from observing others
conform, though. It is not an internal motivation, and should not obviously show change.
Another aspect to parse is the methodology of Altemeyer’s model. The social
learning model of authoritarianism is faulted for its reinterpretation of the classic F-scale
test. Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) test implements the attitudinal
conceptualization to probe different aspects and instances of authoritarian preferences in
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an individual at a given time. Intrinsically, it follows the belief that the F-scale was valid,
but needed to be fashioned to actually measure authoritarian attitudes (1981, 25). The
popularity of this formulation is evident in its continued use to this day in the field of
psychology. However, this shift had the perverse effect in the literature to make the
definition of authoritarianism synonymous with the methodology of the RWA scale
(Duckitt 1989, 65).
The social learning model of authoritarianism constitutes a sizable portion of the
research literature. It is especially prominent in the field of psychology, but political
scientists, mostly in non-American contexts, also make use of the model (Bizumic &
Duckitt 2013; Brandt & Henry 2012; Harteveld et al. 2015). However, it has been
challenged and criticized in political science. Some argue that attitudinal model lacks any
underlying vision on which to build the foundation of a theory (Duckitt 1989; Feldman
2003). The preference for authoritarian social relations undermines the need for
psychological theory as authoritarianism becomes a reflection of political preferences. It
is essentially sterilized from its original intent when one views authoritarianism as a
basket of attitudes. The idea becomes minimally separated from the concept of prejudice
and intolerance, and often serves as shorthand for it, as a result. It is not distinct in this
way, and one searches for a reason to refer to it as authoritarianism.
This argument against Altemeyer’s model joins the critique of the methodology
for the social learning model. Feldman pointedly states that the RWA scale is not valid
(2003, 45-46). Like the methodological construct of the F-scale, the RWA scale contains
numerous questions that are suspiciously close to the dependent variable that
authoritarianism purports to influence. The RWA conflates authoritarianism with
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attitudes of intolerance consequently, and does not tap an underlying construct (Stenner
2005, 5). Authoritarianism needs a basis for organizing an inference pattern and
methodology that is not a tautology of what it measures. The failure of the RWA scale to
measure authoritarianism portends consequences to consider for this inquiry. A majority
of researchers favor the RWA scale to operationalize their experimental design. For this
reason, this inquiry will not incorporate conclusions from the research of scholars who
use the RWA scale as anything more than speculation.
One must disregard the social learning model of authoritarianism, and disqualify
its use in political analysis. The model is irreparably limited. Another notable critique is
that, like the original model, Altemeyer’s model fails to capture the autonomy trade-off
between an individual and society as a dynamic process for individuals (Brown 1995;
Feldman & Stenner 1997, 742). It fails for two reasons. First, one must also doubt that
attitudes change as quickly as they do to explain fluctuations in research (Stenner 2005,
16). Altemeyer’s reinterpretation transformed authoritarianism into learned, patterned
behavior. Attitudes are acquired and maintained through social interaction. They are
capable of changing in the short-term unlike the Freudian model, but the model of social
learning does not offer an explanation to account for sudden changes in individuals or
wide fluctuation in the aggregate measures either. One may defend the model by stating
that the attitudes change in response to a powerful catalyst. However, such a defense runs
counter to the claim that child rearing practices and long-term interactions with others
serve to acclimate individuals to their preferred set of authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer
1988, 54-55).
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In relation to the first critique, researchers secondly cite the lack of dynamism in
the social learning model as an inherent flaw. This critique is a recent one as new
conceptions of personality have emerged. It was never originally posited in response to
problems with theorizing authoritarianism. The concept of dynamism took nearly a halfcentury of development to percolate through the field of psychology, and nest in the
literature on authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner 1997). Researchers introduced the
concept in response to constant and troubling findings of varying levels of
authoritarianism within other proposed models such as the attitudinal model (Stenner
2005). Previously, theories of authoritarianism lacked any mechanism to explain change
in relation to one’s interaction with their environment. They envisioned the individual as
a stable entity in his/her environment whether in terms of personality or attitudes.
Dynamism imagines an individual having a stable personality with preferences that
change based on ephemeral events. These preferences revert to something resembling a
status-quo ante position after a bout with turbulence when the effect of the stimulus fades
(Cantor & Synder 1998).
Dynamism explains the shortcomings of the previous models based on a revised
conception of personality. The preferences of authoritarians tend to remain strong and
constant over time despite situational changes in one’s environment (Hetherington &
Weiler 2009, 41; Hetherington & Suhay 2011). The same response does not happen with
other individuals on the authoritarian spectrum, however. They react according the
potency and direction of outside stimuli with regard to their authoritarian inclinations
(Lavine et al. 1999, 338; Stenner 2005, 61). Sales and Friend observe this problem
tangentially in their argument against personality as an internally-regulating system. They
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found that the presence of anxiety in a test environment raised levels of authoritarianism
(1973). This outcome is outside the explanatory capacity of both the Freudian personality
or social learning model. The failure to identify this problem sooner is that researchers
looked at macro-level data with the notion that authoritarians and authoritarianism were
synonymous (Doty et al. 1991; McFarland et al. 1995). This realization of a distinction
prompted one to view authoritarianism as an interactive process instead between an
individual and societal conditions. People will maintain their authoritarian disposition,
but levels of support for authoritarian social arrangements and cultural preferences will
fluctuate (Stenner 2005).
The concept of dynamism pioneered a breakthrough for the research of
authoritarianism. Ultimately, it renders only one model fit for consideration. This model
relies on the concept of ephemeral changes of preferences in the face of developing social
events. Its causal mechanism will be essential for mapping the psychological processes of
authoritarianism. It will provide the basis to understanding the potency of social identities
like gender in political conflict. The foregoing review was beneficial to these ends by
removing other models from consideration, and demonstrating the necessity of a
defensible theory for understanding authoritarianism. One’s knowledge of how
authoritarianism operates would be limited otherwise. The analysis of the dynamic model
will serve the same end as before to substantiate it for application to political analysis.
Detractors of the social learning model advocate for the dynamic model of
authoritarianism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). The key innovation of this model is
dynamism. In this way, one views the individual in the functionalist approach to
personality as both enduring yet situational (Brown 1995; Cantor & Synder 1998). This

DiMariano 23

perspective is distinct from the internally regulated concept of personality as found with
Adorno and his collaborator’s psychic model where behavioral responses endure across
situations. To fully comprehend the consequences of the functionalist view, one must
deconstruct the processes underway at the individual level between personality and
environment. Under normal circumstances, one expects an enduring personality to be
present. Scholars conclude that an individual has a unique predisposition toward
authoritarianism from this logic (Feldman & Stenner 1997, 744). This predisposition is
innate and considered to be an enduring characteristic of one’s position toward the
autonomy-conformity tradeoff. Changes in one’s preference for authoritarian outcomes
can occur when their predisposition comes into contact with outside events.
Environmental cues cause the individual to change preferences in the short-term. The
individual returns to their original set of preferences as the stimulus fades into the long
term. As a result, one can account for changes in authoritarian political preferences in a
population without having to explain how the aggregate level of authoritarians changed.
This model relies on anxiety from an environmental threat as the explanatory
variable for operationalizing the dynamic. Most forms of threat appear to be relevant to
interact with authoritarian predispositions to produce higher levels of support for
authoritarian behavior as long as the threat produces feelings of uncertainty about future
outcomes (Stenner 2005, 19). Threat alters a person’s temperament toward tolerance
(Marcus et al. 1995). Feldman and Stenner find economic threat from employment
uncertainty triggered a change in authoritarian preferences (1997, 764). However, the
agreement on the degree to which economic anxiety provokes a reaction in manifest
authoritarian preferences is not settled (Stenner 2005, 68). Political uncertainty from a
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variety of sources is sufficient to provoke an interaction (Conover & Miller 2015;
Feldman & Stenner 1997, 765; Greene 2004; Huddy 2002). These sources can range
from news media uptake to the questionability of the outcome of an election.3 Real or
imagined threat motivates a short-term deviation in one’s authoritarian preferences. In
response, individuals across the authoritarian spectrum gravitate toward authoritarian
preferences. It is believed that only non-authoritarians redouble their commitment toward
autonomy during threatening situations (Stenner 2005; however, see Hetherington &
Weiler 2009, 43).
The dynamic model also utilizes a valid measure to reflect its conceptualization.
The problem with the RWA scale is that it is a measure of authoritarian preferences. One
cannot draw logical inferences about authoritarianism from the RWA scale due to this
flaw. Luckily, the literature posits an alternative measure to operationalize
authoritarianism. This measure is a scale of four questions regarding child-rearing values,
the CRV scale. The questions measure one’s pedagogy concerning the upbringing of
children in a parsimonious manner without tapping political allegiances or policy
commitments. The CRV scale is valid because it is a non-intrusive probe of the trade-off
between conformity and autonomy (Feldman & Stenner 1997). The relation of parent to
child is a microcosm of an individual to society. A conformist to society would prefer
that one’s child uncritically accept parental authority. Martin and Westie found that
tolerant and intolerant people more sharply divide over child-rearing pedagogy than any
other measure for authoritarianism (1959, 555). The benefit of the CRV scale is that it
has internal validity with experimentation along with external validity through mass
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It is highly probably that future research will demonstrate that Trump’s authoritarian supporters formed
the vanguard of the perpetrators of the January 6th coup attempt.
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surveys (Stenner 2005). The only limitation is that the scale does not tap latent
authoritarianism in non-white populations (Pérez & Hetherington 2014). That does not
stifle this inquiry, though.
The CRV scale captures an individual’s base propensity for authoritarianism
while questions about social relations measure concrete preferences at a point in time.
The distinction in the dynamic model presses one to search for a deeper understanding
about conformist tendencies to understand authoritarianism. The philosophical tradition is
replete with discussion about this propensity, but it is necessary to introduce the
psychology of why individuals have varying comfort levels toward autonomy in the first
place. Childhood upbringing is acknowledged as one aspect, but one must examine other
identified motivations in individuals (Duckitt 1989; Jost et al. 2003). An individual’s
predisposition is not the starting point in this model. It is itself a reflection of the other
psychological needs. These forces drive individuals toward their base predisposition for
conformity or autonomy through what is labeled authoritarianism. For a robust
understanding of the dynamic model, one must therefore analyze the psychology of
conformity (Feldman 2003, 47).
Several explanations for the tendencies behind conformity are found in models of
authoritarianism and the larger psychological literature. These explanations generally rest
on the innate needs of individuals as social beings. From the perspective of sociality,
people have a need to belong (Cox & Leary 2008). This need is described as “[having] a
pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and
significant interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Leary 1995, 497). Indeed, Cox and
Leary find this need as foundational to being human (2008). Through this lens,
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conformity is corollary to one’s desire to maintain social ties. One relinquishes autonomy
for social acceptance. This conception of social behavior saturates Duckitt’s perspective
on authoritarianism. He articulates the premise that individuals prime their
authoritarianism when group identities are salient (1989, 73). It is not until a threat
touches on one’s group identity that the issue interacts with one’s predisposition to affect
authoritarian outcomes (Feldman 2003). This perspective beneficially narrows the range
of threatening stimuli that alter commitments to autonomy. One can discern this groupcentric perspective in other models.
The motivation to conform is explicitly addressed by proponents of the dynamic
model. They cite a need for order in their elaboration on the mainspring of
authoritarianism (Stenner 2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 34). The need for order is
not mutually exclusive of the need to belong, but is rather a different frame. The crux of
this argument is that individuals with a high predisposition toward authoritarianism have
difficulties with a lack of order. They need certainty, so they affix themselves to any
authority capable of producing order. This order is divinized for the certainty it provides,
and individuals form their identity around it. Social norms become fixed instead of fluid;
natural instead of conditional; permanent instead of temporary. As Grabennesch explains:
[One] discourages or obviates any activity which would tamper
with a social world that is superordinate and infused with transcendental
authority… [This] world is self-justifying. Being morally and
ontologically superior to men, it demands that men strive to adjust
themselves to it. [These] institutional orders admit of no legitimate
compromises, deviations, or alternatives (1972, 864).
It is therefore no coincidence that authoritarians believe in biblical inerrancy in greater
terms than non-authoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 36; Hogg et al. 2010).
Traditions provide wisdom beyond the creation of ordinary people, and likely come from
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some “higher authority” (Feldman 2003, 49). Consequently, one must actively defend
“the order” from any challenges as a moral imperative.
The Role of Closure in the Authoritarian Dynamic
The need to belong and the need for order represent two powerful arguments to
explain the motivation behind the authoritarian predisposition in authoritarianism. The
accounts of each need are convincing and credible for understanding human behavior in
their own right. However, they do not appear to be the appropriate underlying frame,
overall. Recent scholarship posits another need as the core human motivation in the
autonomy-conformity tradeoff (Dhont et al. 2013; Hogg 2014). This scholarship claims
that the need for closure is the central psychological basis to incorporate to understand
conformity. The need for closure supersedes and subsumes the other listed needs
(Keersmaecher et al. 2016; Kruglinski et al. 2006). One should not discard the
explanatory potential of other needs; however, one should view those needs from the
perspective of the need for closure (Hogg 2000). One can think of closure conversely as
the need for certainty or the need to know. The need for closure relies on social identity
to satisfy epistemological needs, and therefore connects authoritarianism to matters of
social identity (Hogg & Adelman 2013). This connection to social identity harmonizes
with previous theorizing on authoritarianism, and provides the lens to theorize about the
relation between it and gender in modern politics.
The need for closure forms the basis of uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg 2014,
338). The central tenet of this theory is that human beings require epistemological claims
about reality to reduce the fear associated with the larger unknown (Kruglanski et al.
2006). Individuals turn to groups to meet this demand as groups provide instructional
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affirmations through identification. Thus, group behavior is “formed or forged to meet
undefined or unstructured situations” (Blumer 1956, 683). The construction of a shared
reality is necessary to achieve this end. Shared reality is the basis of identity for group
members in social psychology. Its legacy is well established in the field (Sherif 1936;
Festinger 1954; Kahneman et al. 1982).
Groups offer epistemological protection from uncertainty. Unlike brick and
mortar structures, though, groups are not physical constructions. They are socially
acknowledged distinctions with their own values (Commins & Lockwood 1979, 281282). Group cohesion exists in the minds of individuals who consider their identity, in
part, reliant on a connection to others based on some shared method of categorization
(Tajfel 1981). Human beings are remarkable in their capacity to categorize objects in
their environment. This categorization extends to other human beings. Affect toward
other individuals depends on the appraisal of the category in which someone is placed.
This appraisal applies to one’s self as individuals seek meaningful identities to bolster
self-esteem. A person’s core identifications will shade how they interpret and perceive
their social environment. In this way, groups meet one’s need for closure by the degree to
which they are central to one’s identity.
Social groups differ in their cohesiveness. Hogg refers to “groups that are well
structured with clear boundaries, and in which members interact and share group
attributes and goals and have a common fate” as entitative (2014, 339; see also Hamilton
& Sherman 1996). Entitative groups exert pressure on individuals to conform to the
group prototype due to their cohesion (Festinger 1954). Individuals with a high need for
closure exhibit a higher propensity toward conformity, and seek out entitative groups to
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meet this need. However, individuals with a low need for closure may also find utility in
membership in entitative groups. Group members must hold similar attitudes and beliefs.
They must mutually acknowledge the group as a category otherwise they would not be
considered linked (Bar-Tal 1990). Robust groups have a distinct culture to inform
members of the group’s conception and perception of reality. A political party, church
congregation, or ethnic group is thus more entitative than a mass of sports fans, for
instance, despite the high levels of cohesiveness in each group. The benefit of the need
for closure over other explanations is that it directs one to focus on salient group
identities as order-providers for the explanation of authoritarianism on behavior.
The need for closure promotes group-centric behavior (Hogg 2014). It motivates
authoritarian behavior with its compulsion toward conformity, especially during
threatening times. One observes independent similarities between the effects of a need for
closure and documented authoritarian behaviors with regard to submission to authority,
deference to social conventions, and aggression toward out-groups. Conditions of
uncertainty foster a general desire for strong leadership (Crisp et al. 2012). In the interest
of maintaining groupness, individuals who are high in the need for closure will ordain a
prototypical member to lead the group (Van Knippenberg et al. 1994). This leader will
provide normative assurances and direction to followers. Cicero and colleagues found
that individuals with high need for closure rated leaders as more effective and motivating
when they strongly self-identified with the leader’s group (2005). They also found that
high need for closure members of a group rely heavily on other members to make sense
of the world. Such individuals seek an autocratic structure to the group to enforce group
norms and protect group values. More entitative groups resemble cults in the totality of
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scope and influence it exerts on individual group members (Baron et al. 2003; Hogg
2005).
This tendency to maintain group cohesion results in hostility towards out-groups
as much as it contributes to favoritism for in-group members. The presence of other
groups helps in the process of group typifying (Mason & Wronski 2018). Other groups
elucidate the boundaries between one’s own kind and outsiders. Distinct out-groups are
not necessarily threatening. Certain out-groups may receive positive affect depending on
the degree to which its reality aligns with one’s in-group (Kruglanski et al. 2006, 88).
However, out-groups will elicit negative affect if their own understanding of reality
conflicts with the constructed reality of the in-group. The more uncertain an individual is
the more likely that they are to sharpen the contrast between their directive sense of self
and others (Hogg 2014, 340).
The need for closure provides a compelling explanation to understand individual
propensities toward conformist behavior (Kruglanski et al. 2006; Luttig 2018). In this
way, one should adopt it as a principal agent in the motivation behind authoritarian
predispositions. Therefore, it is important expound the inference pattern of the need for
closure as it relates to the dynamic model. Authoritarian predispositions toward
conformity are a reflection of one’s need for closure. Those individuals with high needs
should therefore have a high predisposition for conformist behavior in the manner one
describes as authoritarian. A high need for closure may also reflect low cognitive skills
(Stenner 2005, 147). Although, it is uncertain which way the causal arrow points in that
regard. Individuals with a high need for closure will seek entitative groups to maximize
the reassurance that they receive from group identification. Authoritarian behavior will
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manifest when threats target their group identity, values, or beliefs based on the
magnitude of the threat. Threatening situations will reinforce commitments to autonomy
and pluralism in the case of some individuals with a low need for closure (Stenner 2005).
These individuals may have higher cognitive abilities, and can manage uncertainty
without manifesting hostility (Hetherington & Weiler 2009).
The incorporation of uncertainty-identity theory forms the contemporary
understanding of authoritarianism as a dynamic. It has important consequences for this
inquiry. First, one may question whether it is prudent to distinguish at all between the two
concepts. It is important to keep the two components distinct in following with the larger
literature. Personality factors, childhood upbringing, narrow life experiences, or one’s
innate character could all contribute to one’s authoritarian predisposition (Stenner 2005,
143). The authoritarian disposition is the loose term for all these processes that acclimate
an individual to their preferred level of personal autonomy. Moreover, authoritarianism is
conceived as a dynamic process while the need for certainty is not. The need for certainty
underlies authoritarian dispositions. Both concepts operate through the lens of conformity
and intolerance. Recently, Luttig has argued that the need for closure produces a
prejudiced personality (2018). He opts to drop the term authoritarianism altogether from
the discussion. This move disregards the dynamism taken from the functionalist
understanding of personality. One becomes statically intolerant as opposed to meting
intolerance based on certain incoming environmental stimuli targeting one’s group
identity. This inquiry will not end the discussion, but it supports the understanding the
need for closure as the compulsion to conform found in authoritarian dispositions.
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The exploration of the models of authoritarianism and the theories of conformity
have expounded a working conception of authoritarianism. One should finalize this end
by additionally noting what authoritarianism is not. First, one must explicitly address
authoritarianism as a desire for groupness and not a particular group. The literature often
treats authoritarianism as conservatism. The overlap of certain goals and needs may
indeed nudge authoritarians toward conservatism. However, groups of the conservative
order are not to be confused with authoritarian groups (Feldman 2003). The notion of a
distinction runs counter to prevailing thought. Researchers have long equated
authoritarianism with conservatism or right-wing ideologies (Jost et al. 2003; Ray 1973).
Jost and colleagues conceptualize conservatism as a motivated social cognition. In this
way, they distill what they believe to be the essence of conservatism to the same
psychological underpinnings that give rise to authoritarianism (2003, 345-346). Any type
of distinction is lost by using the social learning model of authoritarianism. That model
equates the function of authoritarianism as right-wing intolerance (Altemeyer 1981). The
lack of theoretical guidance in both cases allows one to conflate the effects of theory with
the essence of the theory itself.
Authoritarianism is not ideological conservatism although authoritarians are
attracted to conservatism for preserving social structures from change (Stenner 2005;
Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Conservatism is a set of beliefs about legitimate authority
in a society. Conservatives may similarly believe that traditions are super-ordinate, and
above the wisdom of individual people. Therefore, they are agents of tradition and
custom. However, this defense of practices in a community is not a motivated desire to
defend conformity for a group (Feldman & Stenner 1997). A conservative may support
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freedom of speech as an established tradition. This freedom would contradict an
authoritarian’s desire to quash challenges to homogeneity in thought and actions.
Moreover, one may arrive at conservative positions after intense reasoning. Individuals
with low cognitive capacities are challenged to engage in the same reflective process
(Stenner 2005, 146). In sum, conservativism may share similarities with authoritarianism;
however, it differs in substance. Conservatives are one group, and authoritarianism is
about groupness.
The discussion of cognitive reasoning with regard to authoritarianism requires
that one discuss the role of education. Several studies purport to demonstrate a link
between education and authoritarianism. They argue that higher levels of education result
in lower levels of authoritarianism (Federico & Tagar 2014; Lipset 1959; Altemeyer
1981; Luttig 2017). The substantive effect of education is diffuse. Education in terms of
knowledge should introduce one to equally-valid, contrarian opinions. A feature of
education should be the inculcation of tolerance for difference, therefore. Stenner
disagrees with this causal arrangement though (2005, 173 & 241). She notes that
individuals with fewer cognitive capabilities tend to avoid higher education, so a
selection bias develops. The positive effects of education on one’s disposition accrue to
those people who had the cognitive capacities to work through the exigencies of higher
education. By her logic, the intervening nature of education on authoritarianism and
authoritarian behaviors is spurious. Education only explains three percent of variance
beyond authoritarianism in controlling for influences on authoritarian behaviors (2005,
161).
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The previous section explored the development of models of authoritarianism in
relation to advances in the literature. The review yielded a defensible model for
authoritarianism based on philosophical and psychological insights. Authoritarianism is a
propensity for groupness. It influences one’s baseline preferences for the structure of
society and the extent of personal autonomy. Therefore, conformity and intolerance are
two behaviors one would expect from authoritarians. These behaviors change when an
individual reacts to the uncertainty in their environment that threatening stimuli create.
Typically, most individuals sacrifice some autonomy for conformity, and signal
favorability toward authoritarian preferences. Not all threats are equally potent, however.
Authoritarians react proportionally to the threat’s centrality to their identity as members
of entitative groups. The more potent the threat, the more one expects an individual to
become intolerant and conformist. This focus on group identity is important. In the next
section, one will place authoritarianism in the realm of politics through this perspective of
social identity.
Groupness and Social Identity Theory
The articulation of a model of authoritarianism in a manner that emphasizes the
role of group affiliation pays dividends for applications in recent political research. The
utility of understanding authoritarianism through the dynamic model is that it allows one
to ground authoritarianism within the inferences of social identity theory as a casual
mechanism of political behavior. Social identity theory specifies that individuals
categorize themselves and others into social groups. This act of typifying serves to inform
partisan beliefs. Individuals dress themselves in terms of group norms and values to
identify their own politics (Hankin et al. 2000, 434). This line of reasoning treads a
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familiar path. Thus, their political preferences reflect the degree to which an individual
conceives of one’s self in terms of a category or group (Greenwald et al. 2002; Huddy
2018). This system of categorization underpins and generates intergroup behaviors and
group identification both politically and non-politically (Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987).
This theory has gained prominence in recent decades to explain the nature of American
partisanship. Consequently, the emphasis of partisanship as a social identity allows one to
evaluate the literature through the insights of the authoritarian dynamic.
Researchers are increasingly adopting a social identity perspective to understand
political developments (Achens & Bartels 2016; Green et al. 2002; Hankin et al. 2000;
Mason 2018). The focus on groups in relation to political action is not a new idea.
Lazersfeld and colleagues recognized that a person “thinks, politically, as he is, socially”
on the precipice of the quantitative revolution in the social sciences (1944, 27). However,
the perspective did not gain traction with researchers in the post-war generation. They
were not keen to consider a social dimension to partisan affiliation. It lacked theoretical
guidance. Instead, mass political behavior was interpreted through the fashionable
inferences of rational choice (Downs 1957). Partisanship was a running tally of
considerations and political learning (Fiorina 1981; Gerber & Green 1999). This
conception is biased in favor of a rational voter rather than a rationalizing voter
(Wattenburg 1996).
Social identity theory operated outside orthodoxy for nearly five decades in
political science. The concept of the social dimension of partisanship, though, slowly
developed in association with the Michigan School of political behavior. The Michigan
model embraced the group-centric nature of politics (Campbell et al. 1960). However, the
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macroscopic context of political stability and ideological incongruency between political
parties during the first fledgling decades of quantitative research biased how researchers
understood politics on a microscopic scale (Fiorina 1981; Franklin & Jackson 1983). A
long-view of politics covering different eras simply was not available at the time. The
hegemony of rational choice theory remains robust even after a long-view developed
(Abramowitz & Webster 2017). For instance, observed parallel movement in public
opinion among partisans was cited to discredit cognitive heuristics like social identity in
framing political perspectives even as the body of research matured (Gerber & Green
1999, 205). The broad perception of political competition had to change before the other
models could gain acceptability.
Advances in social identity theory developed despite this environment. In
psychology, social identity theory traces its prominence to Tajfel’s work on group
discrimination. Tajfel sought to explain the infamous, and now discredited, Robber’s
Cave experiment in the mid-1950s. The Robber’s Cave experiment purported to show
how the power of social group attachments with regards to something trifling like a camp
group could lead individuals to derogate and even attack out-group members (Mason
2018, 2). These outcomes raise an interesting question: at what point in identifying with a
group does an individual orient one’s behavior around the group? He concluded that a
minimal-group identity did not exist. Human beings categorize themselves to build
identities, and those identities mean that categorically one either belongs or does not
belong to a group (Tajfel 1981, 43).
The potency of group categorization has consequences for the development of
self-perceived identities and intergroup relations. Identification with a group influences
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cognitive decision-making processes. Consequently, one exaggerates the differences
between and similarities within groups (Tajfel 1979). In turn, individuals are motivated
by their allegiance to their group to act fraternally with their fellow partisans and
suspicious toward outsiders (Engelhardt & Utych 2018; McConnell et al. 2017; Tajfel &
Turner 1986). The process of categorization changes how one feels about others in one’s
social environment. The triviality or absurdity of the reason behind the group’s cohesion
does not matter. The mere act of self-categorization results in affect and prejudice (Tajfel
1970). The process of differentiation could occur over anything arbitrary. Hundreds of
experiments have demonstrated the underlying tendency of individuals to sort socially,
and to stereotype others accordingly (Gagnon & Bourhis 1996; Hankin et al. 2000, 435).
Social identity theory engenders a view of conflict oriented around group
memberships. This perspective compliments theories of conformity. Tajfel and Turner
believed that individuals behave in ways to sharpen the contrast between in-groups and
out-groups (1979). However, scholars are not certain whether to infer in-group affection
or out-group derogation from the desire to define boundaries between groups. This
distinction is important to interpret the motivations and designs of political conflict. It is
possible that in-group affection and out-group derogation need not occur at the same time
in political action (Brewer & Brown 1998). Yet, this dual process model thus begs the
questions. What are the circumstances and situations in which one is primed to seek
positive self-identification with a group as opposed to negative self-identification in
opposition to another group? The literature provides a rich debate on how conflict results
from the efforts to differentiate the consequences of social identity theory.
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The inference pattern of motivations in social identity theory matters for political
analysis. Scholars are in disagreement over the underlying motivational processes and
interpretation of intergroup behavior. Social identity theory is premised on the
assumption that individuals join groups to gain a positive identity (Brown 1995, 174).
Thus, one must view intergroup behavior as the result of the desire to obtain and maintain
a positive self-identity. A sizable portion of the literature on social identity emphasizes
the need for positive self-esteem through group differentiation (Brewer 1999; Turner et
al. 1987, 42). Originally, Tajfel found that even meaningless group identities produced
in-group favoritism without corresponding out-group derogation (1970).
One concludes that individuals sort others in order to elevate one’s sense of
regard. Brewer takes this opinion in her commentary on the minimal group paradigm.
She observes that psychologists tend to conclude that bias results from a groundswell of
in-group favoritism when it does occur (1979, 321). People want to feel better about
themselves through the groups with which they associate. Identity offers esteem as much
as affirmation. In this way, Huddy critiques the perspective of group identification as an
irrational, hollow exercise. Groups provide a positive identity with which to share with
other people. These bonds bestow a sense of unity of purpose, and offer a common vision
of the good (2018, 7). Groups provide a source for self-esteem insofar as someone
identifies with a group.
The positive differentiation perspective does not stand unchallenged. On the other
side, scholars conclude that intergroup behavior results from opposition to other group
identities. These scholars criticize the conditions under which the proponents of positive
differentiation derive their conclusions. They acknowledge that individuals seek positive

DiMariano 39

self-esteem through identity, and will even accrue esteem from meaningless identities.
However, bias from increased positive self-evaluation tends to occur in the absence of
competition (Hogg & Abrams 1988). One may find these conditions present in a
laboratory, yet the absence of competition is not a tenable assumption in real-world social
relations. It is the case that “social and economic conditions leading to rivalry between
groups for various kinds of objective benefits are associated with a diffusion of certain
derogatory notions about the outgroup” (Tajfel 1981, 224). Competition heightens the
saliency of group identities as it promotes uncertainty of future events. Identities entrench
under such conditions. Competition enhances the antagonism between groups in a
mutually reinforcing pattern. Intense competition can alter the stakes to the point where
one even acquires self-esteem from the domination of out-groups (Sidanius et al. 1994).
In these situations, one arrives at derogation as an end unto itself.
The entrenchment of group identification through conflict alters social calculus. It
makes domineering the essential motivation for intergroup relations (Conover & Miller
2015; Mason 2018). The desire to win has perverse effects on the behavior of individuals.
People will act counter to their pure material self-interest for the intangible gain of having
their group victorious in competition. In one situation where individuals could choose
between all participants receiving the maximum benefit, including members of the outgroup, or in-group members taking reduced benefits but also winning the competition,
Tajfel and colleagues found that “it is the winning that seems more important to them”
(1971, 172). The irrational nature of this competition means individuals seek to hamper
out-group members. McConnell and colleagues found that 75 percent of test subjects
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were willing to forgo a doubling of their reward bonus to avoid the researchers
concomitantly making a donation to the opposite political party (2017, 15).
The conflict-oriented perspective does not come without its share of criticism. It
is a given that individuals will experience competition with others at some point in their
life. The real question is whether it is tenable to assume that competition automatically
induces or is motivated by out-group derogation. One imagines that there must be an
upper limit to the influence that competition has on intergroup behavior in a liberal,
democratic society (Engelhardt & Utych 2018; Lelkes & Westwood 2017). A liberal quip
is that Trump supporters would burn down their home if the smoke caused a liberal
displeasure. However, one can recognize the hyperbole.4 Indeed, McConnell and his
collaborators saw test subjects forgoing a doubling of their bonus from $3 to $6 in order
to avoid a rival political party from gaining $3. The sums are inconsequential; so, one can
engage in identity signaling without consequential material damage. Lelkes and
Westwood conclude that partisans do avoid hostility, overall. “Partisans willingly engage
in some behavior that might incidentally cause harm to the opposition… but they are not
willing to impose harm” (2017, 496).
Moreover, the desire to defeat an out-group must derive from a motivation to
score a victory for one’s own side at some level. The proponents of out-group derogation
fail to acknowledge the presupposition of in-group favoritism. Otherwise, why compete
in the first place? Competition, therefore, induces a double-down effect by promoting an
in-group favoritism. The positive identity is primed, and consequently, one is motivated
to defend it. However, this process may not operate uniformly across different types of

4

This sentence was written before the January 6th Coup attempt where Trump and his supporters did
metaphorically try to burn down the People’s House. The author stands partially corrected.
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threat or circumstances. If there are limits to the effects of competition with regard to outgroup derogation, does derogation occur in every situation? The answer could reside with
the emotion that the out-group inspires in the member of the in-group. Hewstone and
colleagues comment that:
“an out-group that violates in-group norms may elicit disgust and
avoidance; an out-group seen as unjustly benefiting (e.g., from
government programs) may elicit resentment and actions aimed at
reducing benefits; and an out-group seen as threatening may elicit fear and
hostile actions (2002, 580).
Another factor is the entitativity of the groups in question. Individuals acquire a sense of
shared fate the more central a group’s membership is to them. Someone who has
internalized the group prototype will be more sensitive to perceived differences and
detractions both within and without the group (Branscombe et al. 1995). This individual,
perhaps an authoritarian, may be inclined to register out-group behavior as threatening,
and react with fear and hostility. Strong group members appear more likely to turn
negative when the stakes are personal and consequential (Conover & Miller 2015;
Iyengar & Westwood 2015).
The ongoing debate involved with intergroup relations concerning threat and
competition offers a bridge into the literature on authoritarianism. The discussion of the
dynamic model of authoritarianism aids in organizing how one understands the literature
on social identity and, therefore, modern partisanship. The presence of strong identities is
a requisite starting point. One absorbs multiple identities in the course of daily life, but
one’s adaptation to uncertainty alters the ends to which these identities are marshalled.
One’s authoritarian predisposition impacts the need to develop a meaningful identity, and
thus alters the calculus of intergroup conflict. In the presence of uncertainty, the purpose
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of sublimating the self with a cohesive group identity is to create meaning (Hogg 2014).
These identities offer self-esteem, and will need to be defended. The reaction to outgroups reflects a level of perceived threat to one’s in-group. It is one’s disposition to
authoritarianism that affects how one responds to intergroup behavior. Authoritarianism
can account for the factors of identity formation and maintenance, and the outline of
competition.
One infers from the dynamic model of authoritarianism that individuals are
motivated to defend their identity when challenged. They defend their group to preserve
the affirmations that they derive from group epistemologies. One expects appraisal of the
group identity as the prime mover (Gomez et al. 2019). One expects out-group
derogation when these identities are challenged or questioned (Iyengar & Westwood
2015, 704). The level of threat increases competition by activating individuals who are
not authoritarian. The threat rationale explains the reason why even non-authoritarians
will engage in authoritarian behavior. One way to explain variance in out-group
derogation is one’s propensity toward authoritarianism and sensitivity to threat.
Individuals with a strong predisposition will appraise the in-group the most favorably for
its essential role in structuring their lives. Correspondingly, they will derogate members
of the out-group at higher rates and with greater intensity than individuals with a weak
predisposition absent threatening cues. Authoritarians are more sensitive to threat, and
more likely to respond with hostility, overall. A non-authoritarian may have strong,
central identities, too; however, they should resist responding with intolerance towards in
most situations unless sufficiently threatened. One might even expect that they strengthen
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their commitment to evenhandedness and tolerance at times (Lavine et al. 2005; Stenner
2005).
Modern politics substantiates these insights. Authoritarianism offers a powerful
lens through which to predict and interpret the dynamics of inter-party conflict. The
foregoing discussion parsed the mechanisms behind intergroup relations through the
insight of authoritarianism, and produced two considerations. First, one must observe
how closely one associates a sense of identity with a group prototype. The more central a
group identity is to one’s own identity, the more a desire for positive self-esteem and
meaning will lead them to venerate the in-group. Second, one must observe threat levels
to determine the dynamics of competition. Competition will produce out-group
derogation in service of protecting the in-group. Authoritarianism mediates these two
propensities. The extremes in both considerations are exactly what one observes in
American politics. Partisan loyalties and high stakes are present in the struggle to win
office and the spoils associated therewith.
An analysis of political identities through authoritarianism must begin with the
mainspring of political conflict: parties. The contemporary Democratic and Republican
Parties exist as two fundamentally distinct ideological entities (Grossman & Hopkins
2015; McCarty et al. 2006; Ura & Ellis 2012). This distinction goes beyond the political
realm. The party label increasingly contributes to a social identity (Bafumi & Shapiro
2009, 3; Green et al. 2002; Mason 2018). The social dimension produces affective
partisanship. It makes the traditional conception of a left-right ideological continuum
increasingly unintelligible for understanding mass partisanship (Sartwell 2014; Ura &
Ellis 2012, 283). A more meaningful way to decipher partisanship is to examine the
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extent to which followers internalize the collective grievances of politicized social groups
(Bawn et al. 2012; Huddy 2018, 7). This focus pushes one to examine an individual’s
membership in a group along with that group’s symbolic culture relating to its social
identity (Ellis & Stimson 2012). Consequently, one must redefine extremism or
polarization when positive views of the in-group sharply diverge from views of outgroups.
Partisanship is one of the most potent social identities in contemporary America
(Huddy et al. 2015, 3). It is easy to foresee political parties creating a social identity
within the focus of psychological theories, but one should not overlook the point. Mass
political parties are especially potent to defining one’s sense of identity as basic values
and attitudes toward social groups tend to be primed by political conflict (Tesler 2015).
Parties are always selling their brand to attract public support. Political parties must
obtain a plurality of voters in an election. As a result, leaders stake positions to attract and
maintain a base (Aldrich 2011). Parties constantly attempt to expand conflict, and alter
the calculus in any given political struggle to achieve a majority (Schattschneider 1960).
The raison d’être of political parties is to convince citizens that the party’s struggle is the
individual’s struggle and vice-versa. As Achens and Bartels succinctly note:
[Political parties] construct a conceptual viewpoint by which its voters can
make sense of the political world. Sympathetic newspapers, magazines,
websites, and television channels convey the framework to partisans. That
framework identifies friends and enemies, it supplies talking points, and it
tells people what to think and what to believe (2016, 268).
The characteristics of political struggle lend themselves to social identity
formation. First, political parties are constantly in competition. This aspect is crucial for
inculcating a requisite sense of shared reality and collective fate. Competition crystalizes
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the boundaries between groups so that members have a vivid, even lurid, understanding
of what it means to be a prototypical Democrat or Republican. One acts like a partisan
even if one does not like the parties (Abramowitz & Webster 2018). The scope of issues
in political conflict and the distance between parties pushes so-called independents to
associate with one party as fence-straddling becomes less feasible (Iyengar & Westwood
2015, 7). The atmosphere of competition makes citizens more likely to support party
positions, especially on important issues (Druckman et al. 2013, 59).
Parties offer a positive identity through association. Competition reinforces this
association by defining one’s identity and stance on issues through opposition (Dilliplane
2014). Goren and colleagues conclude that cues from the opposing party are slightly
more likely to influence a voter’s position on an issue than overtures from the voter’s
own party (2009, 805). This motivation for differentiation gives credence to the position
that positive affect toward in-groups creates a need to disassociate from other groups
through negative self-identification. Even when a political party fails to win an election,
strong supporters recommit to partisanship and leaders (Gomez et al. 2019).
Homogeneity is important to partisans so much so that they additionally conform their
beliefs to the expected position that they anticipate others in the group to hold (Sinclair
2012).
Partisans are remarkably predisposed to the conformist tendencies of intergroup
competition. The mass electorate provides a telling example. The majority of citizens in
the electorate have sorted so that they align their ideological political stances with their
partisan affiliation (Levendusky 2009). Yet, the process of sorting only explains part of
the dynamic of modern partisan conflict. The typical voter in the electorate has
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difficulties thinking in ideological terms. However, they are adept at using party
identification and elite cues as a heuristic to arrive at their political stances (Goren 2013).
These heuristics inculcate strong support for one’s party as the parties themselves are
ideologically distinct. The follow-the-leader approach with two diametric parties makes
politics exceptionally competitive. Paradoxically, most voters do not vary significantly
on staking issue positions (Abrams et al. 2009). Around 60 percent of voters hold liberal
positions, yet half of those voters misidentify as conservative (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 88).
These mismatched voters self-identify as conservative based on their Republican Party
association despite their liberal ideological stances and material self-interest. The social
bonds associated with symbolic attachments outweigh programmatic considers. The
ultimate irony is that group affiliation makes voters unable or unaware to seek civil
agreement despite the extensive overlap in policy preferences (Mason 2018, 21).
The reason for the oversized influence of opposing partisans on belief formation
emphasizes the idea of uncertainty reduction. Individuals harbor ideas of who other
members of the in-group are. A set of common causes or connected attributes link them
(Jenkins 1996, 23). Individuals assume that members of the in-group resemble them and
how they think (Brown 1995, 54; Theodoridis 2017, 1256). This assumption that others
share the prototype of the group reduces uncertainty about associating with them (Hogg
2014, 339). It allays fears that one’s co-partisan will espouse dissonant positions
(Johnston 2018, 222). The tendency to think in terms of group identity increases the more
someone identifies with the group identity. Partisan identities are central to offering
epistemological certainty in most aspects of life because partisan competition has
expanded to include more a greater number of non-political matters.
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The presence of competition never wanes in politics due to the nature and number
of everyday partisan squabbles. Political actors are always rallying their followers. The
obvious place for competition on display is during elections (Conover & Miller 2015).
Candidates and allied elites continually present their platform to voters. These platforms
serve as an idealized vision of the party’s governing philosophy and a policy roadmap if
the party wins. Political parties tend to seek prototypical members of the party and allied
social groups to run in elections to assure voters of the party’s dedication to their causes
(Bawn et al. 2012). This process informs voters of positions with which to associate and
disassociate. Partisans view themselves as moderate, and view their opponents as extreme
(Abramowitz & Webster 2018, 626). This perception fosters the incorrect belief that they
are farther apart on issues than in actually (Mason 2015). As a result, the boundaries
become firm and often unbridgeable absent cues from elites. The sense of
irreconcilability depletes trust in the intentions of the other side, and elicits negative
affect like disgust, aversion, or anger.
Moreover, partisan bickering continues after elections end even if the intensity
subsides. The struggle migrates toward the legislative process where elected officials
battle over policy change. Policy is the prize of politics (Hacker & Pierson 2014).
However, a voting majority is no guarantee of a legislative majority. The federal and state
legislatures are designed with a number of choke points to prevent unpopular policies
from becoming law (Robertson 2018). Elected officials exploit every choke point in an
attempt to veto policies. Ideologically divergent parties in a state of parity amplify the
intransigence. The Democratic and Republican Parties compete at nearly equal strength.
Neither party maintains hegemony in power. Parties adopt a campaign mentality in office
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without either side able to enforce its will on the other (Lee 2016). The competition
dissuades compromise to avoid handing one’s opponent a policy victory, and thus a
potential electoral defeat for one’s own side. One expects identity entrenchment in a
constant state of close competition. Indeed, contemporary elected officials are much more
likely to stick to their principles than compromise (Gutmann & Thompson 2012). The
sharply contrasted stances of both parties allow citizens to clearly register where each
party stands (Druckman et al. 2013; Levendusky 2009).
News media enhances the perception of competition. Standard news outlets are
biased in favor of what is new. They are systemically disposed to follow and break new
stories without much attention given to older stories afterward (Berry & Sobieraj 2014).
Media reporters tend to cover political struggles like a sportscaster covers a horse race
(Ladd 2013, 110). The news is framed through this individualistic and episodic lens to
capture the limited attention of citizen consumers. They bias against a holistic approach
to covering pressing social and political problems. In this way, the news rarely presents a
comprehensive understanding of its coverage. The “drive-by” media leaves viewers
technically informed of the minutia in daily events. Yet, it never leaves viewers truly
educated. This type of political coverage heightens anxiety and uncertainty in viewers as
if they really were watching a sports match rather than the steady development of tectonic
social forces (Berry & Sobieraj 2014, 99).
Partisan media accentuates this bias. They attempt to capture the limited attention
of viewers by increasing the perception of outrage (Berry & Sobieraj 2014). Members of
a group are sensitive to actions that violate group norms, values, manners, and morality
(Huddy 2018, 6). Consequently, partisan media highlights or manufactures the most
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scandalous actions and behaviors of opposing partisans. This type of media feeds the
perception that partisans are under constant, perhaps existential, threat. Opposing
partisans are seen as enemies who want to destroy the principles upon which America
stands (i.e. the in-party’s principles). The spread of this narrative is aided by the fact that
the two parties have two fundamentally incompatible ideologies for organizing society
(Grossman & Hopkins 2015, 120). This media keeps the most extreme members of each
party constantly alert and polarized in their positions (Levendusky 2013). They
extinguish trust in the motives of their competitors (Ladd 2013). Partisan media promotes
fear in its viewers with regard to the outcome of political events. In return, they provide
reassurance and validation in self-constructed echo chambers (Berry & Sobieraj 2014,
140). Followers believe that only their partisan news media has the “true” and “correct”
story that has not been warped, spun, or twisted by other media outlets.
Consequently, news media promotes the entitativity of political social identities.
Viewers are able to self-select their preferred programs (Holbert et al. 2010; Iyengar et
al. 2017). Viewers choose providers who allow allied elites to offer policy positions and
other cues to the public. Elites are able to identify public problems and solutions in
frames that activate and reinforce partisan identities (Dilliplane 2014). The cheerleading
for one’s team in the news boosts one’s enthusiasm for the party (Marcus et al. 2000).
However, the combative presentation of partisan news saps trust in opposing partisans
and independent institutions (Ladd 2013). The lack of trust in unfamiliar sources reduces
the chance that a partisan will defect from the party, even in the face of otherwise
credible arguments (Druckman et al. 2013). The convergence of both positive and
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negative bias in confirming prejudices reduces any cross-cutting pressures to think
outside the terms of the party.
Social polarization augments the strength of politicized identities. Scholars
recognize that people have multiple social identities in conjunction with their political
identity. The causal trend is that social identities reinforce partisan identities (Mason &
Wronski 2018, 260). Typically, group identities attach individuals to political parties
(Greene 2004, 137). A revisionist theory of parties even claims that parties largely exist
as bundles of social and economic groups uniting to achieve policy victories (Bawn et al.
2012). In this inference pattern, one finds negotiations between party leaders, constituent
groups, and voters over how to compete in politics (Schlozman 2015). Intermediate,
constituent groups act as a conduit between voters and parties. Groups attach their
members to political parties to have their collective grievances registered (Baylor 2018).
These political demands serve to operationalize the lofty principles on which the group
stands. In return, groups take the broader platform of the party to voters (Schattschneider
1960, 52-53). The result is a symbiotic relationship between the partisan identity and the
social identity that attaches members of the public to political parties and, subsequently,
government policymaking.
The process of party-group coalition building has produced an enduring
arrangement in modern politics. Groups and voters have sorted into their respective
ideological camps (Levendusky 2009). Republicans are the coalition of the whole; that is,
they represent Christianity and traditional whiteness. On the other hand, Democrats
represent the coalition of the other. They represent the minority groups who cannot
broadly be considered straight, white men (Grossman & Hopkins 2015; Iyengar &
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Krupenkin 2018). Increasingly, these prototypes are permanent. These social identities
act as gatekeepers of party ideology. Parties have collapsed into the ideological space
maintained by activists (Noel 2013). The alignment of various social and political
identities into one congruent identity amplifies the effects of social identity and
intergroup behavior. The social-party identity nexus is powerful enough to alter deeply
held beliefs on issues such as abortion (Levendusky 2009). Indeed, it is even capable of
altering subordinate social identities to align with the prototypical image of the social
group in the partisan coalition in certain circumstances (Egan 2019). One will elaborate
on this development in Chapter 3.
This implication of the social aspect of politics captures the essence of modern
partisanship. Politics generates more heat than light. Partisans embrace their party
identity (Green et al. 2002). Simultaneously, they loathe opposing partisans. Iyengar and
Westwood conclude that partisan animus has no countervailing force in society. If
anything, elites promote dislike and prejudice as appropriate and commendable (2015).
Partisans try to segregate themselves from opposing partisans instead of engaging them
(Lelkes & Westwood 2017). Partisans do not want their children to marry individuals
from the other political party (Iyengar et al. 2012). During elections, the rivalry between
parties pushes partisans beyond resentment and toward hostility in extreme cases
(Conover & Miller 2015). Relations between Democratic and Republican partisans have
radically deteriorated over the last 40 years (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). According to
Johnston:
[In] the twenty-first century [politics] seems more vitriolic than in the
past: Partisans are divided by things that are easy to conceptualize,
emotionally evocative, and which underpin one’s broader lifestyle choices,
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all of which increases the perceived social distance of one’s opponents and
promotes bias against them (2018, 220)
The spirited nature of intergroup competition based on social identity demands
that one view partisanship through the structure of authoritarianism. Past studies have
shown that authoritarians and non-authoritarians are increasingly sorting between the
parties (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Within the parties, authoritarians are additionally
becoming partisan warriors (Luttig 2017). Increasingly, however, the structure of
political contests entrenches partisan social identities across the authoritarian spectrum.
Party affiliation is a meaningful, entitative identity with purchase in non-political
environments. The consequentiality of partisanship to social relations influences how
partisans interact with opposing partisans and each other (Egan 2019; Iyengar &
Westwood 2015). It is therefore a powerful identity for authoritarian dispositions to use
to navigate the world. Even individuals who are not authoritarian are pressured to act like
authoritarians within the current structure of partisan conflict. Competition heightens
threat, which turns partisanship into more of a sports match than a group of investors
choosing which stocks in which to invest.
Authoritarianism is ideal to explain to partisanship as scholars increasingly adapt
insights from psychology to understand politics. The primacy of spatial models and
rational choice theory to explain mass partisanship is waning in the contemporary
literature. It is no longer tenable to infer voters standing outside each party rationally
comparing the merits of each in a running tally. They are attached to parties through
identity formation. The citizen is no longer sanitized of social allegiances in this regard.
Scholars have tried to revitalize the rationalist approach in the face of strong, personal
attachments to a partisan label, though. However, the spatial view is better suited to
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studying elites and legislative behavior (Aldrich 2011, Hart 2016; McCarty et al. 1997).
The limited number of players and a narrow set of highly beneficial goals coalesce to
make rational expectations more predictive of elite behavior than the interests of a
diverse citizenry (Mayhew 1974).
The main approach for these scholars of mass partisanship is now to integrate
rational choice into a model of social competition (Abramowitz & Webster 2017;
Abramowitz & Webster 2018; Highton & Kam 2011). This interpretation of a
rationalizing voter will yield benefits for the study of partisanship through social identity
theory. Huddy recognizes that individuals vary with regard to their attachment to
identities (2002; 2018). It is hypothesized that authoritarianism plays an underlying role
in identity politics. This variance allows other consideration like issue positions and
economic standing to further broaden the collective understanding of partisanship (Goren
& Chen 2016). For this present inquiry, the social dimension takes precedence in the
partisanship of voters. This follows the trend in the literature to place politics in the social
context of the individual voter (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009). Economic considerations are
important (Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Bartels 2008; Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000).
However, social conflict changes the bases of economic consideration to secondary,
derivative, or tangential through the prism of group considerations (Johnston 2018, 235).
In light of the shift of theoretical perspectives in vogue, scholars have recently
begun bridging the two literatures on partisanship and authoritarianism (Johnston 2018;
Luttig 2017). The opportunity window has opened in the last decade to incorporate
authoritarian models with partisan identities. Scholars had to expand their thinking
beyond rational choice perspectives to allow psychological approaches to mass politics to
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guide research, and the dynamic model of authoritarianism had to develop. The
connection between authoritarianism and partisanship is made possible through the focus
on identity. The milieu for these two concepts is the individual desire for epistemological
certainty within a cohesive community. This cognitive approach underlies a broader
understanding between the two concepts. It marries psychological approaches to
understand political behavior.
The personal nature of political competition allows one to draw connections
between authoritarianism and modern partisanship. Political parties are highly entitative
groups in competition for real policy prizes and non-tangible benefits like pride in
winning (Conover & Miller 2015). Each party has developed a distinct ideology, and
electoral forces interact to promote ideological purity (Noel 2013). One would expect that
authoritarianism thus structure political conflict in the party system, as a result. Political
parties have the requisite characteristics to inculcate strong identities in followers. Their
label is visible and meaningful to citizens. The division between governing and
campaigning has largely vanished, so individuals have plenty of opportunities to signal
their partisanship. Critically, each party has a narrative about reality through ideology.
They identify what issues should matter to the voter based on their unique epistemology
(Huddy 2018). Conjointly, they offer a platform to redress collective grievances. Partisan
media helps to maintain the bubble of reality in which party members reside (Berry &
Sobieraj 2014, 99). The alarmist trend in media reporting ensures that individuals with a
high need for certainty keep returning to cheer on their team (Lavine et al. 1999; Lavine
et al. 2005). In sum, political parties form a robust identity within which several
associated social identities can nest. This consonance of identities makes the political
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identity even more central to a partisan’s sense of self. Authoritarianism influences the
internalization of identities. The consequences of this influence will cascade into political
decision-making.
In sum, this section dissected the concept of authoritarianism as it has developed.
It identified a model to account for the cognitive processes that make individuals
predisposed to authoritarianism. The same processes involving social identity allow one
to understand the contours of modern partisanship through the lens of authoritarianism.
The dynamics of political competition make each party identity particularly salient
among other identities in society as government policy has expanded to affect nearly
every aspect of life. This section laid the foundation to deepen the connection between
partisanship and authoritarianism through the lens of social identity theory.
On this note, it is useful to present descriptive statistics to give an understanding
of the nature of authoritarianism in contemporary politics. The tables below investigate
the distribution of authoritarianism in white Americans by sex and party. The tables are
arrayed in such a way to offer a comprehensive view of authoritarianism in this
population. Starting broadly, one can infer that there are more women than men and also
more Republicans than Democrats. A remarkable feature of all of the tables is the near
even distribution of authoritarian types among men and women. The percentages for each
box in the columns for men and women hardly deviated from the percentage in the row
total. Table 1 exemplifies this trend. The distribution of authoritarian types among men
and women is nearly uniform. The greatest deviation from the row total may only be two
percentage point. Moreover, one observes that there are more non-authoritarian types
than authoritarian types. Non-authoritarians and weak authoritarians account for 66
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percent of respondents both overall and for men and women individually. True
authoritarians are not numerous. Their limited number underscores their outsized
influence on modern partisanship.
Table 1: Authoritarianism among Men and Women in White Americans
Men
Women
Total
Non-Authoritarian
467
520
987
(34.11)
(34.17)
(34.14)
Weak Authoritarian
308
329
637
(22.50)
(21.62)
(22.03)
Somewhat Authoritarian
354
430
784
(25.86)
(28.25)
(27.12)
Authoritarian
240
243
483
(17.53)
(15.97)
(16.71)
Total
1,369
1,522
2,891
(100)
(100)
(100)
Source: 2016 American National Election Survey
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses

The breakdown of authoritarians among men and women in the Democratic and
Republican Party in Tables 2 and 3 respectively adds nuance to the picture painted in
Table 1. The spread of authoritarian types among men and women are again remarkably
symmetric between men and women in both parties. There is no discernable imbalance
between the sexes when controlling for party affiliation. The most prominent difference
is the spread of authoritarian types between parties. Non-authoritarians account for half
of the Democratic Party while they are less than a quarter of the Republican Party. This
compositional statistic validates Hetherington and Weiler’s observation that
authoritarians are increasingly sorting into the GOP (2009). Non-authoritarians are
increasingly finding a home in the Democratic Party in addition to authoritarian types
finding a home in the Republican Party. The Republican Party is not completely
comprised of authoritarians. The Republican Party is split in half by authoritarian and
non-authoritarian types. Each type is nearly evenly distributed. Meanwhile, only one in
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ten Democrats are true authoritarians. It is the Democratic Party which is heavily skewed
in their composition.
Table 2: Authoritarianism among White Men and Women in the Democratic
Party
Men
Women
Total
Non-Authoritarian
249
323
572
(50.71)
(47.36)
(48.76)
Weak Authoritarian
98
143
241
(19.96)
(20.97)
(20.55)
Somewhat Authoritarian
92
136
228
(18.74)
(19.94)
(19.44)
Authoritarian
52
80
132
(10.59)
(11.73)
(11.25)
Total
491
682
1,173
(100)
(100)
(100)
Source: 2016 American National Election Survey
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses

Table 3: Authoritarianism among White Men and Women in the Republican
Party
Men
Women
Total
Non-Authoritarian
161
150
311
(22.80)
(23.26)
(23.02)
Weak Authoritarian
180
144
324
(25.50)
(22.33)
(23.93)
Somewhat Authoritarian
218
228
446
(30.88)
(35.35)
(33.01)
Authoritarian
147
123
270
(20.82)
(19.07)
(19.99)
Totals
706
645
1,351
(100)
(100)
(100)
Source: 2016 American National Election Survey
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses

It is prudent to examine the spread of sex by party affiliation for the next chapters.
Table 4 documents the distribution of men and women in the Democratic and Republican
Party without controlling for authoritarian dispositions. The most striking fact is the
overall sex imbalance in favor of women. There are nearly five percentage points more
women than men in the survey. This general imbalance reflects in the distribution of sex
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by party affiliation. Whereas men are not a majority of the population, they are a majority
in the Republican Party. The sex balance skews in favor of men, but it is nowhere near as
large as the sex imbalance in the Democratic Party. Democrats are overwhelmingly
women. There is a 15-percentage point spread between men and women in the
Democratic Party. Circumstantially, these statistics portray the Democratic Party as the
party of women and non-authoritarian. To a much lesser degree, they portray Republican
Party as the party of men and authoritarians. This information will be useful in the next
section.

Men
Women
Total

Table 4: White Men and Women by Party Affiliation
Democratic
Republican
579
818
(42.76)
(51.90)
775
758
(57.24)
48.10
1,354
1,576
(100)
(100)

Total
1,397
(47.68)
1,533
(52.32)
2,930
(100)

Source: 2016 American National Election Survey
Percentages are listed in parentheses

In the next chapter, this inquiry will advance to demonstrate the importance of
gender with regard to partisanship and authoritarianism alike. Gender is an organizing
principle in the private lives of individuals, and a political divisive issue in the public
arena. Its potency and reach as an identity interact with authoritarianism to condition
authoritarian preferences for social arrangements. This inquiry has taken the first step to
test this proposed interaction by developing the theoretical contours of authoritarianism.
The discussion of modern partisanship presented evidence to substantiate the claim that
one should view politics through the lens of authoritarianism and social identity. This
evidence will be supplemented and substantiated in a later section on the development of
polarization where it is shown that elites have sorted on issues of gender and authoritarian
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postures. Elite polarization has produced mass affective partisanship based on the
increased currency of political identities as social identities. In turn, this point reinforces
the claim that authoritarianism structures modern partisanship. One must first introduce
the literature on gender identity to expound its relation to authoritarianism in the realm of
partisan politics.
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Chapter 3: Gender and American Politics
The concept of authoritarianism has influenced seven decades of academic
research. It is not the only classic to influence this inquiry. One year prior to the
publication of the Authoritarian Personality, Simone de Beauvoir published her opus on
gender, the Second Sex. The instant classic systematically unmasked the impoverished
nature of the female condition throughout history. It addressed the origins and
continuation of female oppression and inequality. De Beauvoir traced how the customs
and upbringing of individuals engender ideas about manliness and femininity (1989). She
sought to undermine the longstanding myth about the sexes throughout history: that the
differences in and the division between the sexes were wholly natural. Those claims
buttressed an essentialist argument for keeping women inferior to men. Her efforts
highlighted the reflexive attempts to make women out of women. The work is itself
credited as the opening salvo for post-war feminism, and as the foundation for gender
analyses in the following decades.
At first glance, an onlooker would not discern a link between the two seminal
pieces. The Authoritarian Personality is a constant attempt to develop a method to test
for fascist personalities. However, the Second Sex originates in the same philosophical
endowment as authoritarianism. Both draw on the same ideas of being and becoming
from philosophers. The novelty of De Beauvoir’s work is two-fold. She applied the
concept of gender to existentialism in order to bring existentialism to bear on the gender
constructs that ensnare each sex. She highlighted how society restrains individual
autonomy by assigning characteristics to each sex. In this way, De Beauvoir’s philosophy
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sought to remove barriers to authenticity as Adorno and his colleagues strove to
understand individual endorsement of conformity.
The legacy of De Beauvoir and Adorno explicitly intertwine to make this inquiry
imaginable. The central dilemma for humanity concerns the tradeoff between individual
freedom and social compliance. Gender, as a set of cultural expectations, and
authoritarianism, as a psychological process, both alter an individual’s position toward
autonomy. The potency of these variables is magnified in political contexts. The structure
of American partisanship links gender and authoritarianism in a heretofore unexplored
manner as they both impact behavior. However, no one has yet to purposefully explore
the relation between the two concepts in these terms. In short, it is hypothesized that the
cultural constructs of gender influence preferences differently for men and women given
one’s propensity for authoritarianism. This concept is not novel once all the pieces are in
places to hypothesize connections; however surprisingly, the link between gender and
authoritarianism remains underexplored.
Previous attempts have grazed the surface. Two studies include efforts to analyze
perceptions of gender roles among authoritarians in relation to abortion and feminism
(Sarup 1976; Duncan et al. 1997). However, they assume that sex has no influence on
position-taking. Additionally, they were based on a faulty operationalization of
authoritarianism. Brandt explores gender gaps in authoritarian behavior in societies of
varying degrees of gender equality (2012). His theorizing is closer to that of this inquiry,
but his methodology is based on the RWA scale. Thus, it is not a study of
authoritarianism either despite his focus on differences of opinion between the sexes on
issues of gender. Only one study has investigated if gender interacts with
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authoritarianism to structure preferences differently for men and women. In a promising
sign, Lizotte concludes that gender moderates gun control preferences for male and
female across the authoritarian spectrum (2017, 386). This limited example provides
credence that gender interacts with authoritarianism to influence political positions.
The central thesis for this inquiry is that gender identity modulates political
preferences differently for men and women based on authoritarianism dispositions. The
internal psychological mechanisms in authoritarianism, which affects the desire to
conform, should be present in both sexes equally. Indeed, the sexes are roughly equally
distributed along the authoritarian spectrum. However, authoritarianism is an interactive
process with one’s environment, and thus offers a pathway for environmental influences
like gender to impact an individual’s preferences. The root of this relation is found in the
politicized grievances of gender identity for men and women. The sexes have unique
political interests due to socialization, and these interests lead to gender gaps. One can
understand these gender gaps as the result of decades of political development. This
process has increased the potency of social identities with regard to partisanship. It is
argued authoritarianism underlies social identity politics (Luttig 2017, 387). Thus, the
effect of gender will moderate political preferences between men and women of the same
authoritarian disposition (Lizotte 2019). While individuals internalize gender at the
personal level, partisan affiliation now also carries gendered connotation. Therefore, the
relation of gender to authoritarianism for each sex is multifaceted in the milieu of
partisanship. To comprehend the full relation, one will first identify gender and its role in
political preference formation exclusively in this chapter. In the next chapter, one will
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situate the relation of gender and authoritarianism in light of the macroscopic
developments of polarization.
This portion of the inquiry embarks in light of a relatively poor integration of
gender in the political science literature. One believes that a reason for the neglect of
gender in authoritarian studies is due to an overall particularized focus of gender in the
literature. It is hard to believe that the topic of gender is not more central to topics of
political analyses after decades of effort (Ritter 2008). The atomistic focus on gender has
produced a narrow view of its relation to other trends. Researchers choose to produce
segmented studies of gender rather holistic accounts. This tendency persists despite the
energies devoted to emphasizing gender in relation to social behavior. An analysis of
gender is robust if it contextualizes the interplay of psychological processes with
environmental factors in historical space (Bos & Schneider 2019, 173; Burns 2008, 50).
Robust treatises matter, especially in light of the fundamental importance and relevance
of gender to everyday life (Shapiro 2003; Waylen 2012).
The study of authoritarianism through the perspective of gender addresses
outstanding issues in the literature on gender studies. Authoritarianism is a psychological
process. Therefore, it provides a means to explain variations in preferences in and
between each sex. It allows one the novel chance to understand the relation of gender
identity with authoritarianism in political terms. Conversely, modern politics conduces
authoritarian conflict (Cizmar et al. 2014; Johnston 2018). It promotes political contests
over questions of identity, which are evocative and accessible to lay citizens. The
evolution of political institutions accounts for the encouragement of the authoritarian
structure of politics, and also the existences of gender gaps within it. Therewith, one
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includes a more complete set of actors, institutions, and behavior to comprehend
gendered behavior (Celis et al. 2013). The inclusion of authoritarianism provides an
opportunity to advance the literature in this way. Its application is one way to advance the
diffuse literatures into a more cogent narrative.
This narrative necessarily requires a definition of gender. Sex distinctions lie at
the root to understand gender. Sex is the most basic category for identity. Sex distinctions
have provided for differentiation in every culture and throughout history. The cultural
behaviors associated with sex are deemed gender. One may not immediately recognize
the significance of gender as most instances of everyday gendered behavior go unnoticed.
Gender is described as the “air we breathe” (Deaux & LaFrance 1998, 778). It exists most
of the time without one aware of its presence. It is likened to a social performance; an act
in which everyone participates (Butler 1988, 521-522). However, gender tends to be
more of an “[un]organized and unself-conscious unity” than a “self-consciously, mutually
acknowledging collective with a self-conscious purpose” (Young 1994, 724). Individuals
absorb gender notions, and follow their prescriptions like second nature. This fact makes
gender an omnipresent variable.
One’s recognition of one’s own biological sex is contingent to one’s construction
of gender identity (Eckes & Trautner 2000). However, one should not imply that gender
is uniform in its construction in everyone’s life despite its constant presence. Whereas sex
is biological, gender is cultural in nature. It is the cultural characteristics attached to one’s
sex that creates gender identifiers; thus, the production of gender always varies (Huddy et
al. 2008, 32). One describes gender as being constructed for this reason. One must
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conscientiously take steps to avoid conflating the two variables, or using them
interchangeably (Hatemi et al. 2012).
Sex is unique as a category of differentiation. The only other distinction that
transcends all societies and throughout time is age. All other categories like race or class
are arbitrary types (McDonald et al. 2011). However, gender is not merely a standalone
category due to its cultural nature. Gender suffuses other categories of identities. This
point is especially true with regard to salient identities like race. An analysis of gender
and authoritarianism beyond white Americans, if possible, would yield different results.
Race and gender interact in their effect on self-understanding. The choice to examine
whiteness and gender has consequences, as a result. White Americans predominantly
occupy the apex of the institutions of civil society (Pérez & Hetherington 2014). The
forms of the racial caste system in the United States have historically privileged whites
above other racial categories despite the leveling norms of egalitarianism. This social
differentiation reflects in self-perception and behavior. Whiteness and sex conflate to
modify interests for individuals who occupy both categories, as a result.
Moreover, gender is not an individual trait like sex. Researchers in the United
States are criticized for failing to capture the broader social context, and study gender in
the paradigm of individualistic terms instead (Deaux & LaFrance 1998). The cultural
aspect of gender makes gender a mass phenomenon. Gender distinctions vary in the
aggregate, across time, and in applicability on the social level as well as on the individual
level (Burns 2008). At times and in particular moments, though, characteristics of gender
appear to carry universal applicability. This illusion makes gender appear innate. The
problem that one risks is taking cultural differences as the result of biological or
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psychological differences (Eagly & Wood 2012, 459). This error essentializes gender.
Conversely, one can also risk misattributing biological differences in behavior to gender.
It is therefore imperative to scrutinize discussions of gendered behavior to avoid
committing either type of mistake. A thorough dissection of the concept will prevent
confusion for political analyses.
The sides in the debate all recognize that biology and sociology influence the
construction of gender (Eagly & Woods 2012; Lizotte 2017, 53; Sidanius & Kirzban
2003). One must therefore endeavor to understand how sex distinctions manifest to affect
behavior for this inquiry. The literature is particularly fissured on this topic as different
approaches highlight the side of biology or sociology (Hatemi et al. 2012; Wood & Eagly
1999). Sex distinctions affect individuals innately as biology influences behavior
(Brizendine 2006, 2010; Benenson & Markovitz 2014). The cultural expectations of each
sex influence individuals exogenously through socialization. These two routes lead to
different understandings of behavior, which generates contention. Only the latter option
is feasible for theoretical and experimental reason, though. One must necessarily
understand gender as a cultural influence that affects preferences after core psychological
processes, not in conjunction with them as a biological reading of political behavior
implies.
One must focus on approaching gender as an exogenous trait. This understanding
of gender as the property of a group or structure offers a viable path forward for the
scientific inquiry of social relations (Ritter 2008, 12). The bases of culture influence
behavior by socializing individuals for the roles that others expect them to perform. One
acknowledges gender, therefore, as a reflection of the valuation of traits for men and
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women in interaction with other individuals in one’s environment (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan
2009, 485). These ideas are captured in the social role model (Bos & Schneider 2019;
Wood & Eagly 1999). Individuals are socialized with gender norms to fit the roles
available to them in society (Eagly & Wood 2012, 460). In this way, the cultural aspect
of gender would affect one’s authoritarian preferences in conjunction with the influence
of one’s authoritarian predisposition.
A social role perspective links gender behavior to a larger environmental context.
Social role theorists infer gender differences as the result of individual experiences with
broader socio-cultural forces. These advocates point to the presence of social constraints
and power differences resulting from structural inequalities that affect the range of
acceptable behavior available to each sex (Lizotte 2017, 55-56). Gender is constructed
and reproduced through the interplay of institutional forces bearing on individuals (Burns
2008). In turn, shared agreements of acceptable gender norms influence culture and
institutions. These lived differences modify perceptions of what is possible and desirable
to become (Celis et al. 2013). The broader cultural context alters the calculus of behavior,
and explains why men and women hold different interests. This theory of gender is
suitable for research, and is possible to operationalize. The constant presence of social
cues makes the adoption of learned gender norms a legitimate variable to study in its own
right.
The study of the cultural effect of sex through gender has ramifications. Cultural
norms arise to give a sense of expectation of self and others. These norms translate into
social roles to instruct one on how to behave for their sex. Individuals commonly view
masculine and feminine as two distinct, mutually exclusive set of traits (Bem 1981;
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Foushee et al. 1979; Winter 2010, 590). The characteristics of social dynamics inform
how members of each sex organize their private lives. The private organizing beliefs of
masculinity and femininity engender understandings of political questions when applied
to solving collective problems (Lizotte 2017; Ridgeway 2011; Winter 2016, 190).
Manifestations of political conflict likewise magnify and accentuate sex-based
distinctions (Magnussen & Maracek 2012). Gender and authoritarianism both impact
one’s appraisal of political preferences as the two concepts affect how one believes
society should be structured. The presence of gender gaps in political issues reveals that
men and women differ in their conception of the good society and the means to obtain it
(Lizotte 2017b).
Gender as an organizing belief pattern relates to authoritarianism as an organizing
belief structure. Gender myths project a set of desirable, prototypical qualities for men
and women, and thereby induces political gender gaps. One accepts as legitimate or
accidental the nature of gender identity by the forces that produce gender roles for each
sex. Consequently, individuals of similar authoritarian dispositions will vary in their
support of associated gender roles by sex, and, therefore, prescriptions of gender will
condition authoritarian preferences. The cultural influences of gender are sufficient to
make one reconsider any assumption of a parity of preferences between the sexes given
the same authoritarian predisposition. Men and women are accultured to value certain
interests over others. The ubiquitous presence of gender on its own in the construction of
an individual’s identity merits an analysis of its interaction with authoritarianism. One
will accomplish this end by analyzing the manifestations of gender in political
orientations through social role theory.
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The remainder of this chapter documents gender gaps in opinion as they exist in
contemporary politics. The aim of mapping the political context is to uncover where and
how authoritarian preferences and gender intertwine within the context of mass
partisanship. One will demonstrate that differences of opinion between sexes create
gender gaps across multiple issues. The following sections will support the claim that the
gendering of politics is sufficient to predict manifest differences of opinion for each sex
with regard to authoritarianism. One expects substantive differences on preferences along
the spectrum of authoritarianism by sex absent and present the priming of partisan
identities. However, social sorting in party membership has intensified with regard to sex
(Mason & Wronski 2018). Each party has responded to the imbalance of sex ratios
among their ranks by framing itself in accordance with or against conventional
masculinity. As a result, party affiliation carries gendered connotations, and will be
considered for its influence on gender (Winter 2010, 596).
With two avenues for gender to influence preferences, one must designate a
model to understand the sources and intensity of relevant variables in the decisionmaking process. One way gender connotations are attractive to individuals is based on
one’s authoritarian psychology. The gender prescriptions of each sex affect perspectives
on tolerance and authority. Partisanship is also gendered at the elite and mass levels. Each
variable touches individuals through identity. One resolution to order the magnitude of
influence of these variables is to adopt the casual pathway model. The logic of causal
pathway models classifies variables that touch preference formation based on their
proximity to identity. In this model, underlying psychological mechanisms like
authoritarianism and other fundamental needs are closest to the core of influence.
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Cultural variables coming from one’s environment like gender are more peripheral while
partisanship is somewhere in between (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller & Shanks 1996,
192). Gender is treated peripheral in this inquiry with other identities like whiteness
despite its influence in variables like partisanship. One will account for the multifaceted
influence of gender as it intersects these other identities (Bos & Schneider 2019;
Kaufmann 2002). Taken linearly, gender follows authoritarianism and partisanship
respectively in the production of political preferences. As a result, gender may accentuate
or conflict with the preference for authoritarian social arrangements that one’s disposition
encourages.
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Figure 1: Visualization of Casual Pathway Model of Preference Formation

One can uncover the details of this relation by examining categories of gender for
each sex to isolate its baseline effect on men and women. To this end, the inference
pattern of social role theory provides a roadmap for expounding partisan gender gaps.
Gender gaps emerge in politics because individuals are socialized to view certain
activities as masculine or feminine. The perspective contextualizes gender gaps as
reflections and representations of the categorical prototype for men and women as a
group (Winter 2016). Therefore, one places emphasis on understanding the
phenomenology of each category and its relation to other categories. The existence of
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gender gaps is the norm rather than the exception due to the unequal position of men and
women in society.
One analyzes the macroscopic forces of gender identity to understand how it
influences individual political behavior for men and women. Gender reflects the
opportunities and constraints imposed on individuals by wider social forces. Resource
disparities, discriminatory experiences, power inequities, and reactions to public policy
make gender salient, and explain why gender gaps emerge (Howell & Day 2000; Lizotte
2017; Sapiro 2003; Mettler 2010). Through the logic of intersectionality, one can further
specify relevant categorical prototype to analyze by adding identities (Bos & Schneider
2019, 173). Partisanship is a key variable in this regard with its influence on gender
norms along with whiteness. This focus creates four types of white voters with different
politics to examine: Republican men, Republican women, Democratic men, and
Democratic women. Together, one can identify individual gender differences between
categories to form a compact narrative to use in hypothesizing relations to
authoritarianism.
Gender gaps are well documented in particular instances in the literature. Political
scientists began studying these gaps at the behest of the feminist movement (Conover
1988; Gurin 1985). Consequently, gender studies are traditionally synonymous with
women’s’ studies, and the gaps are framed in the experiences of women in their own
terms (Wolbrecht et al. 2008). The most consequential divide between men and women
to interpret herein regards party affiliation as individuals turn toward public policy to
alter or preserve their conditions. Women tended to favor Republicans until the 1964
presidential election, but gradually found a home in the Democratic Party afterward
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(Cassese & Barnes 2017). Women are now consistently more Democratic than men in
voting and party identification (Kaufmann 2006, 448). Female politics evolved on a
variety of issues as they changed their partisanship and new roles in society became
available. The magnitude of movement in the direction of the partisanship of women has
generated interest into such underlying causes.
Research investigations have pinpointed two areas of political difference between
men and women as key catalysts behind the origins of the gender gap in partisan
identification. These areas of difference are categorized broadly within the boundaries of
social welfare economics and cultural issues to the extent to which they are separable.
Researchers have traditionally concluded that men and women emphasize issues of social
welfare and culture differently, especially in the construction of their ideological selfidentification (Jelen et al. 1994; Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999; Kaufmann 2002, 285).
However, recent scholarship has questioned the assumption that specific issues contribute
to any difference in ideological reasoning or revealed identification (Condon &
Wichowsky 2017, 15; Norrander & Wilcox 2008). Gender consciousness plays a role, but
gender consciousness only matters with regard to political preferences if gender matters
in the first place (Gurin 1985; Cook & Wilcox 1991). The existing gaps on issue
positions and ideological tendencies remain for reasons relating to social roles.
Social markers are attached to categories of identity whereby one can understand
gender identities through the lens of group belonging. A sociological analysis pinpoints
how these categories are salient with regard to personal identity. An analysis of the
narrative and myths of each group prototype reflect what it means to be a member of a
particular sex. These stories reflect the aspirational values, opportunities, and constraints
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a member of each sex is likely to face. They allow one to contextualize modern gender
gaps in areas of social welfare and culture politics. Admittedly, interpretations of the
categories of gender identity are just that – interpretations. The task is qualitative;
however, it is still productive. The study of the individual relations to institutions informs
one of the ways in which others perceive their interests (Béland 2009). As a result, one
can springboard into a more detailed understanding of gender differences and evaluations
in modern politics. The dichotomy between men and women offers a contrast between
narratives. Broadly, one can understand the mythology of each sex through the narratives
of decline or of rising (Stone 2012, 160). For men, the narrative is one of decline. For
women, the narrative is one of rising. The narratives reflect the changing social reality in
the lives of most citizens.
One evaluates masculinity through a narrative of decline. According to
Baumeister, men experience a greater spread of successful and unsuccessful life
outcomes, on average, than women (2010). While the apogee of society is inhabited
mostly by men, so, too, is the nadir. Overall, the median man has seen a decline in
fortunes in the context of growing inequality. The economic story of the last 50 years is
one of increasing hardship and scarcity (Kimmel 2012). Men believe a changing
economy has left them behind (Cramer 2016). The transition from an economy of
organized labor and manufacturing to an economy of service-oriented jobs and
automation has hit men without the college education especially hard (Hacker & Pierson
2010). All the while, men have coped with the loss of traditional economic power along
with the loss of unilateral political power in home and society (Carlson 2015). Women
have entered the public sphere, and have renegotiated relations in the domestic domain.
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This evolution of roles has rendered the conventional model of manhood incompatible
with most modern socio-economic lifestyles.
Furthermore, men feel adrift in a culture that they no longer unquestionably
dominate. Conventional masculinity no longer garners the same prestige. A lot of ink has
been spilled to bemoaning the loss of positive images of men in American culture. One
adduces the growth of the masculine self-help industry as evidence that men lack visible
public role models (Kimmel 2012). Popular culture appears devoid of men as paragons of
virtue. The Ward Cleaver type was replaced by Archie Bunker type: faulty men without
the admirability of a stoic comportment. These men like Homer Simpson and Peter
Griffin are depicted as lovable oafs, but still lacking. The change may reflect the way that
the average man actually is, but the commonplace is not an ideal for manhood. Ideals are
aspirational, and women now hold the values worth idealizing (Eagly & Mladinic 1994).
Women are portrayed as more praiseworthy, and implicitly superior for their congenial
nature (Baumeister 2010, 25). Feminine traits are now considered essential for corporate
and professional environments. White-collar men have adopted these feminine values,
but the majority of men in the working-class adhere to conventional masculine values and
norms (Nichols 2020).
While it is impossible to gauge in actuality the accuracy of this narrative, it
appears real in the mind of observers and commentators. It is given credence by the fact
that Trump harnessed this dour self-perception among men to bolster his longshot
campaign (Williams 2016). Men are searching for a positive self-image and esteem in a
society where conventional masculinity is considered outmoded (Baumeister 2010;
McKay & McKay 2009; Twigger 2002). The dual trends of economic and social
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dislocation amplify the distress. Many men cannot attain the ideal of breadwinner or
provider. The average, contemporary man still desires esteem. In such a situation, one
expects an individual to redefine their gender identity to make it attainable. The evidence
suggests that men are turning toward new cultural badges to signal manliness to replace
past models. For instance, the rise in gun culture is attributed to men finding a new sense
of self as protector as the provider ideal is increasingly out of reach (Carlson 2015).
Consequently, the transition from economic-based notions of manhood to identity-based
notions of manhood makes political masculinities more symbolic in nature. Collective
grievances are the predecessor to political action in social identity theory, and relevant
herein.
The new masculinities built on notions of identity face novel challenges. No one
could contest men as breadwinners as it was an economic fact to most families. However,
one can contest identity-based forms of masculinity as misguided, unnecessary, or
pernicious. Men face a dilemma as they endorse these new masculinities. Male advocates
claim that this transition to attainable identities is to build positive self-esteem. Feminists
dispute the innocence of the new male movement (Kimmel 1995). They see it as a
repackaging of past sexist and anti-egalitarian tropes. This contestation over manliness,
especially by women, leads to resentment no matter how well-intentioned (Barnett &
Rivers 2019). In this way, the push for equity and accommodation even resembles
oppression from the perspective of men (Blow 2018). Policy efforts to improve the status
of women appear injurious the status of men (Bullock & Reppond 2017; Garcia et al.
2005). Under contest, one expects men to double-down on their masculinities.
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Not all men have responded negatively to the decline of traditional masculinity.
However, the effects of masculinity in transition can intensify the salience of the
traditional male identity among men. Men persistently perceive change as a threat to
one’s livelihood, status, economic power, and privilege (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010).
The presence of women asserting the right to define masculinity likely makes the issue
relevant to otherwise apathetic men. Men, unlike women, seem hardwired to avoid
connection to traits of the other sex (Berent et al. 2016; Brizendine 2010, 19). A loss of a
sense of superiority should prompt men to seek redress politically, and hold political
views unique from women. Narratives of decline push adherents to retrench, and confront
the causes of their losses (Stone 2012). This visualization likely leads men overall
holding the same preferences favored by authoritarian types to seek preservation through
political ends. The fact that masculinity resembles authoritarian behavior likely magnifies
the relation.
On the other hand, the narrative is one of rising for women. The last 50 years has
seen a surge in the status of the average woman, overall. Waves of feminism have
propelled generations of activists to challenge the patriarchal practices of society. This
activism has removed countless legal and cultural barriers from sidelining women in
society. The economic situation has improved dramatically for female workers and
consumers (Silverstein & Sayre 2009). For example, women now outpace men in
attainment of higher education. Education is often a shorthand metric for future income.
More women are enrolling and graduating from college proportional to men. It is
estimated that women will be the majority of the educated workforce sometime in the
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2020s (Matias 2019). Therefore, the near future may see women displace men as drivers
of the economy and earners of the national income.
Female integration into the broader public domain through expanded
opportunities has remade social relations. Respectable culture has equally evolved to
support the rise of women. The perception of women contrasts with men in this regard.
Women are portrayed as exemplary, and having the values for which one should aspire. It
is not that only women hold women in high regard. Both men and women regard women
as positively. The imbalance of positive affect between the sexes may represent a
collective overcorrection to compensate for the history of female oppression. Indeed,
commentators adduce that women benefit from a broader culture that promotes this selfregard (Baumeister 2010, 81). Feminine qualities are desired and praised. For instance, a
Gallup study of 27 million employees in 195 countries found that women are preferred
leaders to men (2015, 26). The reason for this conclusion is that employees favor
superiors with people-oriented qualities, which are considered feminine. Women take a
keener interest in relationships, and are more engaged with their subordinates. These
people-oriented qualities are considered oppositional to agentic qualities, which are
associated with men and masculinity.
The gains for women in society, however, also reveals the limitations of progress.
Women still face examples of gender barriers and discrimination (Lizotte 2017, 54).
Paradoxically, women lack overall confidence in comparison to men, on average, despite
significant gains (Kay & Shipman 2014). Additionally, they feel underserved and
unaccommodated as workers and consumers (Siverstein & Sayre 2009). It is still
expected that women manage a work-home balance while leading in the domestic sphere.
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Women find that parenting has become more demanding (Miller 2018). Childcare costs
have grown in real terms. These costs are complicated by the loss of real income due to
inflation and anemic wage growth of the last decade. The growth in economic inequality
over the last four decades particularly hurts women, who still earn less on average than
men. As a result, women possess a sense of solidarity as women since they are still
uniquely affected by social inequalities (Burns et al. 2011; Howell & Day 2000). This
situation should dispose women to oppose conventional social arrangements while
supporting redistributive policies. As a result, the effect of gender on women should
counter the influence of authoritarianism depending on one’s disposition. The values of
conciliation and cooperation associated with femininity should reinforce this oppositional
nature.
These narratives highlight gender gaps with regard to social welfare and culture.
Past research corroborates this perspective. Women favor greater social services and
redistributive programs. Overall, women possess fewer economic resources than men
(Bullock & Reppond 2017). Fewer resources leave women vulnerable to economic
hardships, but it also has a chilling effect on female political mobilization. Historically,
women have had a lower level of interest, engagement and knowledge of politics (Burns
et al. 2011; O’Conner & Yanus 2009). Fewer resources and years spent outside the labor
market in motherhood help explain higher levels of support for maintaining redistribution
programs among women in areas of healthcare, housing, education, child-care, and
welfare (Huddy et al. 2008, Lizotte 2017). In contrast, redistributive programs elicit
opposition from men as they are viewed as an injury to economic and group interest
(Bullock & Reppond 2017; Garcia et al. 2005). Reminders of past injustices to promote
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female advancement prime men’s sense of gendered self-interest, and attenuate support
for equity policies as men feel women currently enjoy gender equity (Hideg & Wilson
2020).
Differences in economic views result from material self-interest, but also from a
learned personality gap due to social expectations placed on each sex. Gender informs
proper behavior and etiquette. Conventional culture instructs women to be empathetic
toward others while teaching men to be distant. Indeed, social norms have a pronounced
effect on gender differences in expressed personality traits, which manifest in partisan
distinctions (Gerber et al. 2011; Vianello et al. 2014). The greater endorsement of
egalitarian beliefs may also contribute to observed differences (Howell & Day 2000).
Eagly and Wood demonstrate that women are viewed as more communal in their
qualities: warm and nurturing. Men were viewed as having more agentic qualities such as
assertiveness and aggression (2012). Men view themselves as dissimilar from others;
whereas women find similarities (Ott-Holland et al. 2014). These internalized beliefs
matter when a person scales appropriate actions from the personal level to the societal
level.
In addition to economic policy questions, women find themselves more liberal on
cultural issues, too. While cultural issues are distinct from economic issues, similar
motivations appear to push women to liberal positions. Women tend to favor
compassionate positions on social issues (Eagly et al. 2004). They disfavor governmental
use of force (Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). Their reluctance to support the use of force
translates into opposition to initiate armed conflict (Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy et al.
2009). Women favor diplomacy instead (Nincic & Nincic 2002). In domestic contexts,
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women are less likely to support the police use of force (Halim & Stiles 2001).
Additionally, they are less likely than men to support capital punishment and harsh
punishments on criminals with a few exceptions for rapist or child abusers (Stack 2000;
Hurwitz & Smithey 1998). Wolpert and Gimpel find that women express consistently
more favorable support for gun control overall (1998). Conversely, men disfavor gun
control as it is viewed as an affront to their conception of manliness (Carlson 2015;
Lizotte 2019).
Moreover, women are more hospitable than men in regard to disadvantaged
groups. This fact likely represents solidarity from one historically disadvantaged group to
another. Thus, they express higher levels of support for gay rights overall (Herek 2002).
Additionally, this support extends to civil rights. However, women do express higher
levels of religiosity and religious fundamentalism than men in Western nations (Kelley &
DeGraaf 1997; Walter & Davie 1998). The literature does not produce satisfying
explanations for why this gap exists. One hypothesis is that women have historically been
disadvantaged relative to men. The vulnerable in society embrace religion in order to
assuage the downtrodden nature of their condition (Water & Davie 1998). Another
possibility is that the values of compassion and charity in Western religion, i.e.
Christianity, are attractive to women because they have become conventionally feminine
values.
Additionally, women express higher levels of support for adhering to
conventional moral values in another unexpected twist. This position translates into
stronger support for school prayer along with bans on pornography and drugs than men.
This culturally conservative exception to female preferences likely exists as these issues
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involve the family (Eagly et al. 2004). Therefore, the conventionally female role of
caretaker in the family acclimates women to conservative social practices, in this regard.
This point about familial expectations for women explains their deviance in supporting
harsher punishments for rapists and child abusers. Abortion differences are inconsistent
or nonexistent, though (Lizotte 2017). While women tend to be more liberal than their
male counterparts the pattern is not concrete.
The discussion to here has focused on contextualizing the categories of men and
women writ large. One constructed the narrative by examining the socio-economic forces
of gender by itself. However, the singular category of gender omits other important
identities that modify perspectives and preferences. The most important and
consequential of which is partisan identity (Sanbonmatsu 2008; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan
2009). Party affiliation radically affects one’s conception of the public good and personal
self-interest. Moreover, party affiliations influence gendered views as each party has its
own gendered image (Winter 2016). One must analyze how partisanship bisects gender in
two ways. The first is to continue with the qualitative discussion of gender in the
Democratic and Republican Parties. Secondly, one must turn to the literature on gender
gaps to examine inter- and intraparty differences in political preferences.
The inclusion of cross-cutting partisan categories is necessary to refine one’s
understanding of modern gender gaps (Lizotte 2017b; Ondercin 2017). The discussion of
the environmental forces acting on men and women was intended to merely establish a
baseline understanding of the modal man and woman. The categorical narratives feel
blockish and overly general at times because the narratives cast a wide net. One needs a
perspective to expound the categories of men and women who deviate from the group
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prototype. A partisan lens achieves this end, albeit indirectly, as a highly relevant social
identity. Political parties have gendered connotations that allow one a window through
which to study gender gaps in light of men and women who affiliate with a political party
of the opposite connotation of their sex.
Partisanship is a powerful influence with regard to gender identity. Republicans
frame themselves as manly, and Democrats frame themselves as feminine (Holman et al.
2016, 136-137). However, men do not exclusively inhabit the Republican Party and
women do not exclusive comprise the Democratic Party. Gender ratios are imbalanced in
party affiliation. The parties are not exclusively sorted with regard to sex (Sanbonmatsu
2002). Yet, each party has polarized over gender identity respectively through cultural
war politics (Ondercin 2017, 751-753). Partisan polarization and issue ownership over
matters of feminism precipitated this gap (Winter 2010, 591). Sharp ideological conflict
reinforces the gender images of each party. Consequently, women and men may
internalize partisan gender patterns in varying degrees depending on the party to which
they attach (Shapiro 2003, 651).
Prevailing partisan forces guide individuals to align their social identities in
accordance with the prototype of their party. Egan has demonstrated that individuals will
align their non-partisan social identities, including gender identity, to the salient
prototype represented in a political party (2019). One expects partisanship to influence
gender norms as it is more explicitly a core identity in causal pathway models of
preference formation (King & Matland 2003; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 2009, 486).
Partisanship and gender identity align for Democratic women and Republican men.
However, this tremendous pressure to conform is complicated by the fact that men and

DiMariano 84

women are not exclusively sorted along party lines, though. Therefore, countless voters
are cross-pressured due to partisan identities and gender, which will condition their
preferences (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Some men are Democrats. Some women are
Republican. These individuals have dissonant social identities as Republicans project
masculinity while Democrats project femininity. They are members of a party that
represent the gendered qualities attributed to the other sex. These voters potentially
complicate the relation between gender and authoritarianism. In this way, the lens of
partisanship identifies men and women whose gender preferences may deviate from the
broad narrative. One must observe their categorical interests, too (Bos & Schneider 2017;
Winter 2010, 588).
A prototypical Democratic man and Republican woman comes into view by
parsing the concepts. Democrats and Republicans stand for different principles, so one
must identify the relevance of partisanship. In terms of ideology, Democrats are liberal,
and Republicans are conservative. However, one needs a substantive understanding of
liberal and conservative beyond the symbolic meaning (Ellis & Stimson 2012). In this
regard, one marshals psychological theories. This perspective supplants the spatial
analysis of individual interest with a social identity analysis. This lens offers a more
tangible understanding of the electorate by replacing abstract ideology with politicized
group interests as the focus of observation instead (Achens & Bartels 2016, 309-310).
The culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties differs due to the extensive
nature of social sorting and elite ideological polarization. Each party has developed its
own prevailing conception of the public good in the party’s culture. The dueling visions
for America constitute the identity politics that animate the “culture wars.” Partisans
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inhabit two separate ideological universes. Unlike 50 years ago when the political elite
shared one prevailing white culture, contemporary Republicans and Democrats diverge.
The bifurcation of American politics is the story of two parties disentangling themselves
from any type of overlap (Noel 2013). The social protest movements propelled this
realignment (Baylor 2018). These movements challenged more than white men in
government. It challenged how the prevailing culture of white masculinity defined
patriotism and political acceptability (Kaufmann 2019, 296; Martinez-HoSang 2008,
288). In turn, the white male as the default national identity eroded (Theiss-Morse 2009).
The defense of and opposition to this benchmark of conventional America led to the
current political culture in each party (Abramowitz & Saunder 2006; Zingher 2014).
The defining feature of American politics in the last 30 years is elite polarization.
This sorting has affected the composition and culture of each party. One can describe
Republicans as the party of the whole while Democrats are the party of the other
(Grossman & Hopkins 2015). The collapse of the shared white-ruling elite in each party
has inspired citizens to sort along racial lines (Mason & Wronski 2015, 260; Tesler &
Sears 2010). The tight re-alignment of social identities for Republicans is important. It
affects the party’s culture and conception of the public good. Grossman and Hopkins
argue that Republicans are akin to a social movement based on notions of convention and
limited government (2015, 120). The high degree of congruence between member
identities, i.e. Whites and Evangelicals, means that Republicans play identity politics
with greater zeal and intensity than Democrats (Mason & Wronski 2018, 258).
The Republican cultural vision for America is referred to as “patriotic
correctness” (Wilson 2008). Abstract limited government ideology is itself a type of dog
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whistle for ending welfare programs to minorities and women in substantive terms
(Gilens 1999, 31). The member identities long for the days when America was “great” in
the desire for white ethno-traditionalism to be the default national identity again
(Kaufmann 2019, 8). In line with this desire, conservative men and women adhere to the
strictures of conventional binary gender identities (Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020). This
adherence to traditional gender norms generates for masculine public policy. The
overrepresentation of men in the Party reinforces the promotion of conventional
masculinity. This quality means that the Republican Party shares the traits associated
with manliness (Winter 2010).
The reality of elite polarization makes the Democratic Party the antithesis of the
Republican Party. This perception has grounding in the composition and culture of the
Democratic Party. Democrats have developed in opposition to the social composition of
the Republican Party. They represent the myriad of social groups and movements
opposed to the “whole” (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Mason & Wronski 2018). This
composition includes anything that does not fit under the broad category of a white man.
The diversity of groups includes ones based on material interest like labor unions. It also
includes ones based on post-material, identitarian lines such as the LGBT, feminist, and
civil rights movements. The resulting culture vision of non-conventional diversity is
political correctness. The culture is enforced to protect the wellbeing of the traditionally
disenfranchised populations who have attached to the Democratic Party.
Democrats face a unique challenge due to their rainbow composition. Diversity
produces distrust (Putnam 2007). It triggers a more cultural form of threat rooted in social
identity and core values (Lavine & Velez 2017, 527; Newman 2013; Sides & Citrin
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2007). Individuals are overly suspicious of the people who do not resemble them, and are
comfortable with the people who do resemble them. It is no surprise then that political
correctness polices are instituted to suppress inflammatory behavior with multiple
identities present. Liberal ideology has changed to incorporate minority groups, and
preserve interests of the wider Democratic coalition (Baylor 2018; Schickler 2016). One
purpose of ideology is to bind individuals with divergent preferences into an organization
through time (Aldrich 2011; Bawn et al. 2012; Noel 2013). The effect of ideological
change on the Party’s culture is to extend the protections of political correctness to new
groups.
Democrats require a strong prevailing culture of toleration to bind its fractious,
diverse elements into a party. The Left has to muster for collective action and to
overcome the status-quo bias. The Right does not face those inherent institutional biases
in the same way (Gourevitch 1986, 163). Democrats adopt values of conciliation,
compromise, tolerance, and cooperation to cope with these centrifugal forces. These
values are associated with conventional femininity. These values are routinely challenged
by networks of activists pushing politics toward being a no-compromise, zero-sum game
(Maskett 2016). These qualities of competition reflect a bias toward masculine qualities.
Therefore, Democrats must additionally face masculine biases inherent to political
competition. A 15-percentage point gap separates women from men on the stances that
politicians have congeniality, civility and compassion in office (Gramlich 2018). One
expects Democrats to double-down on civility to preserve its coalition, which will have
extra appeal to the women who engage in its politics. The reality of political forces
disposes Democrats to be default party for conventionally femininity.
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If men and Republicans are from Mars while women and Democrats are from
Venus, what should one make of Republican women and Democratic men? These two
groups face cross-pressuring forces on their identity. Gender identity in these two cases
nuances political identity. However, partisan identification is superior over an
individual’s other social identities (Egan 2019). Partisanship has rank over environmental
identities in casual pathway models, too. Therefore, gender identity should bend in the
direction of the party’s gendered images associated with its sex (Lizotte 2019; Prusaczyk
& Hodson 2020). These two incongruent categories are often overlooked as a matter of
analysis. As a result, one is left to speculate about the gendered politics of a large
percentage of men and women. In this case, however, the prototype for each party with
regard to gender revolves around each party’s respective treatment of feminism (Winter
2010). Men in the Democratic Party should hue toward feminine values in political
approaches while women in the Republican Party should hue toward masculine values.
The growing importance of gender analysis to political science has recently
prompted researchers to study these incongruent categories. The election of Donald
Trump with support from a majority of white women has served as the catalyst for closer
academic scrutiny. The methodology of intersectionality has also opened the conceptual
space to analyze intra-sex differences as well as intersex differences (Barnes & Cassese
2017; Bos & Schneider 2019, 173). Republican women distance themselves from the
feminist label (Schaffner et al. 2018). Interestingly, they have co-opted feminist rhetoric
and concepts for non-feminist goals (Deckman 2016). Republican women use the
language of feminism to serve the interests of patriarchic gender roles and norms. In this
way, they avoid the egalitarian nature of feminism. They endorse benevolent sexism, and
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support male patterns of group dominance (Radke et al. 2018). They adhere more
strongly to gender binaries than conservative men, and the instruction of conventional
roles (Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020).
On the other hand, Democratic men have embraced feminism. These men are
notably less studied than the other three categories. The academic focus rests on
understanding why men cling to conventional notions of masculinity, and do not often
distinguish between party affiliations among men. According to Shapiro, Democratic
men have adopted the egalitarian beliefs of feminism (2003). They do not endorse the
limited notion of manhood bequeathed to them by their forefathers. They fit the idea of
the “new man” who liberates himself from restrictive gender norms (Kimmel 2012). It is
perhaps for this reason that Democratic men do not use the rhetoric of masculinity to
support egalitarianism. Culturally, the combination of masculine means toward the ends
of feminism is an unwelcome contradiction. Democratic men’s proximity to progress,
though, makes them comfortable with the new roles for women and men in society. They
adopt a cosmopolitan approach to politics rather than an insular, nationalistic one. This
quality especially reflects affluent Democratic men where income helps to promote
egalitarianism (Ciuk et al. 2018; Nichols 2020).
Feminist men may not caricature all Democratic men, however. The view of
progressive men in the Democratic Party may overstate the case that men hew closely to
ideals of feminine values. The relevance of party composition on social polarization
between Republicans and Democrats is that white men in the Democratic Party may face
stronger cross-pressures on their identity than white women in the Republican camp.
Several Democratic men are members of the working class, and identify economically
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with the Democratic agenda (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009; Bartels 2008). In this regard, the
role of class potentially complicates the degree to which men attach to the Democratic
Party. Their gender identities may soften their support for Democratic cultural politics
(Nichols 2020). Men are known to resist association with feminine traits and objects
(Brizendine 2010, 19). Yet, high income men in the professional classes may be more
likely to practice post-material politics (Ciuk et al. 2018). Class cross-pressures may be
unique to this category in the degree to which members are conflicted between identities,
but ultimately it may be irrelevant since partisanship is the prime influencer on political
behavior.
These two groups are unique in that they face cross-pressures on their identities of
self. They remain in a situation of incongruent identities when they can sort to align their
partisanship with their sex. However, partisanship is an enduring identity that remains
mostly unchanged over one’s life (Green et al. 2002). Partisan cross-pressures
undoubtedly impact the relation between gender and authoritarian preferences among
individuals along the authoritarian spectrum. The gender of masculinity and Republicans
resemble authoritarian attributes. The support for hierarchies, force, and hostility to outgroups reinforces this overlap. On the other end, femininity and Democrats resemble the
non-authoritarian type. They support tolerance and egalitarianism for diverse ways of
life. This respect for diversity is anathema to an authoritarian.
The relation between authoritarianism and gender in men and women may differ
in strength depending on the party in question. Given the strength of partisanship over
constituent social identities, it is quite possible that Republican women resemble
Republican men in exhibiting stronger preferences for authoritarian politics since the

DiMariano 91

Republican Party is a more cohesive movement than the Democratic Party (Lizotte
2019). Likewise, Democratic men are less likely to endorse authoritarian preferences
than Republican men, but they are still more likely to support such outcomes than
Democratic women. While authoritarianism promotes strong partisan identities, it is a
conjecture how it will influence preferences in the Democratic Party where the partisan
identity and prevailing gender norms are antithetical to authoritarian preferences.
The modern partisan gender gap is significant and enduring as men and women
continue to diverge socially and politically. The politicization of gender under the Trump
presidency makes it unlikely that the polarization of gender identity will subside any time
soon (Fox & Lawless 2018). However, the emphasis on the modern gender gap is only
the first part of a complete analysis. Gender is understood as a group construct that
changes over time (Sanbonmatsu 2010). One has posited a connection between
authoritarianism and gender, yet support for the thesis has yet to be fully substantiated.
Social preferences supported by authoritarians have gendered tones insofar as
aggressiveness and intolerance are related to maleness and conciliation and diversity to
femaleness. One has linked the effects of authoritarianism to gender through partisanship,
and justified the relation through the casual pathway model. However, one must include
the element of historical development to fully comprehend the politically relevant nature
and bases of contemporary gender (Burns 2008, 50; Ritter 2008, 20). This task requires
exploring the origins of affective partisanship and the rise of social identity politics. This
historical dimension is crucial to cement the larger claim between gender gaps in
partisanship and authoritarianism as the norm due to political polarization.
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Chapter 4: Gender and Authoritarian Cleavages in Context of Elite Polarization
An historical analysis of institutions illuminates in greater detail the connections
between authoritarianism and gender for men and women as political institutions promote
polarization on these issues. To this end, it will further elaborate how authoritarianism
and a social identity like gender became robustly intertwined within partisan identity.
This entanglement means that gender should condition preferences formed by
authoritarianism beyond issues of culture due to elite polarization. Race is central to
forging this link. The political struggle over racial issues transformed party politics into
its modern tribal form by fostering party polarization. In turn, elite polarization fomented
affective mass partisanship.
Affective partisanship amplifies the effects of the gender and authoritarian
cleavages in politics. This form of partisanship functions as political conflict between
social identity. It is itself influenced by authoritarianism as an underlying psychological
mechanism (Luttig 2017). Because tribal partisanship is gendered, gender roles are
intimately intertwined with political issues through ideology given elite divergence. The
political self-interest of each sex contributed elite polarization as much as it was
influenced by it. In this way, gender paved the way for authoritarian understructure of
affective partisanship. Activists in the New Deal state linked issues of race, economic,
and culture into one dimension, and parties gradually absorbed their position (Noel
2013). Voters have sorted in reaction to this form of elite ideological polarization
(Levendusky 2009). Therefore, the authoritarian substructure of modern partisanship due
to elite polarization will necessarily produce gender gaps as the norm rather than the
exception.
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Race is the catalyst for the political development of the relation between
authoritarianism and gender in contemporary politics. Authoritarian studies are studies of
whiteness insofar as the methodology only obtains for whites (Pérez & Hetherington
2014). White interests are gendered. These factors illustrate the need to discuss white
identity politics. Studies on these matters dovetail with contemporary conversations about
the explicit role of race in public policy. Racial bias is on trial in American society
(Silverstein 2020). The current moment raises important questions about the centrality of
race in the story of American political development. Herein, one relies on racial identity
to fully understand the linkages between authoritarianism and gender identity through the
consequences of elite ideological polarization. The process of polarization reflects
institutional changes in the function and organization of parties in relation to the federal
policy state. Racialized notions of gender propelled these changes. The role of these
notions in the promulgation of authoritarianism in partisan politics underscores the claim
that authoritarianism structures gender gaps as the norm.
The literature on polarization through the lens of political development provides
the necessary backdrop to substantiate the central thesis. The exploration of polarization
in this context is crucial to understand the rise of politicized social identities. White men
and women reacted to matters of race relations differently. The male repulsion from New
Deal racial liberalism catalyzed polarization. This thesis is a synthesis of other historical
accounts. Certain studies focus on the institutional roots of polarization, but not to the
degree herein. Currently, a couple studies focus on authoritarian and polarization
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Luttig 2017). Or, they focus on gender and polarization
(Gillions et al. 2018). Moreover, the question of race is secondary and implicit in those
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analyses. No study synthesizes gender and authoritarianism together in their account for
white Americans in depth.
This account would not be complete without race. Whiteness plays a role in the
contest of economic welfare and cultural policy throughout the development of the New
Deal state (Gilens 1999; Katznelson 2005; Kinder & Winter 2001, 440; King & Smith,
2005, 83). It shaped the preferences of white men and women as the operation of the
federal government became increasingly central to daily life and national politics. The
largesse of the federal government became increasingly essential to control through the
office of president, especially as politics splintered into explicit clashes based on partisan
social identities. The promotion of elite ideological polarization due to issues of race
combined economic and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict. It allowed
authoritarianism to structure conflict by collapsing issue cleavages into a singular “us vs.
them” continuum for partisan struggle (Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Huddy et al. 2015;
Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Therefore, racial identity contributes to a deeper theoretical
connection between authoritarianism and gender in partisanship among white Americans.
The debut of ideological polarization contributed to the unique relation of each
sex toward authoritarianism. Trends in the expansion of federal policy state rendered
traditionally constituted parties obsolete. Elites reconstituted parties as ideological
vehicles to respond to the growth of the policy state. Ideological divergence over the ends
of policy led to partisan polarization, and the salience of partisan social identities
(Webster & Abramowitz 2017, 641-642). Questions of economics and culture drive the
preferences of men and women apart, but also separate authoritarians and nonauthoritarians alike. The reconfiguration of parties pushed these groups to diverge
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politically at different rates with different intensities. The developments ultimately align
the interests of men and authoritarian politics with the Republican brand across issue
domains. It links women and non-authoritarian politics to Democrats. The salience of
partisan identities in both parties makes strong authoritarians into partisan warriors
(Luttig 2017, 867). Committed partisans internalize elite ideology with greater precision,
and contribute to polarization in the electorate in turn (Druckman et al. 2013; Federico &
Hunt 2013, 105; Levedusky 2013, 10).
The novelty of this argument bridges outstanding gaps in the isolated literatures.
It responds to calls to encapsulate gender in a holistic understanding of politics (Burns
2008). Moreover, it provides the theoretical lens to better understand the nature of
authoritarianism in modern partisanship. For instance, the intertwined nature of race and
gender in light of partisanship offers a basis for explaining economic preferences among
authoritarians. Heretofore, scholars have been unable to fully link authoritarianism to
ideologies due to its weak relation to economic preferences (Cizmar et al. 2014, Johnston
2018, 237). Economic beliefs are of primary concern in political conflict (Goren & Chen
2016, 712). The foundation of the argument that authoritarianism is central to modern
partisanship by scholars like Luttig is diminished if it cannot explain economic positions
(2017).
The emphasis on identity as a fundamental feature of partisanship encourages one
to consider economic ideology in terms of group competition (Iyengar & Krupenkin
2018, 207). Affect is a key component of political competition because partisanship is an
expressive social identity (Huddy et al. 2015). Affect toward the target group of public
policy is sufficient to enhance or mitigate support for the policy (Condon & Wichowsky
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2017; Jacoby 2000). Additionally, gender roles influence the formation of social welfare
preferences differently for men and women. This theoretical shift enables one to link
authoritarianism to economic ideology by way of sex, which derivatively advances the
literature on partisan polarization. As a result, one should have the capacity to further
understand several independent literatures through a combined analysis.
These breakthroughs are possible through the emphasis on race as it is central to
the incorporation of authoritarians in the party system. This premise follows King and
Smith’s claim that one cannot explore American political development without observing
struggles between orders of white supremacy and racial egalitarianism (2005, 89). To this
end, this inquiry examines the conflict over race in policymaking for men and women in
the development of elite polarization and mass partisanship. The methodological focus
continues with the inference pattern of social identity theory to examine the convergence
and divergence in the collective grievances of politicized social groups. The inclusion of
a political development perspective guides the narrative.
The employment of a section dedicated to political development allows one to
contextualize political behavior as a reflection of the interests of a category of identity
through time. The focus of an institutionalist perspective in political development is a
pragmatic choice to accomplish such an end. These identities are reflections of
psychosocial dynamics of a certain situation or context (Burns 2005, 141; Huddy et al.
2008, 32; Deaux & LaFrance 1998). The temporal dimension provides the ideational
background to situate what it means to be a white man or woman across particular
moments (Ritter 2008, 13). Secular changes in institutional contexts define observed eras
of self-perception and political preferences (Sanbonmatsu 2010, 427). American political
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development seeks to demarcate periods of change and continuity. These institutions
stage the terrain for politics. The longue durée presents a firmer foundation on which to
justify an expansive relation between gender and authoritarianism. The insight of
American political development is suited to advance this inquiry in line with practice in
gender research.
The addition of a historical element requires guidelines for clarity in purpose and
method. In a seminal text on the methodology of political development analysis, Orren
and Skowronek cast their research program as a search for “durable [shifts] in governing
authority” (2004, 123). They argue that one must place institutions in the center of
analysis as independent variables in order to contextualize the political realities of an
observed era. The focus on how patterns of governing authority do change transcends
quantitative approaches through the use of qualitative tools. This approach differs from
standard causal inference with its wider focus on overarching theory and structural
causality (Galvin 2019). The approach is subsequently non-teleological by nature.
Consequently, the methodology to arrive at conclusions varies as approaches in the field
remains diverse.
The open-ended framework of political development compliments inquiries into
social identity. This aspect makes the approach all the more useful to studying a multifaceted phenomenon like polarization. The study of durable shifts in governing authority
advances a perspective focused on social identity as the interests associated with one’s
category of identity change. Political development examines the role of “temporal
processes and events [in influencing] the origin and transformation of institutions that
govern political and economic relations… [and the] identity of actors over time”
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(Fioretos et al. 2016, 3-4). Collective identities change organically in response to
environmental factors. Shifts in authority precipitate and react to changes in how groups
perceive themselves and their needs from governing institutions. Institutions are
structured patterns of behavior to constrain human interaction (North 1990, 1; Orren &
Skoronek 2004, 82-85). Individuals develop interests in conjunction with their relation to
pertinent institutions. Thus, the historical study of institutions benefits this larger study of
social identity.
Social identities are an important matter of inquiry. Institutions are not neutral
variables. They shape opportunities and constraints available to actors in the policy
process. Thus, they can either be obstacles or advantages in the gendering of politics.
Hacker and Pierson refer to the population of institutions in the policy process as the
policy terrain (2014). The interaction of institutions and actors operating in the policy
terrain shape the ideational process of the framing of politics. This process refashions
what policies are possible, desirable, or even imagined (Béland 2010; Lukes & Hayward
2008). Institutions favor certain interests over others as mobilizations of bias
(Schattschneider 1960). They are biased toward self-preservation while seeking to
maintain their chartered purpose (Baumgartner & Jones 2009). Citizens heuristically
form their understanding of policies relative to their values vis-à-vis the symbolic and
programmatic output of institutions in this dynamic process (Goren 2013).
Reciprocally, policymakers construct policies to reflect prevailing notions
associated with salient identities. Systems of institutional orders enforce racial and gender
identities, in this way (King & Smith 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2010; Skocpol 1992).
Policymakers craft policies to engender notions of what it means to be a white man or
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woman. For instance, institutions managing access to credit existed to primarily serve
men before the late 1970s. The limited access of credit for women continued despite
economic and social changes because credit institutions supported a male-breadwinner
ideal for society (Prasad 2012). The institutional bias toward the status-quo means that
the lag of past ideas impacts current politics (Gourevitch 1986; Hacker & Pierson 2014).
Institutions do not gradually change to reflect a plurality of opinion, but tend to change
sharply in a single instance as a new position gains prominence (Baumgartner et al.
2009). Pivotal events are points of observation, therefore. In the case of credit, Congress
moved to remove paternalistic restrictions as the pressure increased to reflect the reality
of female financial independence from men.
The case of credit policy is emblematic of the larger partisan contest over social
welfare policy in the United States. The clash of gendered notions of race in the battle
over the state has arguable contributed the most to inflaming political polarization as the
former white male standard became merely an option. The rise of an alternative to
“traditional America” induced polarization within the two-party system. Polarization is
the most prominent feature of modern American politics (Fiorina et al. 2005). One cannot
develop the narrative without accounting for polarization in partisan social identities.
Polarization has been a multifaceted process with roots in the high-stakes, racialized
game for hegemony over the progressive policy state. It has unfolded variably over time.
As such, one must frame the conflict over federal policy within the context of
fundamental changes to various institutions in the government such as the presidency and
the structure of political parties.
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The story of polarization is not flat, linear, or continuous. One must advance
beyond simple accounts of causal inference toward an analysis of political development
(Pierson 2005, 9). By and large, the current literature offers limited examples of a long
view in the discussion of polarization. The early period in the literature on polarization
squabbled over its existence, causes, and extent as a mass phenomenon (Abramowitz &
Webster 2006; Fiorina et al. 2005; McCarty et al. 2009). Polarization was a relatively
recent development in its modern iteration by the 2000s. The 1980s bore witness to the
visible breakdown of the New Deal consensus, and the hegemony of the Democratic
Party. The seeds of this demise were sown decades before, however (Ellis & Stimson
2012). Partisanship adopted an ideological stance among elites, and political struggles
took on an acrimonious tone after the election of Reagan (Lee 2016). The presence of the
first president hostile to New Deal progressivism in the federal government since its
incorporation modified notions of political acceptability and interest.
Scholars reacted to these unexpected developments in polarization. In a bit of
irony, researchers had concluded only a few decades earlier that political parties were
moribund (Highton & Kam 2011, 203). Technocratic capabilities were supposed to
supplant parties in progressive theory. However, partisanship was thriving by the new
millennium in a form recognizable by contemporary standards. It took decades for
collective understanding to recognize changes in political behavior were more than
momentary deviations from the norm, though. Parties had reversed their fortunes as
vestibular organs in the early 1970s to gain new relevance in the organization of political
conflict in a relatively short period of time (Abramowitz & Saunders 1998). The
renaissance of parties occurred concomitantly with the resurgence of the Republican
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Party. Republicans were increasingly challenging Democrats, and emerging victorious
electorally. The 1994 Republican Revolution would have been improbable only 15 years
prior. The paradigm of competition for parties substantively differed from partisan
conflict of the previous generation.
The essential change in partisan conflict resulted from the development of
organized ideology. Politics shifted from topsoil issues to bedrock concerns about the
foundations of American life. Coherent belief structures differentiated modern
polarization from the 1950s or even the highly polarized post-Reconstruction party era. In
the 1890s, the country had experienced intense polarization (Stonecash & Brewer 2009,
48). However, the parties were not polarized over ideological agendas. A multitude of
unconstrained economic issues formed the main schisms. Questions of race plagued the
country at this time, but economic positions never constrained racial positions. This
pattern held into the 1960s (Noel 2013, 148). The lack of organized ideology or any
substantial political conflict characterized the immediate period after World War II. The
undifferentiated parties of the era led the American Political Science Association to call
for more polarization. The organization feared that voters would not be able to exercise
political control without clear policy signals from either party (Milkis 1992; 180).
Political parties have indeed polarized in the interim, but for reasons unrelated to
the prodding of academics. The elites in each party began to internalize ideological
constraints as early as the 1970s (Mann & Ornstein 2013; Theriault 2008). Elite positiontaking has moved away from local coalitions, and toward the national party’s ideological
stance for candidates in U.S. House races in an ongoing trend since, at least, the start of
the New Deal (Ansolabehere et al. 2001). These candidates often professed more extreme
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policies than voters held as prototypical partisan (Bafumi & Herron 2010). The
emergence of polarized elites was not limited to the House of Representatives (Hall
2015). Turnover in the Senate introduced polarized factions from the House (Rohde &
Theriault 2011). The existence of bipartisan issues between leaders in each party largely
evaporated by the 1990s (Noel 2013). The parties became homogenous, ideological
entities in spatial terms by that point (McCarty et al. 2006). Social polarization has
increased since then, as a result (Mason & Wronski 2018, 261). As expected, the success
of adopting ideology was different for Democrats as it was for Republicans.
Compositional factors allow the parties to polarize at different rates as they disentangled
themselves of overlapping consensus (Grossman & Hopkins 2015).
The documentation of what happened in American politics leads one to question
how polarization manifested. The term polarization implies that something caused the
parties to diverge in the first place. The answer is two-fold: the growth in federal
policymaking power and the policy ends to which those powers were used. Parties have
since changed in terms of function and purpose. This truism is especially valid in the case
of the Republican Party as it has morphed into a parliamentarian-type, absolutist party in
its structure and mission (Grossman & Hopkins 2015, 120; Mann & Ornstein 2013). The
growth of the policy state has catalyzed these developments. The centralization of policy
prerogative in the federal government has raised the stakes to control the levers of power
due to the potential to suffer lasting policy defeats (Hacker & Pierson 2015). Relevant to
this inquiry, the new center of gravity in politics gained gendered overtones as the federal
government advanced civil rights. White men shifted their partisanship in reaction to
racial liberalism to align with their material self-interest and gendered beliefs about
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individualism and hard-work (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Authoritarians reacted
against the ability of a progressive federal government to remake social relations
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Their refuge in the Republican Party forged the early
bonds between gender and authoritarian politics.
Therefore, polarization and its political consequences is rooted in the modern
federal policy state. Unfortunately, the modern federal policy state does not have a start
date. Scholars address this dilemma by demarcating eras and typifying periods of
common politics. In this situation, the election of President Roosevelt in 1932 marked
both a watershed moment in the alignment of parties and the growth of the federal policy
apparatus. The story of modern ideological polarization starts at the precipice of the New
Deal. The Great Depression wrought unimaginable upheaval throughout society,
especially among political coalitions. It ended a generation of Republican hegemony led
by a haphazard coalition of workers and business leaders (Gourevitch 1986, 148).
Roosevelt’s 1932 election victory resulted from a diverse coalition reacting to the
immediate threat of total economic collapse. The coalition contained strange bedfellows
as Roosevelt united immigrants, urban northerners, union laborers, Jews, southern
segregationists, and farmers (Stonecash & Brewer 2009). The pressing emergency of the
Depression precipitated, and maintained, this coalition.
The Roosevelt administration initiated an unprecedented explosion in federal
policymaking. The New Deal era marks the incorporation of progressivism into
federalism. Progressivism emerged as a solution to the human misery of the industrial
revolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is described as a creative
synthesis of Hamiltonian means of state action to Jeffersonian ends of individual liberty
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(Noel 2013, 2-5). In practice, progressives like President Roosevelt harnessed power of
the federal government to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. The New Deal’s
progressive doctrine gained constitutional legitimacy when the Supreme Court
strategically abandoned its pro-business libertarianism in 1937. This reversal ended
challenges to the delegation of plenary power to the federal government to regulate
commerce (Miroff et al. 2015, 42-43). Ackerman argues that the incorporation of New
Deal ideology into constitutional jurisprudence marks the birth of the progressive
constitutional regime (2019). The Court’s reversal marked the beginning of a
constitutional era that still reigns today.
The dawn of the New Deal to the modern day bounds the 90-year period of
common politics for this inquiry. Operational questions about the scope of the federal
government in the lives of Americans define the central political schism throughout
(Goren & Chen 2016, 704). This era itself divides into roughly 30-year periods for the
purposes of studying polarization. Pivotal events denote the dawn of new eras:
Roosevelt’s 1932 election, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Republican Revolution in
1994. These periods are unique with regard to the role of race in structuring conflict
against the backdrop of changing political institutions. It is important to bound eras with
regard to race since a raft of scholars consider race to be the most consequential issue to
divide politics in this era (Abramowitz & Webster 2018, 123; Carmines & Stimson
1989).
Questions of race gained traction in national politics after 1932 for the first time
since Reconstruction. The conflict over race defined American institutional development
more broadly once racial and economic liberalism combined into one ideological
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dimension in the context of Great Society programs after 1965 (Poole & Rosenthal 1997,
323). Men disassociate with the Democratic Party, and increasingly develop into agents
of conservatism afterward (Gillions et al. 2018). Party positions diverged as elites sorted
into ideologically homogenous pairings. The parties to emerge from the ideological
reorganization of conflict take diametric positions across issue dimensions in the third
observed era. Elite polarization then leads to sorting in the mass electorate (Levendusky
2009, 110). Women begin to polarize over party affiliation later around the 1992 election
when they began to depart the Republican Party (Kaufmann 2002, 285).
One must therefore observe moments of transformation in racial politics as
moments in the development of polarization. In the initial stages of the New Deal, leaders
kept race off the agenda to ensure the survival of progressivism in federal politics.
Roosevelt’s economic liberalism would remain supported and popular so long as the
promise of the New Deal applied to helping the common (read: white) man (Ellis &
Stimson 2012, 73; Gilens 1999). The inclusion of southern segregationists in the
Democratic majority ensured that the New Deal would not be as expansive as Roosevelt
had envisioned. This group regularly joined Republicans to restrict the scope of labor
rights and aid to African-Americans (Katznelson 2005). They supported the New Deal
only when it brought material benefits to their political clientele. Southern Democrats
feared the ability of the New Deal policy regime to end the caste system of White
supremacy built on compliant black and white labor (Schickler 2016).
The realities of the bargain between white progressives and segregationists
characterize the first observed period of the New Deal era. The combination of these
factions in one political coalition appears strange in modern times. However,
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arrangements of convenience were the norm prior to ideological organization of parties.
Parties maintained cohesion through “a decentralized spoils system rather than a fully
developed and coherent policy agenda” (Robertson 2018, 52). Parties were parochial,
locally-oriented coalitions. The power of the federal government was strategically
contained as states maintained a prominent position of prerogative in federalism (Miroff
et al. 2015, 40). The legitimation of federal plenary power supplanted states as the prime
movers of political action, however. The new tools of the federal policy state gradually
replaced the spoil system in their ability to forge political coalitions. The arena of politics
transitioned to national leaders and national issues where the old ways of the political
process would be de-emphasized in lieu of technocratic government. Political activity
flowed from Washington D.C. as opposed to toward it (Milkis 1999, 9).
Political leaders reacted to this new calculus. Candidates for the U.S. House from
both parties were ideologically unresponsive to local districts prior to the New Deal. In
substantive terms, one would expect this lack of responsiveness as parties organized
groups independent of ideology. This organizing principle changed in 1934 when
Republicans began responding to ideological pressures as the New Deal cleavage opened
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). They took on a liberal or conservative position
depending on their district. This demonstrates the instant preeminence of the New Deal
economics in national politics. Economic issues consolidated into one primary dimension
of conflict rather than staying unconstrained (Noel 2013, 81). This new cleavage reflected
how much the federal government should regulate the economy on the whole (Goren
2013). However, the impact only affected ideological formation in the Republican Party
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initially. Democrats remained unresponsive on the whole in the short term to ideological
pressures to constrain beliefs.
This resistance to ideological polarization in the face of institutional change could
not endure. The preeminence of national politics encouraged ideological conflict over the
course of the first observed era. The Democratic Party eventually organized around
ideology, which fueled the growing trend toward polarization in ideological terms. The
increased salience of race in relation to the New Deal state induced sorting. This point is
reflected in the fact that Democratic nominees were responsive to their districts by the
late 1960s “when movements in national politics began to re-allocate racial politics to the
primary ideological axis [of economics] that organized partisan differences”
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). The contemporary dimension of ideological politics is
gradually absorbed by the party system during the period such that Democrats become
liberals and Republicans become conservative. This ideological dimension eventually
expands to ensnare more issues in line with liberal or conservative economic beliefs
(Noel 2013, 80).
The policy success of the original New Deal coalition led to its political
disintegration. Fault lines in the pact surfaced early and often. The coalition lost cohesion
as the anguish of the Depression and World War II faded. Progressivism had entrenched
in federal policymaking, and no longer required a broad coalition to defend it. Activists in
each party lobbied to constrain party coalitions in line with ideological conceptions.
Conservatism and liberalism outside political parties had developed by the 1950s to
resemble their modern iterations (Noel 2013, 79). This means that elites connected
economic, racial, and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict.
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The inclusion of racial politics into party ideology reflected the increasing
national push for civil rights. Local Democrats, labor unions and civil rights groups
mobilized a grassroots effort to push the Party to embrace their ideological commitments
to champion civil rights (Baylor 2018). Meanwhile, Republican party building initiatives
under Eisenhower began courting racial conservatives in the South into a coalition for
limited government (Schickler 2016). National Democratic leaders resisted the call from
liberal Democrats during this time to organize ideologically as they rightfully feared it
would shatter the New Deal coalition (Rosenfeld 2017). This resistance included staking
clear positions on race. However, the influx of racial liberals into the Democratic Party
and the decline of the segregationist-wing made the problem of keeping race off the
agenda moot (Schickler 2016).
The end of the first observed period coincides with the changing center of gravity
in the original New Deal coalition. In the first period, one finds change and continuity in
the collective opinion of politicized groups. Public opinion, especially in the North,
warmed to racial liberalization while it remained unpopular in the South. As the emphasis
of politics broadened to include race, voters chose leaders with more concerns in mind
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). Groups in each party mobilized from the grassroots to
reform the party coalitions ideologically (Baylor 2018). To this end, liberals and
conservatives used the issue of race wherever possible to dissever economic liberals from
racial conservatives in the Democratic Party, and vice-versa in the Republican Party
(Schickler 2016, 273-275). The sack of racially liberal Republicans in the North in the
1958 elections signaled the beginning of partisan sorting on race (Hetherington & Weiler
2009, 67). Race and economics continued to exist as two separate cleavages despite
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increasing Democratic ownership over both issues. Parties reluctantly continued as
coalitions of interests despite incentives to reorganize as ideological vehicles. As a result,
one also observes southern Democrats with liberal racial views replaced with southern
Democrats with conservative racial views and liberal economic views during this period
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001).
The gradual realignment of parties on race triggered ideological organization of
the mass electorate. Partisans warmed to their respective party’s stance on race as the
racial cleavage slowly merged with the New Deal cleavage in light of the civil rights
movement (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 8). The Johnson administration finalized the merger
of these two dimensions in the public consciousness through the president’s support for
civil rights and expanded welfare programs. His 1964 presidential victory equipped him
with friendly supermajorities in Congress. By now, liberal ideologues were in control of
the Democratic Party (Schickler 2016). His Great Society initiative extended the New
Deal beyond industrial factory workers to more groups like the poor and AfricanAmericans. Additionally, Johnson responded to calls for national civil rights guarantees
to end the Jim Crow regime in the South (Milkis 2016). He advanced this end with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This support of racial policy permanently linked liberal
ideology with civil rights, and connected African-Americans and the Democratic Party in
political matters (Baylor 2018). Questions of economics and race in ideology remain
linked to this day, as a result.
President Johnson’s achievements mark the transition to the second observed era
of New Deal politics. His administration was a critical moment in the story of
polarization as his legacy of civil rights forever changed the institutions of the presidency
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and partisan coalitions. For one, his presidency signals the death knell for the shared
white elite in both political parties (Mason & Wronski 2018, 260). Moreover, he is the
last Democratic president to win a majority of white male voters. The majority of this
voting bloc has not identified with the Democratic Party since (Kaufmann 2002, 286).
The first gender gap also emerges in the tumult presaging the 1964 election as Goldwater
campaigns as the first ideological conservative in the New Deal era. Racial resentment
among white men contribute to the formation of this gap (Gillions et al. 2018).
The expansion of the New Deal welfare state coincided against a backdrop of
social tumult. The unrest of the 1960s explains several of the reasons for the long-term
shift in party demographics and preferences (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 76-85). It is by the
point of the Civil Rights Act that national politics began activating authoritarian voters
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 68-76). One must suspect that the rapid assault on
conventional social relations during the protest movements of the 1960s primed
authoritarian concerns. This position is only speculation absent reliable public survey
data (Cizmar et Al 2014). The civil rights movement provoked the development of a
concurrent “law and order” backlash movement as civil rights was equated with black
lawlessness (Murakawa 2008, 252). It is difficult to believe that authoritarians did not
flock to the banner of order in an atmosphere of unrest. Liberalism itself was sullied by
its association with the discord.
The enlargement of the policy state heightened anxieties for authoritarians. The
developments of the Johnson administration and their effects on ideological polarization
would not have been possible without the growth of the policy state. The development of
the New Deal policy state gave new impetus and meaning to political participation. The
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apparatus of the national government had become something essentially different by the
1960s. Schattschneider captures the contemporary sentiment succinctly:
While we were looking the other way, the government of the United States
became a global operation a decade or two ago. The budget is about 250
times as large as it was [in 1890]. If you multiply the diameter of a
baseball by 250 very suddenly, you have an explosion. Is it possible to
understand American politics without considering the regime a going
concern? [Emphasis added.] … The changes in the regime are so great
that one might well ask whether or not our theoretical equipment is
adequate for the comprehension of what has happened. (1960, 115-116).
Schattschneider’s analysis about the growing thicket of policy on institutions was
prescient. He proposed that policy creates politics, and applied this understanding to the
New Deal state. This concept was novel for the time. It emphasizes how changing
institutional configurations alters political realities. In this case, even observers of the
time recognized that politics had become conceptually discontinuous against the
backdrop of the policy state. The goal of parties became to capture control of the
apparatus of state for durable policy victories beyond short-term spoils (Hacker &
Pierson 2014).
The Johnson administration is an inflection point in institutional development as
he realizes the power of the policy state to bring the New Deal to its highwater mark. He
wields the resources of the Great Society program to remake American social relations.
Changes in the presidency mirrored transformations in the party system during the
period. The growth in executive administration made the presidency a more
consequential office to hold. The increased prominence of the presidency accelerated
trends in party polarization. For one, it reinforced the movement toward federal-centric
politics. Political parties had a new impetus for competition, and now an office to
necessarily capture (Hacker & Pierson 2014, 650). National administration of policy had
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supplanted the original purpose of parties to dole out patronage (Milkis 2016, 294). The
loss of this traditional tool to maintain party unity ultimately led to the collapse of
traditionally constituted parties by the 1970s. Party leaders needed a new way to sustain a
long coalition with the implosion of the original New Deal coalition. Ideology and the
new battle over the proper use of the policy state emerged to replace the old bonds of
collective action (Noel 2013, 119). Both parties succumbed to ideological takeovers as
noted with activists increasingly handling the drafting of platforms (Rosenfeld 2017;
Schickler 2016).
Consequently, the burgeoning policy state changed the role of the presidency in
the New Deal state. The economic calamity of the 1930s and warfare of the 1940s gave
the president a new set of powers to claim as inherent (Kornhauser 2015, Tichenor 2013:
779-782). The arsenal of policy tools at his disposal gave the president independent
leverage in politics (Milkis 2016, 302). The administrative president combined with the
progressive ideal of a popular president. This president would represent the whole nation,
and articulate public opinion (Tulis 2017). This type of president would appeal to popular
opinion over the heads of lawmakers to take an active lead in national politics. The new
policy state increasingly gave the president a prerogative and capability to assert himself
in national politics. Consequently, it was shaped by successive presidents’ expeditions
into evermore polarized politics in a self-reinforcing circle.
These trends accelerate under President Johnson. The Great Society programs and
the Civil Rights Act reflect the new power of the presidency as a prominent figure in
politics. This executive power assumed a racial, and subsequently gendered, dimension.
Social welfare issues sparked the first sustained gender gap among white Americans
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(Gillions et al. 2018, 9). The racialization of social welfare programs is the result of
Johnson’s choice to adjoin social movements with modern executive policymaking
(Milkis 2016). The presidency could proffer support for the same ideals as prominent
social movements as a hub of growing administrative and political commitments (Miroff
1981, 14). The president could fashion political alliances himself in this regard by relying
on the gravity of his office (Milkis & Jacobs 2017). The independent base of power of
presidents to speak directly to groups and social movements weakened the power of party
leaders to maintain coalitions. Johnson combined the administrative state, political
parties, and the presidency in a way that linked all three institutions in the public mind
with notions of race (Milkis 2016).
Johnson’s commitment to the civil rights movement had political ramifications for
his office and the reconstruction of political conflict. The public polarized to the merger
of partisanship and the presidency at the helm of a policy state. Ordinary citizens no
longer viewed the president as a statesman at the helm of the ship of state. Johnson had
politicized the office with his support for the civil rights movement (Azari 2014, 13). The
presidency took on the critical perception of a partisan office. Meanwhile, Great Society
programs expanded presidential political power, and the president’s centrality in
policymaking at the expense of the other branches. These new programs gave the
president a newly unimaginable position to affect daily life (Milkis 2016, 302). In
conjunction, these trends made the stakes of holding the office of president evermore
consequential.
The politicization of the presidency abetted the transformation of the party system
along ideological, polarized lines. President Johnson’s support for the economic and
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racial liberalism is the moment when the two are permanently fused one dimension of
ideology in mass politics. The Democratic Party assumed the full mantle of liberalism,
and liberalism assumed its contemporary negative connotation at this moment.
Liberalism no longer implied support for the “common man.” Instead, it would denote
government largesse for the undeserving poor and minorities at the expense of the
common (white) man (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 76). Johnson’s controversial support for
civil rights involved assuming the costs of a close alliance with minority interests without
the substantial benefits of electoral gains (Milkis 2016). The public linked Democrats
with uncontrolled federal spending and the disorder of protest movements as liberalism
quickly fell out of grace (Ura & Ellis 2012, 283).
The Johnson administration permanently altered the nature of American politics.
Johnson’s support for civil rights solidified the conversion of parties into ideological
vehicles by irrevocably shattering the New Deal coalition. Ideological elites had spent
decades after World War II attempting to remake the parties into ideological units
(Rosenfeld 2017). Race was the issue to break apart the big-tent party coalitions, and
reorganize them along ideological lines. The growth of the federal government to affect
race relations concerned many Americans. The backlash against the growth of the state
constitutes the raison d’être for the modern conservative movement today (Hacker &
Pierson 2014, 653-654). Men fueled this movement (Gillions et al. 2018; Kaufmann
2002, 288). Modern conservatism finds its roots in the ideological mobilization of
Republicans in their opposition to state activism. The issue of race catalyzed the
transformation of Republicans into an ideological vehicle for white male antipathies
(Schickler 2016, 276).
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In this way, the issue of race propelled the reorganization of party coalitions into
something closer to their current composition (Carmines & Stimson 1989). Perceptions of
race shifted large swaths of public opinion as adduced by the immediate change in
fortune for the term “liberal” in the context of the Great Society. These changes in
politicized grievances are key observations in the focus of political development. The
most immediate consequence of contentious election of 1964 is the swing in support for
Goldwater among white men (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). It is important to remember
that men and women sorted at different rates over different issues at different times
(Barnes & Cassese 2017; Huddy et al. 2008; Kaufmann 2002; Ondercin 2017). This point
matters when interpreting the 1964 election. In many ways, it foreshadows future
presidential elections in third observed era of New Deal politics between ideological
conservatives and progressives.
It is important to note that men did not diverge from women in 1964 explicitly
over matters of gender. The polarization over gender identity and the feminist revolution
has yet to occur. Gender roles in a patriarchal context still largely define masculinity and
femininity for men and women in both parties. Instead, one observes men breaking for
Goldwater’s platform of racial and economic conservatism (Gillions et al. 2018). Their
political movement reflects the strength of the value of individualism; in this case with
regard to gendered notions as white Americans (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 7-8; Goren
2001). This point accentuates Kaufmann’s observation on the link between taxes and
male political preferences (2002, 296). White men opposed the expansion of social
welfare programs at their perceived cost. They favored welfare retrenchment once given
a clear choice on the matter between ideologies.
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The developments of the 1960s set the stage for sorting in the second observed era
of the New Deal. In spite of the social upheaval of late 1960s and early 1970s, Americans
remained attached to their parties – initially. One expects that contentiously polarizing
issues would cue realignments in the electorate. Partisanship continues influencing issue
orientation until the early 1980s (Highton & Kam 2011, 212). Elite polarization reaches
its lowest point in the early 1970s, in fact (Abramowitz & Saunders 2006, 177; Fiorina et
al. 2005). One must question why polarizing issues like civil rights did not have greater
influence on partisanship at this moment. For one, party leaders had strong attachments to
their party. Southern Democrats were still Democrats (Carmines & Stimson 1989; Noel
2013, 156).
The most prominent reason for the lack of immediate polarization, however,
appears to be the lack of an organized ideological movement at the helm of the
Republican Party to offer a viable alternative choice (Hacker & Pierson 2014, 653).
However, changes were visible under the surface. Mass partisan affiliation sinks to its
lowest level following the 1960s despite the continued influence of partisanship over
voter preference. This decline reflected a cadre of disenchanted voters (Bafumi &
Shapiro 2009, 2). These voters would have been unrestrained by partisan overtures. Their
departure would have allowed ideological factions in parties to remake coalitions (Noel
2013). However, the reorganization along ideological lines was far from complete among
masses and elites.
In general, voters had imperfect choices to register their preferences at this time.
Party elites remained imperfectly sorted. Moreover, the Republican Party largely
acquiesced to Democratic hegemony following the staggering defeat of Goldwater. Party
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leaders pushed back against conservative ideologues, and did not press advantage to
escape their minority position (Lee 2016; Rosenfeld 2017). They accepted the New Deal
consensus as a fait accompli. Therefore, they had no viable route to majority as they did
not embrace the conservative ideological movement or present an essential alternative to
the Democrats on economics. Instead, enterprising party leaders saw a way out of the
political wilderness through cultural issues (Heatherington & Weiler 2009, 68;
Levendusky 2009, 23).
The seeds of Republican Renaissance begin with Nixon’s southern strategy.
Nixon sought to peel the white working class from Democrats through coded racial
appeals. The white working class remained loyal to New Deal economics, but grew
increasingly wary of its association to cultural and racial liberalism. Urban unrest
contributed to a growing fear of government-sponsored lawlessness. The Great Society’s
War on Poverty had hastened public concern with welfare reform, and the public largely
perceived poverty and welfare in racial terms (Gilens 1999, 122). Nixon recognized that
the scale of reform nauseated white voters. The merger of the New Deal economic
liberalism with racial policy presented an opportunity. Nixon highlighted issues to
accentuate the cultural trepidations of white Americans. The new cultural cleavage
bisected public opinion as anticipated. The issues targeted southern Democrats, who
reflected a more racially conservative demeanor than their northern counterparts
(Levendusky 2009, 79; Noel 2013, 131). The new cultural dimension capitalized on the
declining popularity of the liberal brand. A conservative identity became increasingly
respectable for white voters, which made appeals to cultural conservatism resonate more
intensely among voters who still supported New Deal economics. Cultural issues, unlike

DiMariano 118

programmatic economic ones, are easy to comprehend to ordinary voters, and
additionally appealing to authoritarians.
The emphasis on cultural issues opened a new front in politics. Of particular
relevance, the feminist movement contributed to the definition of cultural politics in the
second observed era (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Feminist men and women
increasingly challenged the traditional gender roles. The movement focused its energies
on political demands. Feminists fought for abortion legalization, economic independence,
and equality between the sexes. The early feminist movement backed the Equal Rights
Amendment to guarantee such rights politically. The 1970s began with broad-based
support for liberalizing gender roles, but ended with gender as a divisive cultural issue
(Mansbridge 1985). Each party supported the ERA until the Republican platform shifted
decisively toward conservatism in 1980 under Reagan’s supervision (Jordon et al. 2014).
However, Reagan campaigned to appeal to women even if he opposed feminism (Davis
1999). His positioning minimized the gender gap in party affiliation despite the
emergence of gender gaps, overall.
The gap in party affiliation takes a while to mature as prevailing partisan moods
influenced perspectives in both parties in the same direction (Ura & Ellis 2012, 280). The
decline in broad support for the projects of liberalism writ large registers in both parties.
It also is a harbinger for a newly ascendant conservative movement. The tenor of politics
had evolved during the 1970s due to social unrest and economic malaise (Ellis & Stimson
2012, 88-89). Liberalism was at its lowest point in popularity in 1980 since 1952 (Hacker
& Pierson 2005, 38). The decade witnessed a growing ecosystem of conservative activists
and thinktanks to support an ideological movement. The liberal cultural victories in areas
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like abortion and school prayer had appalled religious citizens, and provided ample
opportunity to secure another disenchanted voting bloc. House constituencies warmed to
ideologically conservative Republicans (Theriault & Rohde 2013, 1023). Reagan
capitalized on cultural backlash and the floundering support for liberalism to secure the
Republican nomination. In taking a page from Johnson, he forged an alliance with
evangelical Christians (Milkus 2016). His victory established that Republicans could win
general elections without sacrificing ideological purity (Jordon et al. 2014, 179).
The link between conservatives and evangelicals proved fortuitous for Republican
fortunes. Democrats recognized they did not appeal to most white voters on racial or
cultural issues. They ceded cultural issues to Republican conservative imagery to focus
on economic issues, which appealed beyond their base (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 177). As a
result, the Republican Party established itself as a base for culturally disaffected whites
(Cizmar et al. 2014; Hillygus & Shields 2008; Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 139). The
inclusion of evangelicals is important as religious fundamentalists favor authoritarian
preferences. These preferences include favoring patriarchal gender relations. These
whites also disfavored the softening of Democrats on issues of force and security
(Levendusky 2009). Reagan’s emphasis on engagement with communism appealed to
disaffected men and authoritarians. The combination of cultural backlash, racial
resentment, welfare retrenchment, and jingoism established conservatism as the home for
masculinity and authoritarianism. The migration of emotive issue of culture to the
forefront of conflict structured politics to activate such voters.
Thus, Reagan formalized the substance of modern partisan ideology.
Additionally, his presidency witnessed the acceleration toward the contemporary order of
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elite ideological polarization. Reagan is the archetype of the modern iteration of partisan
president (Skinner 2008). Reagan is notable because he served as the chief campaigner
for Republicans in 1980; whereas, he would not have entered the picture until after the
party convention just a decade earlier (Jordon et al. 2014; Karol 2016, 476). Thereby, he
condensed the role of party leader and president into one person. One can attribute to
Reagan the perfection of presidency-centered politics (Milkis & Jacobs 2017). Politically,
Reagan was the first president to attempt to offer a viable alternative to New Deal
progressivism for the American public. He created a mandate to retrench the New Deal
state (Azari 2014). He used his office to sustain his conservative coalition by issuing
executive orders to craft and to appeal to his base. In doing so, he solidified the
presidency into its modern form for partisan warfare. Skowronek marks Reagan’s
presidency as the fulfillment of previously identified shifts in governing authority. He
notes that by Reagan’s tenure:
The political foundations of presidential action [had] become increasingly
independent over time, the incumbent drawing upon resources for action
that [were] ever more directly tied to the executive branch itself… [and]
the polity directly engaged in a president’s leadership project [had]
expanded over time both geographically and demographically (1997, 55).
It is no surprise that birth of presidency-centered partisanship after the 1980
campaign coincides with the first significant developments in affective partisanship
(Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018, 202). Ideological divergence in presidents causes partisans
to view the other party’s leaders with suspicion. Presidents have been the main source of
polarization ever since Reagan (Wood & Jordan 2018). The formalization of presidents
as party leaders has made the two synonymous in the context of an expansive federal
policy state. The president is the most visible and consequential figure in American
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politics due to the gravity of the office (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 4). The vestige of so
much influence in one office simplifies political conflict into a battle for president, which
intensifies electoral competition. They articulate ideological goals when they articulate
policy goals because the two parties now operate in two different thought-ecosystems
with two distinct bases.
When presidents propose a legislative program, they are doing more than
suggesting a set of policy proposals for Congress to consider. They are
also serving as the most visible public face of their political party.
Members of Congress consequently react to a president both in capacity as
chief legislator and party leader. In viewing a president as party leader,
members of the opposing party have incentives to resist his proposals,
separate from their agreement or disagreement with his actual policies.
Members of the president’s party have electoral motive to support their
party leader (Lee 2008, 924).
Presidents are as polarizing today because Reagan accelerated the absorption of
ideology into the party system. Reagan offered more than conservative policies in a
liberal regime. He offered a fundamentally different type of political regime in place of
the New Deal state. As a result, the Republican Party served as a credible alternative to
southern Democrats. These Democrats essentially operated as a third party throughout the
New Deal (Carmines & Stimson 1989). The elites of southern Democrats resisted sorting
into the Republican camp, but had no reason to stay loyal to Democrats after liberals in
Congress reorganized committees to strip southern Democrats of seniority. The southern
Democratic wing essentially collapsed during the 1970s after losing the benefits of party
loyalty (Noel 2013, 124). Reagan’s political maneuvering absorbed these Democrats into
the Republican coalition based on ideological concerns first. The ideological organization
of long coalitions supplanted the partisan long coalition of Roosevelt’s New Deal during
Reagan’s presidency (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, 52). This transitional era ended with the
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1994 Republican takeover of Congress as the few remaining southern Democrats
converted to the ascendant Republican Party. This period corresponds to the emigration
of women from the Republican Party as both sexes finally polarize with regard to party
affiliation (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Thus, the constitution of modern parties was
finally in place. Afterward, the process of polarization would intensify.
The alignment of elites along both ideological and partisan lines represents one
aspect of polarization. The other component is the mass electorate. Elite polarization is
instrumental toward the development of partisanship in the electorate. Elite partisans sent
clear signals to citizens once they had disentangled themselves of overlapping ideological
ties. These signals prime voters’ partisan affiliations (Dilliplane 2014, 86). The most
common method of sorting involves partisans aligning their ideology to match their
partisanship (Levendusky 2009, 108). However, partisans with strong issue positions also
used the clear signals from elites to align their partisanship to better match their ideology
during the 1980s and 1990s (Carsey & Layman 2006; Highton & Kam 2011). The
alignment of partisanship and ideology induces identity politics. The reduction of crosscutting social identities, especially in the Republican Party, has dramatically increased
affective partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster 2017, 626; Cassese 2020; Mason 2015).
The process of sorting fueled the dynamics of competition over matters of social identity
in the contemporary era of the New Deal.
The emergence of ideological elites amplified sorting based on gender and
authoritarian concerns as they promoted politics of cultural disagreement. Each variable
factors into the development of partisan polarization. The cultural cleavage links gender
and authoritarian preferences with the racialized economic cleavage due to elite
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ideological polarization. This cultural cleavage has tracked closely with the economic
cleavage for elites since 1986 (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 122). It has brought previously
unaligned or un-politicized social identities into the partisan divide. For instance, Reagan
enlisted antifeminist groups and evangelicals into his camp as the feminist movement
settled in the Democratic Party (Spruill 2008). Ellis and Stimson argue that “cultural”
concerns have always been associated with conservative ideological self-identification
over the last 50 years (2012, 49). However, the advent of ideologically coherent elites
guarantees the participation of conservative-minded social identities. Ideological elites
organize the demands of their constituent groups into a coherent belief system (Bawn et
al. 2012; Noel 2013, 160). Unaffiliated groups with politicalized social identities outside
an ideological coalition have to align themselves as ideologies constrain issues. This
process creates a self-perpetuating circle as the ideological organization of parties offer
groups paltry incentives to change sides. The combination of economic and cultural
ideology exacerbates polarization.
The evidence for the connection between cultural issues and polarization is
widespread in the literature. Leege and colleagues find that the politics of cultural
differences are increasingly characteristic of modern elections as wedge issues (2009; see
also Hillygus & Shields 2008). Previously, scholars assumed that issues evolved, and
supplanted old party coalitions as new issues emerged (Carmines & Stimson 1989).
However, the organization of parties around elite ideology has proved remarkably
resilient. The inverse appears to be characteristic of modern politics: parties make issues
and not vice-versa. One witnesses conflict expansion rather than displacement. The
potency of the near alignment of cultural and economic issues bifurcates issues to fit
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within the structure of existing conflict. Partisanship is combining with more issues as a
result (Abramowitz & Saunders 2006; Bafumi & Shapiro 2009; Baldassarri & Gelman
2008; Brewer 2005; DiMaggio et al. 1996). The ideological constraint of elites has
incorporated more cultural and moral issues into partisan dispute (Adams 1997; Carmines
& Woods 2002; Carsey & Layman 2002). The expansion of conflict creates the
appearance of a culture war by portraying only two ideological visions for America.
Under the circumstances, one expects the dynamics of political conflict to activate
authoritarian voters based on a simplified “us vs. them” mode of politics.
Into this mix, elites have polarized over issues of gender. It is telling that the first
sustained gender gaps on issues open in 1980 (Kaufmann 2002). The prime movers in the
gender gap are men at first. The liberalization of social welfare policy since 1952 made
men more conservative on the whole (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Men view social
welfare policies as injurious to them as men. As a result, men supported conservative
candidates like Goldwater in 1964 and Reagan in 1980, who promised to retrench the
welfare state. The connection of civil rights to New Deal economics meant that racialized
opposition to the welfare state carried a gender dimension. Gillions and colleagues find
that ideological polarization was instrumental for polarization on gender issues. The
sexes did not polarize until the parties were sufficiently differentiated on issues of social
welfare (Gillions et al. 2018, 5; Ondercin 2017, 751). At first, men shuffled toward the
Republican Party. Afterward, women sorted toward the Democratic Party.
Men opened the gender gap in partisanship; however, women have also polarized
with the ascendency of feminism in society. Women became more liberal as women
entered new roles in society (Inglehart & Norris 2000; Howell & Day 2000). The contests
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over abortion rights and the ERA highlighted the choice between traditionalism and
egalitarian reform (Wolbrecht 2000). The liberalization of women and their roles in
society provoked a reaction in men, and exacerbated the gender gap (Wolak 2015). These
conflicts reinforc the gender gap. At first, campaign appeals about traditional women’s
issues did not seem to increase the partisan gender gap (Hutchings et al. 2004). The
female propensity to favor the Democratic Party appeared more deeply connected to
questions of economic independence (Gillions et al. 2018; Kaufmann 2002). Women
relied on the policy state to sustain their economic independence (Barnes & Cassese
2017; Huddy et al. 2008). As the parties sorted ideologically, though, social issues then
became more important to women (Kaufmann 2002, 302). Elites invested economic
issues with gender connotations. Therefore, female political identities are tied into
questions of social position, and put into opposition to the interests of men.
The development of a progressive policy state to remake social relations
precipitates the emergence of politicized gender identities. Questions of social
egalitarianism now take precedence in voting behavior for both men and women in
relation to redistributive politics (Kaufmann 2002, 301-302). Elites have responded to
these gender gaps by framing themselves in gendered ways. Republicans describe
themselves in masculine terms, in part, to underscore their oppositions to dependency on
social welfare to retain male voters. Democrats avail themselves in compassionate and
interpersonal terms to highlight their support of social protections to retain female voters
(Winter 2010, 590). These stances reinforce gender stereotypes in each party’s ideology
(Holman et al. 2016).
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In conjunction, the collapse of symbolic and programmatic issues into one
dimension of ideology primes authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Polarized
issues are easy to decipher based on heuristics relating to self-identity. The developments
behind ideological politics have therefore increased the prominence of authoritarianism in
structuring voting behavior. One suspects that the social upheaval related to the rights
movements and their backlashes raised issues of order and security. Questions of
egalitarianism and remaking social relations would be anathema to authoritarians.
Unfortunately, the lack of representative public survey data from this era inhibits firm
conclusions. Continuous national surveys of authoritarian voters only commence in 2000.
However, Cizmar and colleagues conclude that authoritarianism “has been associated
unfailingly with opposition to government efforts on behalf of blacks and other racial
minorities” for the representative surveys done in 1952, 1972, and 1992. Additionally, it
is significantly associated with conservative attitudes on abortion and women’s rights in
1972 and 1992. Lastly, it has been predictive of presidential votes from 1972 to present
day for the years with available data (2014, 74-75).
These data in light of the sketch of political development offer circumstantial
evidence that sorting along authoritarian lines is intertwined with the gendering of
ideological conflict. One finds stronger evidence for this theoretical interaction in third
observed era of the New Deal regime from 1994 to present. This final period coincides
with the robust development of affective partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster 2017;
Iyengar & Westwood 2015; Mason 2018). In this era, the institutional development of the
policy state has matured, and the main components of ideological politics are already in
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place (Noel 2013, 165). Political conflict has a robust symbolic meaning in the paradigm
of liberal and conservative (Ellis & Stimson 2012).
More inclusively, the symbolic dimension of ideology touches personal matters
like “race, gender, safety, and security” together with economic matters (Hetherington &
Weiler 2009, 67). The breakdown of the political and social consensus after World War II
has bifurcated into two ideological visions for organizing American society in each party.
The outlet for the expression of politicized identities resides almost entirely in one’s
choice of president now. The centrality of the selection of leader further simplifies
authoritarian decision-making by reducing political conflict into a singular struggle over
who to elect to the White House. Thus, ideological organization and political
development reinforces the authoritarian structure to modern politics.
Momentous events in the form of terrorist attacks and the election of first black
president dispel any lingering doubts about the connections of gender to authoritarianism.
The weight of the 9/11 attacks in the collective conscious could only compare to Pearl
Harbor. However, terrorist attacks are not the same as a nation declaring war on the
United States. Americans did not know who the enemy was or where they were
operating. The specter of fear and threat impelled authoritarians and non-authoritarians
alike to support extraordinary means to secure safety and protection. In troubled times,
individuals rely on “instinct over cognition” (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 110). One
observes the potency of public insecurity as Republicans defied a law of political gravity
to gain seats in Congress in the 2002 midterm elections. Prior to that election, the
president’s party had lost ground in every election since World War II during midterms.
One must observe this event as a catalyst for a deeper relation between Republicans,

DiMariano 128

authoritarians, and men. Republicans painted themselves as tough to broadcast their
leadership bona fides to distressed voters (Holman et al. 2016; Winters 2010).
Moreover, the election of President Obama intensified affective partisanship.
Obama articulated public outrage with the growing boondoggles in the Middle East and
the collapse of the financial industry. The calamity of the Great Recession gave Obama
supermajority status in Congress in 2008 only for the Democratic advantage to evaporate
by 2010. Spectators have written at length to account for the sudden reversal of fortune
when a modern New Deal hegemony was predicted for Democrats. These scholars
identified aggressive big-business lobbying to identify Democrats and big government as
the source of the economic misery (Hacker & Pierson 2016). Folk theories state that
uneducated rubes who watched Fox News bought the line from Republican elites, and
voted against their self-interest (Mann & Ornstein 2013; Williams 2016).
These folk interpretations identify features of polarized politics, but miss the
essential point. The rubes only appear irrational when one observes them through the
narrow lens of material self-interest (Cramer 2016; Deckman 2016). Politics is about
collective grievances associated with social identities and the programmatic policies that
follow therewith. Transactional policies acquire currency through the social identities that
they benefit or harm. Identity politics harmed Obama’s electoral fortunes after his
election in a way that Roosevelt never encountered. Obama’s presidency witnesses the
culmination of the effects of the transformation of the federal policy state in conjunction
with the authoritarian structuring of politics. His race solidified this development.
The essential point about partisanship under Obama is that his race mattered
(Williamson et al. 2011, 34). In this way, race continues to factor into the ideological
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relation between gender and authoritarianism. Several political commentators recognized
that Obama’s mixed-race heritage affected his perception among voters. Race had
become an albatross for Democrats by Reagan’s presidency. They had long since ducked
their obvious alliance with African-Americans under Clinton (Hetherington & Weiler
2009, 139). However, Democrats could not change subjects to mask Obama’s skin tone.
Obama ostensibly racialized politics despite his own steadfast neutrality on the topic
(Tesler 2016). Racial resentment soon colored the bailouts for banks as voters blamed
government policy toward minorities for the sub-prime lending meltdown. Whites
continued to hold anger against African-Americans for violating the ethics of hard-work
and individualism. The view that African-Americans claimed victim-status to receive
government assistance for their own self-inflicting injuries shaped perceptions of policies
during Obama’s presidency (Banks 2014, 26). White men and women became more
racially conservative (Tesler 2016). Hostile sexism and the denial of racism eventually
factored into support for Trump behind Republican partisanship, especially for men
(Schaeffer et al. 2016, 23).
The contentious modern era of elite polarization has fomented affective
partisanship in the electorate. The phenomena manifests much like a constrained belief
system (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018, 270). Affective partisanship propels the strong bias
toward the in-group into derogation toward the partisan out-group. The programmatic
aspects of elite ideological visions matter to the extent that it promotes or diminishes the
status of the party brand (Huddy et al. 2015, 12). Individuals reject policies that clash
with their partisan conceptions of self even if they are inclined to otherwise support the
policy (Mason 2018). Compromise tarnishes the party brand because it makes the party
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appear inferior. Mass partisanship translates the positions of elite ideology into the “us
vs. them” logic of competition. The dynamics of gender and authoritarianism obtain in
this context. Difficult policies become comprehendible through the heuristic of the party
brand and the reduction of nuance into one dimension of “for” or “against.”
The encompassing aspect of affective polarization thus makes issues of gender
and authoritarianism consequential to political struggle. Often, issues of gender and
authoritarian politics intersect explicitly at the same time. This is the case with gay
marriage or gun control (Lizotte 2019; Prusaczyk & Honson 2020). Partisan elites gender
secular issues explicitly to marshal their base. Polarization accentuates the extent to
which voters absorb these gendered cues. However, political issues implicitly carry
gender connotations through association with the party’s ideology. These ideologies
combine economic and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict (Noel 2013). They
reflect each party’s composition and stance on feminism. The linkage allows the
authoritarian basis to cultural issues to extend to politics in general (Johnston 2018).
Political arrangements attract men and authoritarians to the Republican camp, and attract
women and non-authoritarians toward the Democratic camp. This deep connection is
possible due to the evolution of political institutions through the catalyst of racial issues
to produce ideological polarization. As a result, authoritarianism and gender should
intersect on partisan issues as the norm.
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Chapter 5: Hypotheses
The elaboration of authoritarianism and gender in the context of political
development elucidates multiple points of connection between the two concepts. One
expects a relation between gender and authoritarianism as a norm on political matters.
The nature of elite ideological polarization and its contribution to affective mass
partisanship has produced two relevant political considerations. First, the promulgation of
partisanship as a social identity has allowed authoritarianism to structure political conflict
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 118; Johnston 2018). Politics is now a contest between
social identities. The intensity of electoral competition activates authoritarian concerns as
partisans perceive attacks on party interests as attacks on personal identity. Thereby, the
bases of identity in political competition create a foundation for authoritarianism in
mediating issues preferences (Luttig 2017).
Second, elite polarization and the imbalance of sex ratios in each party have
gendered the image and policies of Democrats and Republicans. Republicans frame
themselves as masculine, and Democrats frame themselves as feminine (Winter 2016).
Voters perceive gender connotations in party cues on issue positions (Sanbonmatsu &
Dolan 2009, 490). The connective tissue of ideology distributes these gendered
perceptions across issue domains. These perceptions interact with the preexisting notions
of gender in an individual. As a result, authoritarianism and gender should respectively
structure and influence a voter’s political preferences as two concepts connected in the
milieu of modern partisanship.
One must pivot to formally expound the theoretical relation between gender and
authoritarianism in concrete terms. The literature review prepared the groundwork for
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this endeavor. As an organizing belief, gender influences political preferences through
cultural socialization. These gender beliefs shade issue and party evaluations (Holman et
al. 2016; Winter 2016). One’s validation and affirmation of gender norms relies in part on
one’s authoritarian predisposition. Authoritarians require security and order borne from
cognitive difficulties with nuanced situations (Stenner 2005). These difficulties
predispose authoritarians to embrace group conventions as time-honored ways to
organize one’s life. The heterosexual gender binary is one of these conventions
(Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020). As a result, authoritarianism impacts one’s gender identity.
Due to inequitable social roles, the endorsement of gender roles across the authoritarian
spectrum will differ for men and women. The ability of authoritarianism to influence
one’s appraisal of gender roles and the ability of gender to subsequently influence
authoritarian preferences creates a multifaceted relation (Lizotte 2019).
Historically, the relation between the sexes has benefited men over women. The
movement toward greater egalitarianism in society has presented new opportunities and
constraints for each sex. These secular changes in society affect how men and women
appraise political preferences in light of authoritarianism. The two variables are not equal
in their effect on issue stances. Authoritarianism is the dominant variable to affect
political preferences. Its central role reflects the fact that psychological mechanisms exert
the greatest influence on decision making outcomes (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller &
Shanks 1996, 192). For its part, gender is a mediating variable in this relationship. It is an
outlying variable that is not central to decision making outcomes, but still exerts a
significant effect on political preferences. This basis allows one to frame the interaction
between gender and authoritarian dispositions.
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One expects gender to exert a greater effect in the absence of a strong
authoritarian disposition. The distance of gender from the core of decision making in the
logic of causal pathway model limits its ability to influence outcomes in the presence of
stronger influencers. Its effect is conditional on the magnitude of one’s authoritarianism
predisposition. A weak predisposition toward authoritarianism will allow more latitude
for gender to determine preferences. The preceding literature review highlighted an array
of issues where men and women differ due to gender socialization. One saw that men are
more culturally and economically conservative than women (Eagly et al. 2004). The
conventional male preference for social arrangements is more closely aligned to the
authoritarian’s preference. Men are more likely to prefer aggressive and punitive policies,
and feel less sympathy toward out-groups than women. Consequently, one expects
gender socialization to push men toward authoritarian preferences as the effect of
authoritarianism is diminished. This process creates a gender gap in preferences along
the spectrum of authoritarian dispositions. The exact ability of gender to mediate
preferences will depend on how much influence of authoritarianism is present.
The dynamic of this relation has the potential to manifest differently depending on
the issue. In most cases, gender will modulate the effect of authoritarianism in an
interactive fashion. On certain issues, gender will mediate and moderate authoritarian
dispositions. For instance, Lizotte finds that gender is a moderating mediator of
authoritarian dispositions on the issue of gun control. This issue is unique as gender roles
define what security and order mean for men and women in different ways. Authoritarian
men oppose gun control as it is injurious to their identity as a protector. Guns offer
protection for men, who experience violence from strangers at greater rates than women.
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Authoritarian women support gun control to protect them and relatives from violence.
Gun control offers protection for women, who experience intimate violence at higher
rates than men (2019, 391). In this scenario, the gender roles for each sex diverge in the
character of defining protection for one’s self. The moderating-mediator relation should
manifest when gender moderates an outcome in conjunction with the mediating effect of
gender interacting with authoritarianism (2019, 395). It is assumed this same moderating
effect will manifest in light of one’s group identifications, too.

Figure 2: Idealized Interactive Mediational Relation between
Gender and Authoritarianism
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Figure 3: Idealized Moderated-Mediational Relation between
Gender and Authoritarianism
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These models capture the two predicted relationships between gender and
authoritarianism. In the interactive model, gender differences appear among nonauthoritarian populations, but disappear in authoritarian populations. In the moderatedmediational model, gender differences may appear in non-authoritarian populations, but
increase in intensity among authoritarian populations. The implication of gender with
regard to the issue in question will determine which outcome to expect. The
preponderance of hypotheses in this inquiry predict convergence in the interaction of
gender and authoritarianism with regard to outcomes. Only one issue will require greater
exploration through the divergence model to establish the relation.
These hypotheses broadly cluster around three topics of interest. Further, they are
arrayed in line with the logic of Altemeyer’s typology of authoritarian characteristics
(1981). The first topic represents issues relating to preferences for social arrangements.
This section tests if preferences are gendered among traditional issues of concern for
researchers of authoritarianism. The second topic concerns intergroup relations with
regard to group identity in the form of affective partisanship. This category examines the
interaction of gender and authoritarianism in relation to relevant aspects of partisanship
and social identity. The final topic investigates the relation in the domain of economic
ideology. The purpose of this category is to cast gender as the missing variable to explain
the absence of any previous connections between authoritarianism and economic
positions.
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Table 5: Typology of Hypotheses
Hypotheses Category of Dependent Variable

Expected Relation

1-2

Cultural Preferences

Mediation (Convergence)

3-6

Affective Partisanship

Mediation (Convergence)

7-8

Economic Preferences

Moderated-Mediation
(Divergence)

Hypotheses of Social Arrangements: Cultural Preferences
The first topic of hypotheses concerns itself with one’s orientation toward the
structure of society in regard to two dimensions of authoritarianism. These two
dimensions are social convention and leadership style (Altemeyer 1981). The assumption
for this block of hypotheses is that gender waxes and wanes in its effect on an
individual’s preference formation depending on one’s predisposition. Non-authoritarians
should be disposed to form their opinions absent the need for closure that predominates
an authoritarian’s decision making. In this realm, an individual should have greater
latitude to select preferences that do not directly force the individual to conform to group
authority. Non-authoritarians should be disposed toward greater diversity (Hetherington
& Weiler 2009, 42).
In addition to diversity, gender will also have influence over how nonauthoritarian individuals color their preferences in the absence of authoritarian constraint.
Here, the effect of gender is different for men and women. Since gender socialization
disposes men toward behavior related to authoritarianism, non-authoritarian men should
harbor a higher level of support for authoritarian preferences than non-authoritarian
women. One should expect authoritarian dispositions to increasingly override other
decision-making cues like gender as one slides across the authoritarian spectrum.
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Therefore, authoritarian men and women should express roughly the same preferences as
the impulses of authoritarianism precede other influences like gender. Gender should not
cause men and women to construe authoritarian means differently in any of the
hypotheses in this topic. Therefore, the convergence model should explain the relation
between gender and authoritarianism for hypotheses in this category, on the whole. Two
hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this first topic:
Hypothesis 1: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
predispositions will be more likely to express support for homogenous cultural
preferences than those with lower authoritarian predispositions.
Postulate 1A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will express
higher levels of support for homogenous cultural preferences than non-authoritarian
women.
Postulate 1B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will express the
same levels of support for homogenous cultural preferences as authoritarian women.
Hypothesis 2: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
predispositions will be more likely to express support for sexist social arrangements than
those with lower authoritarian predispositions.
Postulate 2A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will express
higher levels of support for sexist social arrangements than non-authoritarian women.
Postulate 2B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will express the
same levels of support for sexist social arrangements as authoritarian women.
Hypotheses of Intergroup Relations: Affective Partisanship
The second topic of hypotheses concerns itself with the domain of partisanship.
The nexus of social identity provides the connective tissue for gender and
authoritarianism through party affiliation. Therefore, this topic explores the gendering of
preferences in regard to the third dimension of authoritarianism: out-group derogation
(Altemeyer 1981). These hypotheses will concern themselves with explicit political
positions as opposed to idealized preferences for the structure of society. The trappings of
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these positions reflect politics as group competition. Affect is a key component in
partisan decision-making because partisanship is an expressive social identity (Huddy et
al. 2015). Party affiliation informs individuals of politicized group grievances to identify
as their own grievances (Huddy 2018, 6). It informs them with whom to associate and
disassociate. Partisans will extend positive affect to others who they acknowledge to be in
the coalition. For instance, a prototypical Republican will feel amiable toward
businessmen while a prototypical Democrat will feel amiable toward labor unions.
The hypotheses in this category deal with the affect associated with partisan
identity. The bulkhead of these hypotheses is that gender mediates affect for opposing
partisans. Women are conventionally socialized to express conciliation and congeniality
toward others. By contrast, men are socialized to unempathetically engage in disputes.
Broadly, gender socializes men to find difference whereas it socializes women find
similarity (Eagly et al. 2004). Social role theory holds that the values ascribed to each sex
translate into political preferences (Lizotte 2017). Indeed, the political preferences of
women are more compassionate toward social minorities than men, on average
(Kaufmann 2002). In the absence of authoritarian constraint, one expects women to
harbor lower levels of negative affect toward out-groups than men. However, women and
men should hold equally negative views toward out-groups as authoritarian dispositions
increases. Authoritarians perceive competition as a zero-sum game, and experience
heightened threat in the presence of consequential stakes. The mediational effect of
gender will disappear in the presence of authoritarian dispositions. In this manner, the
convergence model of the relation between gender and authoritarianism will obtain. Four
hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this second topic:
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Hypothesis 3: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
dispositions will be more likely to be strong partisans than those with lower nonauthoritarian dispositions.
Postulate 3A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
more likely to be strong partisans than non-authoritarian women.
Postulate 3B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely
to be strong partisans as authoritarian women.
Hypothesis 4: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
dispositions will be more likely to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential
candidates than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions.
Postulate 4A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
more likely to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential candidates than
non-authoritarian women.
Postulate 4B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely
to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential candidates as authoritarian
women.
Hypothesis 5: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
dispositions will be more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized
social identities than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions.
Postulate 5A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized social identities
than non-authoritarian women.
Postulate 5B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely
to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized social identities as
authoritarian women.
Hypothesis 6: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian
dispositions will be more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political
parties than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions.
Postulate 6A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political parties than nonauthoritarian women.
Postulate 6B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely
to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political parties as authoritarian women.
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Hypotheses of Intergroup Relations: Economic Preferences
The dynamics of competition present a second relevant dimension of partisanship
to investigate in light of the hypothesized relation between gender and authoritarianism.
This dimension of partisan derogation involves the conversion of affect into concrete
policy positions. It is the thrust of the third topic of economic hypotheses. The inference
pattern for the social aspect of partisanship is that partisans compete to protect the status
of their party (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Iyengar & Westwood 2015; 704). The linchpin
assumption is that competition induces partisans to rely on their negative affect for other
out-groups to form their policy preferences. They oppose the policies that the other side
supports. Intense elite ideological polarization clarifies this connection between affect
and policy, and reinforces it in the mass electorate (Johnston 2018).
The conversion of affect into policy positions connects the interaction of
authoritarianism and gender to economic ideology. For decades, researchers have failed
to link authoritarianism with support for specific economic ideologies (Stenner 2005). Its
effects are contained to social and cultural issues. As with the case with gender and
authoritarianism, this disconnect between economic policy and authoritarianism is undertheorized. One must reconsider the relation in terms of social identity. Economic
ideology is largely bifurcated into liberalism and conservatism with regard to the New
Deal cleavage. Voters decide whether they would like more government activism in
economic affairs or less. Traditional research into the link between voters and their
ideological bearings rests on respondent self-identification (Abramowitz & Saunders
2006). One should be skeptical of revealed ideological labels because voters often do not
understand what “liberal” and “conservative” mean in political contexts (Ellis & Stimson
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2012, 16). These terms are idealized generalizations. Consequently, shared understanding
between partisans on their meaning is weak.
Traditionally, scholars have overcome this limitation by probing respondents’
feelings toward government itself. In this way, one can get a sense of operation ideology.
Voters can use this heuristic to inform policy positions regardless of sophistication
(Goren & Chen 2016). Scholars argue that beliefs about operational ideology form the
fountainhead of political behavior in American politics (Abramowitz & Saunders 2017;
Goren & Chen 2016). The concept is accessible to enough Americans to navigate
political issues, and may even serve as the means by which voters inform their partisan
identity. Abramowitz and Webster claim that ideological polarization, the sharp and
irreconcilable difference over policy, drives affective partisanship. They substantiate their
proposition by testing if one’s social welfare ideology affects one’s affect toward
presidential candidates (2017, 638). Their conclusion would undercut the assumptions of
the social identity theory of politics if one stopped on this point, but their results beg the
question. Does social welfare ideology drive affect, or vice-versa?
One must consider the social dimension of ideological conflict. Affect toward the
target group of public policy is sufficient to enhance or mitigate support for the policy
(Condon & Wichowsky 2017; Jacoby 2000). Questions over the scope of government
matter to individuals in the first place because welfare policies imply a transfer of
resources from one group to a beneficiary group. Redistributive politics have an implicit
racial component for white Americans (Ellis & Stimson 2012; Gilens 1999; Tesler 2016).
This racial dimension is also gendered (Schaffner et al. 2018). To white men,
redistributive politics is a net loss. The government taxes them, and they perceive no
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benefit in return. For white women, redistributive politics offers some insurance against
male economic dependence and the vicissitudes of the market (Bullock & Reppond 2017;
Lizotte 2017). The government taxes them, but they receive access to social welfare
programs in return. Therefore, men and women construe economic security differently
due to gender roles.
The divergence of male and female interest for redistributive policies affects the
role of authoritarianism in relation to economic ideology. Past attempts have failed to
safely link authoritarianism and economic ideology because these attempts relied on the
labels of revealed ideology instead of concrete positions in the realm of group
competition. One finds that these attempts have also failed to distinguish between the
interests of men and women (see Abramowitz & Saunders 2006). Men perceive
economic security by retrenching redistributive policies. Women receive economic
security by entrenching redistributive policies. The divergent interests of men and women
mean that gender plays a moderated mediational role with regard to authoritarianism as
expected in the divergence model (Lizotte 2019).
Gender will moderate authoritarianism in this situation. Men and women will
diverge in terms of economic ideology toward conservatism and liberalism as they
become more authoritarian in their disposition. Concurrently, gender will serve to
mediate the relation between authoritarianism and economic ideology. In a similar
assessment made in the second category of hypotheses, non-authoritarians differ from
authoritarians in their perception of competition as a zero-sum game. The authoritarian
motivation to derogate out-groups will not be powerful for non-authoritarians. It is
predicted therefore that non-authoritarian men will be slightly more conservative than
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non-authoritarian women while authoritarian men will be much more conservative than
authoritarian women. Non-authoritarian men will be less conservative than authoritarian
men overall, and non-authoritarian women will be less liberal than authoritarian women.
The chasm of the gender gap in economic preferences will expand as one’s authoritarian
disposition increases. Men will further support conservatism in the sense that they favor
less redistribution while women will increasingly support liberalism in that they favor
expanding redistribution. Two hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this
third topic:
Hypothesis 7: In a comparison of individuals, men will be overall more likely to oppose
government regulation of businesses than women.
Postulate 7A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
slightly more likely to oppose government regulation of businesses than nonauthoritarian women.
Postulate 7B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be more
likely to oppose government regulation of businesses as authoritarian women.
Hypothesis 8: In a comparison of individuals, men will be overall more likely to oppose
the taxation of millionaires than women.
Postulate 8A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be
slightly more likely to oppose the taxation of millionaires than non-authoritarian women.
Postulate 8B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be more
likely to oppose the taxation of millionaires as authoritarian women
Caveats and Considerations
The hypotheses of the second and third topics, which probe intergroup relations
broadly, are potentially complicated with regard to party affiliation. This variable
possesses the ability to bisect the influence of gender and authoritarianism. Party
affiliation carries gender connotations itself (Winter 2010). Party affiliation is also a
visible and consequential identity (Huddy et. Al. 2015; Iyengar & Westwood 2015). In
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this regard, its influence bends the interests of constituent social identities toward the
prototype of the party (Egan 2019). This influence cross-pressures men and women who
belong to political parties with different gender connotations to the one associated with
their sex. This cross-pressure impacts Republican women and Democratic men. Party
affiliation will potentially muddle the relation between gender and authoritarianism. It is
possible that it intensifies support for authoritarian outcomes for Republican women
across the spectrum while conversely weakening the support for the same outcomes
among Democratic men. This attenuating effect could distort the predicted relation
between gender to authoritarianism. One must be aware of this potential, and take care to
isolate the influence of partisanship to the extent possible.
The takeaway for these hypotheses is that in most situations the full effect of the
authoritarian disposition should have the influence on female preference formation.
Gender will have the greatest influence on preferences absent the influence of the
psychological mechanism of authoritarianism. In the American context, that provides
white females more latitude in preference formation as gender socialization moves men
toward authoritarian social arrangements absent authoritarian dispositions. In the majority
of all hypotheses, the effect of authoritarian dispositions will move men and women
toward preferences for authoritarian social arrangements. This relation deteriorates in
light of economic issues as different ends are needed for authoritarian means. In the
example above, liberalism defines protection for women and conservatism defines
protection for men. It is not uniform like it was in the other hypotheses where greater
conformity to groupness was the end to authoritarian means for both men and women.

DiMariano 145

Chapter 5: Data & Methods
The broad hypothesized interrelation between gender and authoritarianism in the
partisanship of white Americans means allows one latitude in the selection of a dataset.
This inquiry relies on the 2016 American National Election Survey (2017). The ANES is
a quadrennial national survey with a reach of over 4,000 respondents. The survey
includes a pre-election and post-election interview to enable analysts to study the
electorate during presidential elections. Large public surveys provide a strong capacity
for testing theories about political behavior (Brady 2000, 48). It includes the CRV scale,
so it is possible to operationalize authoritarianism. However, the methodology of the
ANES potentially biases results. Surveys conducted around elections register public
sentiment at a moment when political identities are salient (Conover & Miller 2015). The
timing exaggerates the extremity of voter responses (Gerber et al. 2010, 742). Despite
these concerns, the ANES investigates a variety of topics from social issues to economic
choices. The reach of the ANES offers insight into multiple political issues.
Independent Variables
This inquiry relies on the CRV scale to operationalize authoritarianism (Stenner
2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009). The four constituent variables to construct the scale
are all located within the 2016 ANES. These four variables reflect a respondent’s childrearing preference to an item in a pair of choices. The four questions include:
1. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Obedience or self-reliance?’;
2. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Being considerate or well
behaved?’;
3. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Curiosity or good manners?’;
and,
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4. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for
elders?’
The resulting scale has good internal reliability (α=.65). The CRV scale will be the main
independent variable of concern. The other independent variable is sex. The ANES asks
respondents what their sex is, and the resulting variable registers if they are a male or
female respondent. A male respondent is registered as a 1, and a female respondent is
registered as 2. The interaction variable is created by multiplying the CRV scale with the
sex variable.
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Variable

Obs.

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Authoritarianism (CRV Scale)

3,612

2.35

1.11

1

4

Sex

4,218

.53

.49

0

1

Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 1 & 2
The first topic of hypotheses treads two dimensions of the authoritarian attitudes:
social convention and leadership. The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is a broad
measure of cultural preferences across these two dimensions. The ANES provides a
multitude of questions, which probe respondents for their orientation toward idealized
social arrangements. Six questions were selected to craft a scale to measure one’s
preference for both strong leadership and traditional social conventions. The questions
selected include:
1. ‘Our country would be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining
everything’;
2. ‘Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of the United States’;
3. ‘To be truly American it is important to follow America’s customs traditions’;
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4. ‘What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil
and take us back to our true path’;
5. ‘The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society’; and,
6. ‘This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties.’
Each statement reflects a tradeoff between a society of diversity and a society of
conformity. The questions were chosen for internal consistency, and the scale has high
internal reliability (α=.83) to justify the selection. The responses to the constituent scales
range from one to five whereby higher responses corresponds with a higher level of
support for authoritarian social arrangements. The conglomerated scale for authoritarian
cultural preferences also ranges from one to five, and has a relatively even spread of
responses among answers. The spread of responses is represented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Distribution of Responses for the Cultural Preference Scale in
Hypothesis 1
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A second scale compliments the first scale by probing attitudes toward social
conventions with the explicit focus on gender roles for Hypothesis 2. These questions
capture the level of sexism in respondents, and it is often referred to modern sexism scale
(Cassese & Barnes 2017, 680). The scale comprises of responses to two statements about
the place of women in society:
1. ‘When women demand equality these days, how often are they actually seeking
special favors?’; and,
2. ‘When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more
problems than they solve?’
These questions focus on the role of women in challenging conventional social practices
in private and in public. The modern sexism scale has relatively high internal reliability
(α=.75). It ranges from one to five with one representing low symbolic sexism and five
representing high symbolic sexism. The spread of responses is relatively skewed toward
the absence of sexism. One can reasonably accept this skew as a reflection of egalitarian
cultural values in the United States. Either respondents truly exhibit low levels of
symbolic sexism, or bias toward social acceptability with their responses.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Responses for the Modern Sexism Scale in Hypothesis 2

Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 3 through 6
The following sections of hypotheses examine the relation between gender and
authoritarianism in regards to intergroup relations. The analysis of this relation divides
into two parts. The first part is the second topic of hypotheses, which measures out-group
derogation in terms of affective partisanship. The ANES offers multiple routes to
operationalize partisan affect. The first measure examines the strength of partisanship in
respondents for Hypothesis 3. Partisanship is a central social identity in lives of most
Americans. Political parties are entitative groups. Therefore, the affiliation of a
respondent with a party should be influenced by his/her authoritarian disposition. Strong
authoritarians are more likely to be strong partisans (Luttig 2017).
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The ANES asks respondents to register the intensity of their allegiance to a
political party. This question is a seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat on one
end to strong Republican on the other end. The mid-point consists of independent voters.
This variable is recoded so that Democrats and Republicans are lumped together based on
the intensity of their partisanship. The new interval scale consists of four responses. A
high response (4) signifies strong partisanship while a low response (1) signifies partisan
disaffiliation or independence. The distribution of responses is skewed in a reflection of
the current state of partisanship in contemporary politics. Roughly half of respondents
consider the strength of their affiliation to a party to be weak or moderate, yet nearly half
identify as strong partisans. Independents in this situation represent the smallest group,
and it is likely that even they are partisan “leaners” (Iyengar & Westwood 2015, 7).
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Figure 6: Distribution of Respondents by Strength of Party Affiliation for
Hypothesis 3

The next measure for Hypothesis 4 consists of a feeling thermometer for each the
presidential nominees in the 2016 election. Candidates for president are the most visible
representative of each party who compete in the most visible and consequential race to
voters (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 4). They represent their constituent groups and their
issues (Bawn et al. 2012). The embodiment of a party’s platform in a candidate generates
polarized emotions in the electorate (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Respondents register
their thermostatic feelings on a scale of 0 to 100 with regard to Trump and Clinton. A
rating of 0 signifies negative affect while a rating of 100 signifies positive affect.
The absolute value of a respondent’s view toward Trump minus Clinton will
represent the chasm in affection between candidates among respondents. A wide gap
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between feelings for Trump and Clinton will signify a high degree of in-group appraisal
and out-group derogation. Lower numbers represent a smaller gap in responses in the
evaluation of Trump and Clinton among respondents. The distribution of evaluations in
Figure 7 do not produce a discernable pattern. The responses register across the scale. It
is not uncommon for an unequal distribution in a thermostatic scale as respondents round
their considerations toward benchmark interval numbers (Zaller 1992, 295).
Figure 7: Distribution of Evaluations of the 2016 Presidential Candidates for
Hypothesis 4

This logic continues in the next hypothesis. The measure for Hypothesis 5
examines affect toward social groups as a compliment to the measure of affect for
candidates and party polarization. The affect for candidates is worth examining, but
candidates possess peculiar characteristics, such as sex, that could foil them as a true
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measure of partisan affect. In the pattern of social identity, one will examine a
respondent’s affect for the politicized social groups of each party.
A scale of feeling thermometers of groups in each party form the basis for the
social polarization dependent variable. For Democrats, a conglomerated feeling
thermometer is crafted from thermometer scales for labor unions, feminists, liberals, the
LGBT community, transgenders, and Black Lives Matter activists (α=.85). For
Republicans, a conglomerated feeling thermometer is crafted from thermometer scales
for Christian fundamentalists, big business, conservatives, rich people, and the Tea Party
(α=.79). A factor analysis revealed two distinct factors. The feeling thermometer for poor
people was not included on the Democratic conglomerated feeling thermometer as it
loaded on both factors. In similarity with the presidential evaluation thermometer, the
absolute value of a respondent’s view toward Republican-aligned social groups minus
Democratic-aligned social groups will represent the chasm in affection between partisan
coalitions. A wide gap between feelings will signify a high degree of appraisal for one’s
partisan coalition and derogation for the opposing party’s coalition. Figure 8 shows that
the responses for social polarization are relatively unskewed. It is hard to discern the
reason for the difference in distributions between Figure 7 and 8. It is likely that
partisanship is actively skewing ratings of presidential nominees while it is exerting less
influence in the evaluation of politicized social groups.
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Figure 8: Distribution of Levels of Social Polarization for Hypothesis 5

Lastly, one examines party polarization outright for Hypothesis 6. The variable in
question in this case follows in the same vein as the previous two. It is another way to
interpret the relation between gender and authoritarianism with regard to partisan
intergroup conflict. It is perhaps the most forthright by probing partisan meta-identities
directly. The inclusion of the last hypothesis is important to study the emerging
phenomenon of social polarization; however, many individuals have wide-ranging
associations despite the alignment of social groups in national politics. The multiplicity
of social attachments to different groups potentially dilutes the relationship between
gender and authoritarianism.
Partisan polarization should not suffer from these drawbacks (Egan 2019). One
constructs the dependent variable for this test in the same fashion as for the variable
measuring the gap in affect between presidential candidates and politicized social groups.
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This hypothesis captures the intensity of affective partisanship among respondents toward
both Democrats and Republicans. The ANES asks respondents to register their feelings
toward the parties on a scale from 0 to 100. The absolute value of their affect for
Democrats minus Republicans on a condensed scale of 0 to 10 forms the polarization
scale. A wide gap signifies polarized feelings toward the parties. Authoritarianism will
structure the gap since strong authoritarians are strong partisans and strong partisans will
be most likely to polarize. The distribution of responses in Figure 9 is surprisingly
unskewed given the tangible presence of partisanship, which promotes the idea that it is
the peculiarity of presidential nominees in addition to partisanship that is actively
skewing the distribution of those responses.
Figure 9: Distribution of Responses of Affective Partisanship in Hypothesis 6
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Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 7 & 8
The second part of the analysis in regards to intergroup relations represents the
third cluster of hypotheses for this inquiry. Hypotheses 7 and 8 are novel for the attempt
to link authoritarianism to economic preferences through the effect of gender. The
connection of authoritarianism to an economic ideology has proven elusive even in light
of elite polarization and mass partisanship (Johnston 2018). The cause for this absence is
likely methodological. The dependent variable for economic ideology is generally one’s
self-identification as liberal or conservative. These identities have more than one
dimension of meaning to voters (Ellis & Stimson 2012). Therefore, it is prudent to avoid
economic ideological self-identification as the dependent variable.
The first step to construct dependent variables for this cluster of hypotheses is to
functionally operationalize economic preferences. This requires that one define economic
ideology. Goren and Chen conveniently define economic ideology functionally as one’s
orientation toward the role of government in the economy (2016). An American who
prefers less government regulation is more conservative in this sense as opposed to a
liberal who prefers more government regulation. The benefit to this conceptualization is
that most citizens use it as a heuristic for understanding partisan conflict (Goren 2013).
The role of government in the economic reflects the central schism in political
philosophy in the context of the New Deal state. The ANES asks respondents two
questions in this context. The first one is an ordinal variable which asks respondents if
more or less government activity is better. This question is quite general. However, the
second one asks respondents specifically about their preference toward government
regulation of business. This question captures the functional tradeoff between
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government and economic supervision, and is more desirable for the model, as a result.
The variable has five choices with lower values signifying more regulation, and higher
values signifying less regulation. The responses are heavily skewed toward moderation of
the two extremes, and could potentially distort results in experimentation.
Figure 10: Distribution of Responses for Government Regulation of Business for
Hypothesis 7

It is prudent to conduct an analogous test to substantiate the results of Hypothesis
7 due to the novelty of the experiment. A second test will operationalize economic
ideology through a dependent variable in a similar vein. The ANES provides a question
probing a respondent’s preference for taxing millionaires. It will serve as the basis for
Hypothesis 8. It is an interval variable consisting of three responses. These responses
include favoring, opposing, and neither favoring or opposing the taxation of millionaires.
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This question follows in the logic of the tradeoff between redistribution and social
welfare in a similar way to regulating business. The taxation of millionaires could
actually be a more salient question to respondents than the regulation of businesses in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. Millionaires function as the personification of one’s
perspective of the market. They are either self-reliant success stories or the human face of
unfair business practices. It is presumed that the same moderated-mediational relation
will emerge as in Hypothesis 7. Similarly, the distribution of responses for Hypothesis 8
is also skewed. Figure 11 demonstrates this bend. The responses for Hypothesis 8 follow
a distinctly populist slant. The differences in skews reinforces the notion that the question
for Hypothesis 8 registers social tensions between economic classes whereas the question
in Hypothesis 7 is an impersonal, programmatic question.
Figure 11: Distribution of Responses for Taxing Millionaires among White
Americans
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Table 7: List of Hypotheses and Associated Dependent Variables
Hypothesis Dimension of Authoritarianism

Dependent Variable

1

Social Convention/Leadership

Cultural Preference Scale

2

Social Convention

Modern Sexism Preference Scale

3

Intergroup Relations

Party Affiliation Strength

4

Intergroup Relations

Presidential Evaluation Thermometer

5

Intergroup Relations

Social Group Polarization Thermometer

6

Intergroup Relations

Partisan Polarization Thermometer

7

Intergroup Relations

Business Regulation Preference Scale

8

Intergroup Relations

Taxing Millionaires Preference Scale

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Variable

Obs.

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Cultural Preference Scale

3,645

3.50

.92

1

5

Modern Sexism Scale

3,610

2.19

.91

1

5

Party Affiliation

4,247

2.87

1.07

1

4

Presidential Nominee Evaluations

4,208

5.24

2.78

1

10

Social Polarization

3,639

5.49

2.87

1

10

Partisan Polarization

3,298

5.18

2.79

1

10

Business Regulation

3,627

3.01

.82

1

5

Taxing Millionaires

3,635

2.49

.77

1

3

Control Variables
The conceptualization of economic ideology in Hypothesis 7 and 8 is
parsimonious; however, another caveat is that it is individualistic. It does not consider an
individual in the context of group identity (Huddy 2018). The function of the government
in the economy to authoritatively redistribute wealth is based on social considerations.
This redistribution occurs in the context of social groups. One’s orientation to
government social welfare policies reflects prejudices regarding who benefits and who
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suffers. At a minimum, individuals do not want their own affiliates to bear costs with no
benefits.
One must isolate the effect of social considerations of affective partisanship to
fully account for the interactive relation of gender and authoritarianism with regard to
economics. A racial component influences the policy considerations of white Americans
toward economic policy. A racial resentment variable will represent affect toward
African-Americans and the welfare state by proxy (Gilens 1999). This variable is the
most commonly accepted way to operationalize racial attitudes. It measures symbolic
racism in lieu of the challenges of capturing outright racism in respondents (Kinder &
Sanders 1996). In this way, it is an appropriate variable in the logic of social identity, and
will serve as a control variable. This variable is another constructed scale from three
constituent questions with high internal consistency (α=.79). These questions probe one’s
racial sentiments in five step intervals. They ask whether a respondent agrees with the
following prompts:
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
Racial considerations play an enormous role in social welfare policies as they
have merged with economic ideologies. Gender and authoritarianism interact with these
considerations in the milieu of the social identity of white Americans. One’s level of
resentment will mediate feelings toward economic regulation. In isolating racial
resentment to the extent possible, one can determine the extent to which gender inflects
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one’s economic ideological preferences while also measuring the interaction of gender
and authoritarianism mediate the intensity of those preferences.
A number of common demographic variables are also included in the models for
controls. These variables cover age, religion, education, region, and household
information. The age variable is an interval variable. Three dummy variables capture
whether a respondent identifies as Mainline Protestant, Catholic, or Evangelical. The
South is represented as a region with its own dummy variable as it is uniquely
conservative among regions in the United States. Lastly, a dummy variable indicates
whether the respondent has children in the household under 18. This variable corresponds
to Lizotte’s model for authoritarianism as she proposes parenthood alters considerations
for social arrangements for men and women (2019). The education variable measures
one’s degree attainment from a high school diploma or less (1), to some college (2), to a
bachelor’s degree (3) to a graduate degree (4).
This model also measures egalitarianism in respondents in the mold of Lizotte’s
model (2019). Egalitarianism is a core value that reflects in an individual’s political
preferences (Ciuk et al. 2017). It reflects the sentiment that policy should produce
equitable outcomes in society. The variable is an interval scale (α=.79) consisting of an
individual’s agreement with general statements about personal dispositions. These
include:
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has
an equal opportunity to succeed;
2. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people
are;
3. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life
than others; and
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4. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many
fewer problems.
Lastly, a variable is included in certain models to capture a respondent’s
partisanship. This control variable is necessary due to the compounding implications of
partisanship in the nexus of social identity. Partisanship carries the trappings of gender,
and certainly could muddle the relationship of authoritarianism and preferences in men
and women in the hypotheses concerning cultural preferences and economics. This
variable will not be included in the hypotheses explicitly touching partisan matters, and
one could leave it out altogether. However, it is identified, especially in the casual
pathway model, as an important influence on preference formation. Therefore, it will be
included in the cultural preferences and economic hypotheses. The ordinal variable itself
is a measure of party identification. It captures if a respondent self-identifies as a
Democrat (-1), Independent (0), or Republican (1).
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Table 9: List of Control Variables
Name

Description

Type

Values

Age

Age of Respondent

Interval

18+

Catholicism

Religious Identification

Nominal

0/1

Mainline Protestant

Religious Identification

Nominal

0/1

Evangelical

Religious Identification

Nominal

0/1

South

Region of Residence

Nominal

0/1

Education

Highest Degree Attained

Interval

0 to 4

Children

Presence of Children under 18 in

Nominal

0/1

Household
Egalitarianism

Preference for Equal Social Outcomes

Ordinal

0 to 4

Racial Resentment

Tolerance toward African-Americans

Ordinal

0 to 4

Party Identification

Self-Identified Party Affiliation

Nominal

0/3

Methods
This inquiry relies exclusively on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for
hypothesis testing. This method is used to test all the hypotheses since the dependent
variables in question are interval in nature. Diagnostics are applied to each model for
these hypotheses to ensure the models are properly specified. The first diagnostic test is a
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity occurs
when error terms differ in their variance over a range of measured values (Williams
2020). This prevents OLS regression from being the best linear unbiased estimator. The
problem plagues each model except for the ones concerning Hypothesis 4 and 7. One
corrects this problem by specifying robust standard errors where needed. Additionally,
one tests for multicollinearity to ensure that independent variables are not correlated with
one another. A variance inflation factor is calculated for each of the eight models. No
model demonstrated multicollinearity. The results of these diagnostics are located in
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Appendix A. Lastly, the models are weighted in accordance with the weighing variable
provided by the ANES.
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Test Result Summaries
Overall, the regression tests supported few of the hypotheses outright. One has
cause to affirm only in certain scenarios that the relation between gender and
authoritarianism on political behavior differs for men and women given one’s
authoritarian predisposition. This relationship shines most prominently in traditional
matters of authoritarian research related to cultural preferences. On the whole, however,
the results blemish the idea that one should expect an interactive relationship as the norm
on political matters. The strength of the effects of partisanship with regard to inter-group
relations subsume the conditional effect of gender and authoritarianism. The interactive
effect holds absent the priming of partisan identities, but not directly in cases of
economic redistribution. Authoritarianism causes men and women to increasingly support
preferences for authoritarian social arrangements, yet the rate of change is not the same
for women as men. The reason for this interactive effect is that men, as a result of gender
socialization, support more authoritarian preferences overall than women. The
preferences converge as authoritarianism overwhelms the effect of gender on preference
formation. Therefore, it is with qualification that one posits that gender interacts with
authoritarianism.
Results for Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis showcases this observed interactive relation between gender
and authoritarianism. The dependent variable for this test measured the cultural
preferences of respondents on a scale toward social relations and convention on issues
such as minority integration and strong leaders. The scale registered responses of 1 to 5
with higher responses signifying higher authoritarian preferences. The authoritarian
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disposition, the sex variable, and the interaction term between those two variables all
produced statistically significant coefficients. The expected preference was 3.2 for a nonauthoritarian male respondent—a score that leans toward authoritarian cultural
arrangements. The value for an authoritarian male respondent is nearly one point higher
(4.12) than his non-authoritarian counterpart. This jump represents a substantive
difference on par with the effect of party affiliation.
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Table 10: Cultural Preference Scale among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.231***
(0.0200)
-0.120*
(0.0692)
0.0705***
(0.0266)
0.0835***
(0.00799)
-0.136***
(0.0153)
-0.148***
(0.0160)
0.314***
(0.0186)
0.0473
(0.0352)
-0.00574
(0.0414)
0.221***
(0.0423)
0.0846**
(0.0377)
0.0309
(0.0309)
3.201***
(0.0844)
2,786
0.518

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The expected preference and rate of change is not the same for women, however.
The expected base preference drops to 3.08 for the population of non-authoritarian
females. This gap represents the full effect of gender on the preferences of non-
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authoritarian respondents. Gender is not as central to preference formation as
authoritarianism in the logic of causal pathway models. Therefore, the effect of gender is
greatest in the absence of authoritarianism. Again, the difference is significant, yet one
would expect gender to produce a more substantive effect. However, the rate of change
also matters. The rate of change is greater for women than men such that authoritarian
women actually hold more authoritarian preferences than authoritarian men (4.28 to

Cultural Preferences (Higher Value =
More Conventional)

4.12).

Figure 12: Cultural Preferences by Gender and
Authoritarian Disposition among White Americans in
Hypothesis 1
4
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The logic of the hypothesis expected convergence of preferences among
authoritarian men and women. However, the gap between the preferences of authoritarian
men and women is marginally greater than the gap between non-authoritarian men and
women. It is possible that gender produces an unexpected effect among authoritarians,
too. This outcome appears to be the only unanticipated result of this test. The variable for
children in the household is insignificant. This outcome corresponds to the results of
Lizotte, who also found that the variable was insignificant (2019). The concern for the
upbringing of one’s children does not impact considerations about the structure of social
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relations. This is intuitive given that authoritarianism imparts the concern for the
upbringing of children, in the first place. The substantive effects of the control variables
contextualize the effect of authoritarianism. The age and education of the respondent
move the needle by less than half a unit of the full spread of their effects. Age increases
one’s support for authoritarian cultural preferences while education decreases it. The
most culturally conservative sect, Evangelical Christianity, likewise only moves the
needle by less than a quarter of a unit. In this regard, the effect of gender appears more
prominent.
Results for Hypothesis 2
The relationship between gender and authoritarianism continues with regard to
modern sexist attitudes. One anticipated that this dependent variable would make gender
even more salient in the decision-making process between men and women across the
authoritarian scale. The results support this prediction. Unlike the previous model,
though, the interaction term is not significant in this situation for Hypothesis 2 (p=.109).
However, it is close enough to significance to justify treating it as such. A nonauthoritarian man holds sexist beliefs, overall. The constant for the model is 2.95 on a
scale of 5. The base position starts from above average sexist perspective. The effect of
authoritarianism increases already present sexist attitudes in men. Authoritarian men
register around 3.30 units on the scale. One expected authoritarianism to produce such an
effect. Authoritarians sharply respond to challenges to the conventional order. The
presence of a prevailing national culture in favor the advancement of women beyond
their current roles in society is believed to produce a backlash effect or resentment among
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men. The push for egalitarianism collides with an authoritarian’s desire for hierarchical
structures in group relations. The results reflect these sentiments.
Table 11: Modern Sexism among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale

0.0942***
(0.0261)
-0.172**
(0.0855)
0.0577
(0.0360)
-0.0387***
(0.0107)
-0.126***
(0.0188)
-0.230***
(0.0199)
0.110***
(0.0232)
0.0163
(0.0466)
-0.0454
(0.0467)
0.0643
(0.0610)
-0.0957**
(0.0483)
0.0580
(0.0421)
2.946***
(0.120)

Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
2,771
R-squared
0.229
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Unsurprisingly, gender registers a pronounced effect in the results. Women are
less likely to view other women as unreasonably complaining about sexism or demanding
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better treatment. These attitudes culminate with women registering around a 2.75 on the
modern sexist scale. This outcome is still somewhat sexist. It is possible that this score
represents a backlash effect among women against the goals of feminism, or is evidence
of latent support for benevolent sexism. Authoritarianism increases support for sexist
attitudes among women. Women become more sexist for every unit increase in
authoritarianism than men. Ultimately, the preferences of authoritarian women converge
with the preferences of authoritarian men to the point that they are indistinguishable. An
authoritarian woman scores 3.236 on the scale compared to the 3.232 points of an

Level of Sexism (Higher Value = More
Sexist)

authoritarian man.

Figure 13: Modern Sexism by Gender and Authoritarian
Disposition among White Americans in Hypothesis 2
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Results for Hypothesis 3
The first two hypotheses demonstrated an interactive relation between gender and
authoritarianism with regard to cultural preferences and social relations. The remaining
hypotheses concern themselves with inter-group relations. It is in these hypotheses that
the original assumptions need further specification. The first of these hypotheses focuses
explicitly on partisanship. The dependent variable assessed how strongly or weakly a
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respondent is attached to a partisan identity. Authoritarianism should structure support for
partisanship as an expressive identity. Gender should modulate the intensity of
partisanship. The results in Table 12 do not support these hypotheses at all. Neither the
authoritarian disposition, the sex variable or the interaction term are significant. This
unexpected hiccup forces one to contemplate the rationale for the insignificance. The
presence of partisanship is likely distorting the results. The literature review identified the
two parties as potentially complicating factor due to differences in nature and
composition. Republicans have more authoritarians, and avail themselves in masculinity.
Democrats have fewer authoritarians, and avail themselves in feminine themes. The
effect of gender and authoritarianism on partisanship may itself be conditional of party
affiliation.
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Table 12: Strength of Party Affiliation among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficient

Authoritarian Disposition Scale

0.0365
(0.0343)
0.144
(0.111)
-0.0340
(0.0452)
0.0679***
(0.0133)
0.0809***
(0.0247)
0.0258
(0.0223)
0.0308
(0.0557)
0.150**
(0.0669)
0.201***
(0.0712)
0.0761
(0.0624)
-0.0565
(0.0516)
2.193***
(0.138)

Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

2,786
0.034
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

One reproduced the hypothesis test in Table 13, but separated respondents by
party affiliation. The results are intriguing. Authoritarianism, sex and the interaction term
are again insignificant for Democrats. Partisanship does not vary by these variables.
However, this is not the case for Republicans. The variables for authoritarianism and sex
are significant among authoritarians, and the interaction term is only just insignificant
(p=.106). If one counts the interaction term as significant due to its proximity to the
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threshold of significance, then gender and authoritarianism interact as expected for
Republicans only. The constant term signifies that the average Republican is already
quite partisan (2.76 out of 4). Authoritarianism has a prominent effect on Republican
partisanship. Its full effect raises the partisanship of a male respondent by half a point.
This effect is twice as much as the full effect of age. Interestingly, women are more
partisan than men overall if one does not assume the interaction term is significant. One
did not expect this result, nor would one expect the results if the interaction term is
counted. In that case, non-authoritarian women are more partisan than non-authoritarian
men, but converge at 3.5 on the partisan scale as expected. This hypothesis requires

Party Affiliation (Higher Value = Stronger
Affiliation)

further parsing to reconcile.

Figure 14: Partisan Strength by Gender and Authoritarian
Disposition among White Republicans in Hypothesis 3
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Table 13: Strength of Party Affiliation among White Americans by Party
Affiliation

VARIABLES
Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Republican
Coefficients

Democratic
Coefficients

0.129***
(0.0305)
0.256**
(0.116)
-0.0691
(0.0428)
0.0359***
(0.0124)
-0.00469
(0.0233)
-0.0780***
(0.0232)
0.000502
(0.0522)
0.107
(0.0671)
0.136**
(0.0623)
-0.0145
(0.0594)
-0.00797
(0.0475)
2.746***
(0.128)

0.00689
(0.0353)
0.0735
(0.101)
-0.00356
(0.0446)
0.0962***
(0.0123)
-0.0424*
(0.0238)
0.0745***
(0.0234)
0.0638
(0.0517)
-0.150**
(0.0681)
-0.244***
(0.0846)
0.00595
(0.0595)
0.0483
(0.0531)
2.644***
(0.130)

1,312
0.047

1,142
0.067

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results for Hypothesis 4

The next hypothesis continues in the same vein. One observes the effect of gender
and authoritarianism on the affection of a respondent toward the 2016 presidential
candidates. This hypothesis tests the concept of polarization through the office of
president. Presidential candidates are the personification of each party, and thus bound to
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produce intense feelings. The public views presidential candidates as avatars of the social
movements of the opposing political party as a consequence of the evolution of the party
system and the office of presidency throughout the course of the New Deal. Gender
issues and authoritarianism were key elements in the production and maintenance of the
current divide between parties. The results should reflect their prominent role in the
development of modern partisanship.
The test demonstrates that a gap in affection exists between presidential
candidates. One expects this outcome. The coefficient of the constant term is 3.21 for
non-authoritarian men. This value is lower than one might anticipate in light of the heated
nature of contemporary politics. The effect of authoritarianism is significant and
substantive. Its full effect raises the predicted response to 4.33 for authoritarian men.
Authoritarianism is the most powerful variable in changing preferences in the model. One
expects a large effect as authoritarianism promotes in-group affection and out-group
derogation. It even trumps partisanship in this scenario. Counterintuitively, the change in
party affiliation from Democrat to Republican lowers the gap in affect between
candidates. This result indicates that Republicans felt warm toward their candidate less
than Democrats, or Republicans felt less cold toward Clinton than Democrats did toward
Trump.

Affective Polarization (Higher Value = Greater
Polarization in Evaluations)
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Figure 15: Presidential Candidate Affect Gap by Gender
and Authoritarian Disposition among White Americans in
Hypothesis 4
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Table 14: Affect Gap between Presidential Candidates among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.278***
(0.0864)
0.655**
(0.275)
-0.289**
(0.117)
0.213***
(0.0345)
0.0416
(0.0640)
0.140**
(0.0634)
-0.166**
(0.0798)
0.117
(0.147)
0.0824
(0.183)
0.206
(0.192)
-0.109
(0.160)
0.274**
(0.136)
3.218***
(0.352)
2,756
0.038

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The model continues to defy anticipated results with the results for women. The
model demonstrates that women had an outsized gap in affect between the candidates.
This outcome is reasonable. The 2016 election pitted the first female candidate in history
against a man who bragged about sexually assaulting women. The intriguing component
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to the results is the coefficient of the interaction term. Its value is -.01 when combined
with the coefficient of the authoritarianism scale coefficient to produce the rate of change
for women. The gap in affect toward candidates remained consistent and constant for
women across the authoritarian spectrum. This result does not imply that women always
appraised one candidate over the other, but could mean that women had strong attitudes
toward each candidate no matter who they were. Women contrast in this model by
deviating from the anticipated effect of authoritarianism whereas men followed the
predicted pattern. Non-authoritarian men were less polarized on the candidates than nonauthoritarian women (3.12 units to 3.87), but authoritarian men were more polarized than
authoritarian women (4.33 units to 3.83).
Results for Hypothesis 5
The results of this hypothesis potentially captured too many of the peculiarities of
the 2016 presidential candidates to faithfully capture the relation between gender and
authoritarianism. Gender salience likely exercised an outsized role in the assessment of
candidates. In all probability, Democratic women likely supported the first woman for
president with intense zeal while loathing the other candidate with a record of sexual
assault accusations. Female Republicans made a conscious decision to support Trump,
which likely intensified this deliberate support as a result. The fact that women are more
partisan than men in the Republican Party offers support to this interpretation. The results
are most likely borne from the unique matchup of the election cycle, though. The next
two hypotheses provide analogous checks to compare results. The first test examines
social polarization. The variable in question registers the gap in affection between
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politicized social group of differing partisan affiliations. The outcome of this test in Table
15 renders equally unanticipated results.
Table 15: Social Polarization among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.043
(0.0864)
0.347
(0.292)
-0.218*
(0.115)
0.076***
(0.035)
0.337***
(0.062)
0.364***
(0.062)
-0.0804
(0.0730)
-0.139
(0.146)
0.159
(0.181)
0.297
(0.199)
-0.619***
(0.159)
0.159
(0.135)
4.017***
(0.366)
2,781
0.084

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The fascinating aspect about the social polarization test is that the main effects are
not significant. The social polarization gap between non-authoritarians and authoritarians
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is not significantly different. The spread of outcomes is not significantly organized by sex
either. However, the interaction term is significant. A female respondent who becomes
authoritarian notices a significant and substantive decline in social polarization. The
effect does not extend to men. In real terms, authoritarian women actually experience a
smaller gap in affect between politicized social groups than non-authoritarian women.
The outcome is counterintuitive. One expects authoritarianism to promote gaps in
affection among politicized groups. However, the condition of being female moderates
the magnitude of the affect gap. In this case, gender either defines how authoritarian
females respond to out-group social groups, or authoritarianism warms or cools women
to a broader array of social groups. The fact that party affiliation is not significant is
telling. However, it is possible that the culture of each party affects the results when
holding party affiliation constant.
Table 16 reports the results of regression testing by party affiliation. The results
are strikingly different from the combined regression test results in Table 15. The
interaction term is no longer significant in either case for Democrats or Republicans. The
main effect for gender is also insignificant for respondents of both parties. However,
authoritarianism is significant and substantive among Republicans and Democrats. One
expected gender in both parties to attenuate social polarization for women. Instead, party
identity plays that role by exercising a conditional effect. It appears to eclipse the role of
gender.

Affective Polarization (Higher Value =
Greater Polarization in Evaluations)
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Figure 16: Social Polarization by Party Affiliation and
Authoritarian Disposition among White Americans in
Hypothesis 5
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Table 16: Social Polarization among White Americans by Party Affiliation
Republican
Democrats
VARIABLES
Coefficients Coefficients
Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.385***
(0.0977)
-.318
(0.371)
0.0212
(0.137)
0.217***
(0.0397)
0.0555
(0.0746)
-0.484***
(0.0744)
-0.067
(0.167)
-0.299
(0.2155)
0.928***
(0.199)
-0.325*
(0.190)
0.335**
(0.1522)
4.318***
(0.410)

-0.554***
(0.106)
0.231
(0.305)
-0.1041
(0.135)
-0.0377
(0.0372)
-0.262***
(0.0720)
0.965***
(0.0707)
-0.332**
(0.156)
-.038
(0.2060)
-1.217***
(0.255)
-0.576***
(0.1799)
-0.003
(0.160)
4.385***
(0.3933)

1,308
0.038

1,139
0.085

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The party to which one belongs matters with regard to the effect of
authoritarianism on the affect gap. A trend in the results is developing that reflects the
nature of the Republican Party as an ideological movement. The psychological pressure
to enforce uniformity in the Republican Party is higher due to its cohesion (Mason &
Wronski 2018). The full effect of authoritarianism in the Republican Party increases the
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affect gap by 1.5 units on a scale of 10. In substantive terms, an authoritarian Republican
ranks Democratic social groups a full 5.85 points below Republican social groups. Only
age possess a greater effect on increasing the affect gap while egalitarian values reduce
the gap with equal vigor. It is unsurprising that authoritarianism would have such an
effect among Republicans. The Republican Party is currently the de facto home of
authoritarian-minded voters. The cohesion of Republicans likely amplifies the effect of
authoritarianism on in-group affection and out-group derogation.
Democrats experience a much different effect from authoritarianism, however. In
this case, authoritarianism decreases social polarization by a hefty amount. The full effect
of authoritarianism lowers social polarization from 4.4 units to 2.2 points. A few potential
causes are behind the inverted effect. Authoritarianism is either reducing in-group
affection or out-group derogation or potentially some combination of both. Democrats
count few authoritarians among their ranks, so authoritarianism may reduce in-group
affection while promoting out-group affection for those who remain. The other
significant values can help interpret the results of authoritarianism. Egalitarian values, in
this case, substantively raises social polarization. It has the largest predicted effect of any
variable in either test. The full effect raises social polarization from 4.4 units to 8.3 units.
The opposing effects of egalitarianism and authoritarianism indicate that authoritarianism
is likely reducing out-group derogation among Democrats as white authoritarians likely
feel warm to social groups aligned with the Republican Party. Egalitarianism is likely
raising in-group affection among Democrats as the party that represents the marginalized
in society. Democrats are social levelers while Republicans represent hierarchy. This
difference would explain the influence and direction of each effect.
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Results for Hypothesis 6
Lastly, one examines the proposed interactive relation with regard to mass
polarization. The dependent variable in question is the most abstract and direct measure
of the distance one feels between prototypical Republicans and Democrats. Partisanship
constitutes a meta-identity of polarized social identities (Mason 2018). It is a salient
identity with numerous occasions to express it in public (Huddy et al. 2015). One
expected the interactive effect of gender on authoritarianism to shine in this hypothesis
where it did not in other tests examining the nature of partisanship. However, the results
in Table 17 are as dismal as in the previous hypothesis tests. Partisan polarization does
not vary by authoritarianism or gender.
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Table 17: Partisan Polarization among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficient

Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.0342
(0.0890)
-0.0688
(0.307)
-0.0556
(0.124)
0.194***
(0.0387)
0.217***
(0.0704)
0.268***
(0.0659)
0.230
(0.157)
0.150
(0.199)
0.351*
(0.210)
0.0256
(0.173)
0.121
(0.147)
3.392***
(0.382)
2,178
0.040

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Consequently, one assumes that the results are conditional on party affiliation as
they were in prior tests. Therefore, one conducted the test again by controlling for party
affiliation. The results are similarly as unexpected as before. Party affiliation matters with
regard to the effect of gender and authoritarianism as seen in Table 18. These results defy
the assumption that authoritarianism results in groupism despite the substance of the
entitative group identity in question. If this assumption is correct, then the concept needs
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to be further specified. The movement of the effect of authoritarianism on polarization is
different depending on party affiliation. Among Republicans, authoritarianism causes a
surge in polarization. Strong Republican authoritarians experience an affect gap of over
five units. The full effect is to raise polarization by 1.15 units from a constant of 4.36
units to 5.51 units. This movement is shy of the full effect of age (1.37 units), but
influences polarization more so than egalitarianism and Evangelism. This effect holds for
men and women. Authoritarianism exerts equal influence on the sexes in the Republican
camp. One expected some effect for sex or the interaction term, though.
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Table 18: Party Polarization among White Americans by Party Affiliation

VARIABLES
Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Republican
Coefficient

Democrat
Coefficient

0.285***
(0.108)
0.172
(0.409)
-0.0435
(0.154)
0.196***
(0.0451)
-0.135
(0.0851)
-0.221***
(0.0830)
0.301
(0.188)
0.131
(0.248)
0.607***
(0.230)
0.0633
(0.212)
0.219
(0.174)
4.362***
(0.454)

-0.422***
(0.144)
-0.789**
(0.399)
0.273
(0.186)
0.177***
(0.0519)
0.111
(0.102)
0.595***
(0.107)
0.0928
(0.219)
-0.297
(0.266)
-0.660*
(0.364)
-0.179
(0.254)
0.199
(0.230)
4.268***
(0.596)

1,001
0.061
Standard errors in parentheses for Republicans
Robust errors in parenthesis for Democrats
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

897
0.110

Affective Polarization (Greater Value =
Greater Polarization in Evaluations)
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Figure 17: Partisan Polarization by Republican Party Affiliation
and Authoritarian Disposition among White Americans in
Hypothesis 6
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Figure 18: Partisan Polarization by Gender and Authoritarian
Disposition among White Democrats in Hypothesis 6
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The effect is reversed for Democrats. Authoritarianism has a substantial
attenuating effect on polarization along with sex. The full effect of authoritarianism is
1.68 units. Strong Democratic authoritarian men experience minimal polarization (2.58
units) whereas non-authoritarian Democratic men experience a gap of 4.27 units. The sex
variable is significant and substantive. It also decreases polarization. One expected such
an influence; however, it is against the trend in the other hypotheses examining
partisanship. A non-authoritarian Democratic female experiences a polarization gap of
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3.48 units; whereas, an authoritarian Democratic female experiences a gap of 1.79 units.
Both men and women in the Democratic Party experience less polarization as a result of
authoritarianism, so gender is likely not the reason for the unexpected results. The fact
that Evangelism produces an attenuating effect on polarization among Democrats
suggests that authoritarianism is raising positive regard toward Republicans. This result
contravenes the notion of authoritarians becoming strong partisans regardless of the
partisan social identity involved (Luttig 2017). The Democrat’s brand of diversity and
tolerance appears anathema to authoritarians who remain in the Party, and thus inoculates
them from becoming Democratic partisan warriors.
Results for Hypothesis 7
Testing to this point has mostly frustrated the proposed belief that
authoritarianism and gender interact to influence partisanship. The relationship of the
interaction between gender and authoritarianism has not always manifested as
anticipated. One has discovered instead that party affiliation further conditions the
hypotheses. The test of the interactive relation on inter-group relations has produced
these shaky results. On initial glance, the proposed relationship does not exist with regard
to the economic ideology test results in Table 19 either. The variables for the main effects
and the interaction term are both statistically insignificant. However, the control of racial
resentment is statistically significant. It produces a substantive effect on the desire to
deregulate businesses, which compliments the idea that racial and economic attitudes are
intertwined. Its full effect raises the predicted response from 3.03 to 3.39 for a
respondent. In this regard, it exudes roughly the same influence as the full effect of the
variable for partisanship. One expected these variables to be significant due to the
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influence of elite ideology in each party. The absence of any significance is surprising for
gender and authoritarianism.
Table 19: Support for Business Regulation among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale

-0.0121
(0.0205)
0.079
(0.0677)
-0.0192
(0.0266)
-0.0194**
(0.00801)
0.0212
(0.0152)
-0.0859***
(0.0152)
0.165***
0.0183
-0.068**
(0.0334)
0.028
(0.0445)
0.033
(0.0450)
-0.054
(0.0381)
-0.066**
(0.0320)
0.093***
(0.0167)
3.029***
(0.101)

Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Racial Resentment
Constant

Observations
R-squared

2,786
0.084
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

DiMariano 192

The lack of a manifested relationship forces one to reconsider the assumption of
this hypothesis, too. It is possible that the operational variable for economic ideology is
not reliable for the purposes of this hypothesis. However, if one assumes that it really is,
then the substantive effect of party affiliation may be responsible for the lack of an
observed relation yet again. It appears that the effect of authoritarianism is conditional on
party affiliation, in fact. One did not anticipate the significance of authoritarianism
among respondents of one party, however. Table 20 documents the results of the previous

Support for Business Regulation
(Higher Value = Opposition to
Regulation)

test by party affiliation.

Figure 19: Economic Ideology by Authoritarian Disposition
among White Democrats in Hypothesis 7
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Figure 20: Economic Ideology by Authoritarian Disposition
among White Democrats in Hypothesis 8
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Table 20: Business Regulation among White Americans by Party Affiliation
Republican
Democrats
VARIABLES
Coefficients Coefficients
Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Racial Resentment
Constant

0.00900
(0.0284)
0.0974
(0.107)
-0.0548
(0.0394)
0.0180
(0.0114)
0.0527**
(0.0215)
-0.0641***
(0.0220)
-0.00596
(0.0481)
-0.0500
(0.0619)
-0.0792
(0.0573)
-0.0745
(0.0546)
0.00623
(0.0439)
0.110***
(0.0259)
2.858***
(0.152)

-0.0763**
(0.0352)
0.0824
(0.0998)
0.0461
(0.0441)
-0.0524***
(0.0122)
-0.0136
(0.0242)
-0.112***
(0.0260)
-0.162***
(0.0511)
0.103
(0.0673)
0.230***
(0.0835)
-0.0251
(0.0587)
-0.110**
(0.0526)
0.101***
(0.0273)
3.188***
(0.164)

1,308
0.038

1,139
0.085

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Authoritarianism and gender continue to be insignificant among Republicans.
This is perhaps due to the fact that the non-regulation of business is the raison d’être of
the Republican Party. Therefore, partisan beliefs do not vary amongst authoritarian
dispositions. However, authoritarianism is significant among Democrats. Yet gender is
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not a significant variable among Democrats with regard to the desire to regulate business,
nor is the interaction term. One concludes that authoritarianism for Democrats supports
the regulation of business regardless of sex. The effect is substantive, and logically fits
with the party’s history and ideological platform. Racial resentment is significant for both
parties with about the same substantive effect for Democratic and Republican partisans. It
produces the opposite effect on white Democrats in line with expectations.
Results for Hypothesis 8
One tests the hypothesis about economic ideology a second time by using support
for taxing millionaires as the dependent variable. This second variable used to
operationalize economic beliefs concurrently fails to produce support for the interactive
relationship between gender and authoritarianism. All three of the main variables are
insignificant. The situation bears resemblance to the previous test. Party affiliation, racial
resentment, and egalitarian values are the statistically significant variables to influence
one’s belief about taxing millionaires. The constant term of 2.47 units out of a maximum
of 3 reflects the skewed nature of the responses toward the popularity of taxing
millionaires. Egalitarian values further increases that support by nearly .4 units, and is the
most influential variable. It is more influential than party affiliation, the full effect of
which is about .35 units. Racial resentment is the least influential, but its full effect still
decreases support for taxing millionaires by about .25 units.
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Table 21: Support for Taxing Millionaires among White Americans
VARIABLES

Coefficients

Authoritarian Disposition Scale

-0.0280
(0.0228)
-0.0857
(0.0710)
0.0359
(0.0297)
0.0168*
(0.00914)
-0.0202
(0.0170)
0.0982***
(0.0174)
-0.170***
(0.0214)
0.0479
(0.0385)
0.0185
(0.0463)
-0.0214
(0.0495)
0.0290
(0.0446)
-0.0552
(0.0372)
-0.0547***
(0.0186)
2.493***
(0.110)

Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Party Affiliation
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Racial Resentment
Constant

Observations
R-squared

2,792
0.13
Robust errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The outcomes for party affiliation and racial resentment are not surprising
considering the fact that racial and economic preferences are aligned in elite ideology and
mass partisanship. However, it is surprising that gender is not significant despite the
significance of racial resentment given the bisecting influence of gender in the
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construction of preferences for white Americans. The lack of significance for the main
independent variables directs one to control for party affiliation while conducting the
hypothesis tests as previously done for Hypothesis 7. The results are detailed in Table 22.
Table 22: Support for Taxing Millionaires among White Americans
Republican
Democrats
VARIABLES
Coefficients Coefficients
Authoritarian Disposition Scale
Female
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction
Age
Level of Education
Egalitarian Values
Children under 18
Mainline Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Southerner
Racial Resentment
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.00866
(0.0311)
0.0196
(0.117)
0.0185
(0.0431)
0.00664
(0.0125)
-0.0634***
(0.0236)
0.118***
(0.0240)
0.104**
(0.0526)
0.0308
(0.0677)
-0.0614
(0.0629)
0.117*
(0.0599)
0.0354
(0.0481)
-0.0750***
(0.0284)
2.345***
(0.166)

1,310
0.037
Standard errors in parentheses for Republicans
Robust errors in parentheses for Democrats
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0826**
(0.0340)
-0.138*
(0.0758)
0.0537
(0.0420)
0.0183*
(0.0109)
0.0383*
(0.0218)
0.0630***
(0.0242)
-0.0328
(0.0496)
0.0152
(0.0571)
0.0805
(0.0642)
-0.0892
(0.0593)
-0.139***
(0.0516)
-0.0296
(0.0232)
2.744***
(0.144)
1,141
0.080
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The conclusions mirror results from Hypothesis 7 with regard to support for
regulating business. It appears that party affiliation is a key condition for the
manifestation of a relation between authoritarianism and sex and economic liberalism.
The test by party affiliation demonstrates that the main three independent variables have
no effect among Republicans. It is more credible now to posit that affiliation with the
Republican Party mutes the influence of the independent variables on economic policy
preferences. It is strongly suspected that economic ideology does not vary among
Republicans, and the results do not vary by the independent variables as a result. Racial
resentment is significant and substantive, though, among opposition to taxing millionaires
for Republicans. The full effect of racial resentment decreases support for taxing
millionaires by about .3 units. With the constant term reflecting some economic populism
at 2.35, a racially resentful Republican would register at 2 units or the equivalent of
neither supporting or opposing taxation. This position does not completely correspond to
the vehement opposition of Republican elites to taxing millionaires, nor does it explain
why gender is also insignificant if racial resentment is significant.
The opposite holds for affiliation with the Democratic Party on support for taxing
millionaires. Authoritarianism and gender are significant as predicted only amongst
Democrats; however, the interaction term is not. Authoritarianism lowers support for
taxing millionaires. The full effect of which lowers support from the constant of 2.75
units by .35 units to 2.4 units. This effect makes an authoritarian Democrat similar to a
standard Republican. Curiously, gender is also significant, but it is not in line with
expectations. The support for taxing millionaires is .14 units lower among the average
female respondent than the average male respondent. The direction of movement for
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women contradicts the thrust of the literature review. Gender, especially in the context of
Democratic party affiliation, should move women toward a stronger desire to tax
millionaires. It is hard to contrast this result since the results for Democratic women are
the only instance gender being significant in the economic ideology hypotheses.
The results of Hypothesis 7 and 8 are disquieting. It is difficult to the reconcile the
results of the economic ideology hypotheses with the deductions made in the literature
review. It is not only the lack of an interactive relationship between authoritarianism and
gender that makes one pause before drawing conclusions from these two tests. It is also
the reverse effect manifesting for gender for Hypothesis 8. The strong influence of party
affiliation and racial resentment represent the best avenue to explain the observations.
Racial resentment and party affiliation appear to come before the effect of gender and
authoritarianism. The influence of racial policies on the development of party coalitions
would explain the strength of these two variables in the context of polarization although it
would not explain the lack of significance for authoritarianism and especially gender. It is
also possible that the dependent variables are not ideal for operationalizing the
hypotheses. Both variables register sentiments about economic ideology, but both
variables lack variance in responses. This is adduced from the relatively paltry R-square
value in all the tests for Hypotheses 7 and 8. It is possible that the results would be
different if one had access to a dependent variable with a better spread among responses.
General Takeaways
Overall, the regression tests present a range of results to inductively contrast with
the hypotheses. The deduced position that gender and authoritarianism interact across
political issues must be qualified and taken as suspect. The hypothesized relation
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manifests as expected within the first set of hypotheses concerning cultural preferences
and modern sexism. It is possible that these questions explicitly activate authoritarian
concerns in a direct contest between “us vs. them”, and thus produced the expected
substantive results. This point would explain why the sets for partisanship and economics
did not meet expectations despite being based on the same logic of conflict. However, it
does not explain why strong authoritarians were not strong partisans in the hypothesis
regarding a direct test partisan affect. It is possible that these relations do exist, but the
models were not operationalized properly for the experiments. One must contrast these
results with expectations to appraise the theory of authoritarianism and gender used for
the hypotheses.
Table 23: Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results
Hypothesis

Not Supported

Cultural Preferences

Partially Supported
X

Modern Sexism
Party Identification

Supported

X
X

Presidential Nominee Evaluations

X

Social Polarization

X

Partisan Polarization

X

Economic Regulation

X

Taxing Millionaires

X
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Discussion and Conclusion
Critique of Core Concepts
The varied results from the regression tests have provided a range of findings to
parse. It is necessary now to compare those results with the considerations made prior to
testing. The preponderance of scrutiny must first fall on the conception of
authoritarianism. One located the motivation for authoritarian predispositions as a need
for cognitive reassurance in the form of epistemological closure. Authoritarianism is a
psychological mechanism for dealing with uncertainty, and results in efforts to impose
unanimity. Scholars commonly witness these resulting efforts for conformity as a defense
mechanism (Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Stenner 2005). These ends are reached through
group affiliation. The exploration of Frankfurt School philosophy helped frame the
essence of authoritarianism. Scholars often remain agnostic to the theory behind
authoritarianism, and consequently it is often reduced to its methodology. The
philosophical exegesis allowed one to distinguish the concept from mere prejudice or
aggression alone. However, this step alone was not sufficient to construct a model of
authoritarianism. It only validated it as a concept worth exploring.
The philosophical element assumed an academic basis with the dynamic model of
personality. In this way, one expounded a comprehensive view of the mechanisms and
consequences of authoritarianism. Personality operates as an enduring, yet situational,
feature of an individual. The concept of dynamism in personality allowed one to frame
authoritarianism as a disposition. Individuals vary in their propensity to sacrifice personal
autonomy to group authority to fulfill internal needs. This propensity interacts with one’s
environment through threatening cues to situationally mediate one’s preferred level of

DiMariano 201

autonomy. This model of authoritarianism begged the question, though. What causes one
to desire to conform in the first place? The answer is multifaceted, and runs the gambit
from childhood upbringing to personal experiences. However, this inquiry focused on the
need for closure as a prime-mover.
The need for closure served as the chief component for determining an
individual’s predisposition for authoritarianism. Other underlying motivations such as the
need for order or belonging were contextualized in the pattern of needing certainty.
Human beings have awareness and meta-cognition. One consequence of this intelligence
is the realization of metaphysical uncertainties. Individuals vary in their comfortability in
a world of uncertainty. The uncomfortable lot seek cognitive refuge by way of
identification with an entitative group. These groups provide a set of super-ordinate
authorities to which one can adjust one’s life. Hence, one arrives at their preferred level
of personal autonomy.
The formulation of authoritarianism by group identification defined the model for
testing. It allowed one to deduce conclusions from its logic. The inference pattern of the
model allowed one to situate authoritarianism as a mainspring of affective partisanship.
Political scientists are increasingly understanding partisanship through the lens of social
identity. Individual citizens behave politically in accordance with social allegiance. The
human mind rationalizes more so than it reasons in political endeavors. Group affiliation
informs individuals of their situation, and forms the bands of collective action. Partisan
affiliation is a particularly strong and salient social identity as partisans are constantly
primed in terms of identity as a member of a political party. This affinity produces
amiable feelings toward fellow partisans and allied leaders. Partisans experience tense
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competition over tangible benefits, and subsequently derogate members of the other party
according to the degree to which one associates with one’s own party. The extent to
which one identifies as a partisan should reflect one’s predisposition to authoritarianism.
Political parties are entitative groups, and provide the essential epistemological
certainties to uniquely attract authoritarians.
Therefore, one concluded that authoritarianism structures modern partisanship.
Authoritarians would be partisan warriors. The distribution of authoritarians between and
within the two major parties affects the dynamic of competition. Democrats are mainly
comprised of non-authoritarians while the Republicans are mostly comprised of
authoritarians. Parties absorbed the authoritarian cleavage over the course of the New
Deal regime. The promulgation of the federal policy state has resulted in the increased
prominence of the president in the political order. The centrality of the office of president
made it as a clearinghouse for partisan initiatives. The vestiture of such authority in one
office altered the calculus of competition. The change in political gravity accelerated with
the finalization of the process of elite sorting into ideological homogenous political
parties. The clear signals of each party’s idiosyncratic ideology have simplified the
decision of party affiliation for individuals of varying authoritarian dispositions by
turning politics into a singular struggle between one party and another over whose
candidate will occupy the White House.
Gender factors into these developments. Men and women increasingly diverge in
terms of party affiliation. This trend has developed concomitantly with the development
of the federal policy state. The social roles of men and women influence their political
self-interest as members of a sex with regard to economic and cultural preferences. The
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alignment of social and economic policy in party ideologies has reduced cross-pressure
on the choice of party affiliation for men and women. This imbalance has gendered the
images of each party and party affiliation. Men prefer the Republican Party while women
prefer the Democratic Party, overall. As a result, each party sends gendered cues to voters
about their stances on conventional masculinity and femininity to maintain their bases.
Republicans traffic in masculine tropes while Democrats traffic in feminine ones.
Conventionally, society has attached attributes to each gender. Masculinity
implies toughness, initiative and agency. Femininity implies compassion, congeniality,
and consensus. Masculine traits reflect characteristics favored by authoritarians, and
feminine traits reflect non-authoritarian characteristics, as a result. These traits engender
individuals with certain patterns of living. They become political when one’s gendered
perspectives are set to solving public problems. These perspectives inform the politics
and presentation of each party’s platform. Consequently, gender influences political
preferences in the electorate. The degree to which gender cues influence political
decision-making are contingent on one’s disposition to authoritarianism.
Overall, the results give little credence to the existence of a broad interactive
relation between gender and authoritarianism in the partisanship of white Americans.
This conclusion requires specific reservations and qualifications, however. The clearest
example of the hypothesized interactive relation between gender and authoritarianism
appeared in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in relation to the cultural preference scale and
effectively in the modern sexism scale. These two scales offered respondents a choice
between convention and change. The authoritarian disposition pushed respondents
towards supporting conventional traditions. These outcomes make intuitive sense.
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Authoritarians support conforming to the established ways of the community. It is not
surprising that authoritarians support minority integration into the majority as opposed to
respect for diversity. The toleration for diversity is not in the authoritarian’s repertoire of
skills. The same pattern holds in the modern sexism scale. Conventionally, gender roles
and social opportunities have favored men over women. Authoritarians should be
attracted to the conventional arrangement between the sexes. One expected the
authoritarians to prefer past arrangements, and scoff at attempts to equalize outcomes.
The proper assessment of authoritarianism for the two preference scales means
that one correctly anticipated the conditional effect of gender on preference formation.
Gender is an organizing pattern for one’s life. However, it is not a central variable in
casual pathway models. It is eclipsed by the interests of salient identities like partisanship
and psychological mechanisms like authoritarianism. The strength of the direct influence
of gender, therefore, relies on the absence of influence of more pivotal variables - a point
that is crucial to understand the lackluster results in the partisanship hypotheses. The
authoritarian predisposition does not weigh on the political calculus of non-authoritarians
as much as it influences the judgment of authoritarians. Not surprisingly, gender
exercised a greater influence on the preference formation of non-authoritarians without
the presence of either authoritarianism or partisan cues. Non-authoritarian men registered
more authoritarian preferences than non-authoritarian women in both tests. This gap
between the preferences of men and women closes as one increases in authoritarianism as
expected. These two tests validate the logic of the two hypotheses without caveat. One
would expect to find this relation on other social issues such as immigration, which was
not included in the cultural preference scale.
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Assessing Explanations for Unanticipated Results
The results of the first two hypotheses must square with the remaining results.
The rest of the hypotheses require more qualification to explain as they did not follow
expectations. The outright failure to manifest results as predicted with regard to affective
partisanship and economic ideology implies an improperly specified model. In this
situation, unforeseen conditions apply or a fault exists in the theorizing. One begins by
examining Hypotheses 3 through 6. The hypotheses dealt with affective partisanship, and
carry significant consequences for understanding the relation of authoritarianism and
gender in party politics. Authoritarian disposition should structure affective partisanship.
Overall, the results of the four tests dealing with partisanship did not support this
conclusion. Authoritarianism did not structure the intimacy of one’s association with a
partisan identity, nor did gender condition the effect of authoritarianism on support for
partisan matters. The results only showed qualified significance when controlling for
party affiliation. The two dueling sets of conclusions require attention to reconcile. One
judges by the results that either the conceptualization of authoritarianism and gender was
incorrect, or that one did not properly appraise the effect of partisanship.
Misconstrued Variables: Authoritarianism and Gender
One will contemplate the possibility of the two propositions. To the first point,
authoritarianism and gender are not properly understood. The likelihood of this point
rests on an improper reading of authoritarianism. One proposed that authoritarians would
seek entitative group identities to satisfy a need for certainty. It is possible that an
authoritarian predisposition does not produce a compulsion to conform to a social
identity. The literature describes a raft of derivative consequences of an authoritarian

DiMariano 206

disposition. One prominent characteristic is to seek security (Stenner 2005; Hetherington
& Weiler 2009). An authoritarian may accomplish that without sublimation to a group
identity. In this way, Duckitt’s emphasis on group affiliation with regard to salient threats
for authoritarianism is misplaced (1989, Feldman 2003). It also cast doubts on the tenet
of uncertainty-identity theory that implies social individuals seek identities to cope with
uncertainty (Hogg 2000). In this situation, authoritarians impose order onto social
arrangements because it is the presence of strong authority itself that soothes them.
Therefore, one attributed more explanatory potential to authoritarianism than justified.
The interpretations of results would comply this reading. First, one found the
existence of the proposed relationship between authoritarianism and gender with regard
to Hypotheses 1 and 2. The scales did not activate a social identity. It probed the feelings
of respondents toward social relations and arrangements. It measured how comfortably
the respondent handled diversity. One counter-argument is that the significance of those
tests, indeed, reflects support for enforcing a group identity. In this situation, that group
identity is the national identity. However, a purely American national identity generally
rests on one’s partisan leanings. Each party represents its own conception of civic identity
and the public good. As a result, one again interprets the results as general need for
protection from a visible source of authority against uncertainty.
The results of Hypotheses 3 through 6 with regard to partisanship also comply
with this reading. Partisanship is a powerful social identity. The two major partisan
identities in the United States are diametrically opposed to one another. They each
propose a vision of the public good, and the means to attain it. One would assume that the
entitativity of each identity is all that an authoritarian would need to satisfy the need for
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closure. However, one witnessed authoritarianism structure politics across parties more
so than it ever structured politics within parties. For instance, authoritarianism increased
the strength of Republican partisanship when sorting OLS regression by party affiliation
in Hypothesis 3. It did not conversely matter with regard to Democratic partisanship.
Likely, authoritarians do not regard Democrats as authoritative. Democrats are social
levelers by nature, and present themselves as diverse. The essence of liberalism or the
tropes of femininity demur authoritarians from structuring their lives around the
Democratic label. The forces of illiberalism do not seem to marshal for the ends of
liberalism.
Moreover, one witnessed authoritarianism reducing social and political
polarization among Democrats in Hypotheses 5 and 6. This result also contravenes the
idea that any powerful, entitative identity is enough to attract authoritarians. The
diminishment of polarization has a few possible interpretations due to the nature of the
construction of the dependent variable for the partisan polarization in Hypothesis 6. One
interpretation is that authoritarian Democrats feel warm toward their own party as well as
to Republicans. However, the inference pattern of inter-group behavior in social identity
theory does not afford much space for this view. One expects fierce competition of
tangible benefits to reduce affect for one’s opponents. Contemporary partisanship is
characterized by the fear and loathing of the other party. In the light of uncertaintyidentity theory, one expects a divergence between in-group and out-group affection.
Group affiliation produces in-group favoritism if nothing else. This expectation
concurrently dispels the interpretation that authoritarian Democrats feel cold toward their
own partisan identity as well as to Republicans.
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The understanding of partisanship as a social identity leaves one to conclude that
authoritarianism produced out-group affection and in-group derogation for Hypothesis 6.
These results contradict the accepted wisdom of the literature. It is more probable that
authoritarianism produces a strong desire for order and structure, and that the Republican
Party provides agreeable means to these ends. It is important to remember that the two
parties are not mirror-images of one another. The Democrats are a flat organization while
the Republican Party, by contrast, is more hierarchical in nature and uniform in purpose.
By nature, the few authoritarian Democrats in the Party will find the Republican Party
more reflective of their worldview. As a result, the predicted relation between gender and
authoritarianism collapsed in the milieu of partisanship.
It is also possible that one did properly understand the role of gender either. The
results are not hospitable to this interpretation, though. Gender organizes one’s private
life, and how one sees public questions. The relation between gender and
authoritarianism appeared as expected in Hypothesis 1 and 2. Men had less tolerance for
diversity than women. The traits associated with men diminish compassion, and engender
support for hierarchical social relations. The problem for the gender variable is that it
produced unexpected results in the affective partisanship hypotheses, and haphazard
results for the economic ideology tests. Often, it was insignificant even when controlling
for party affiliation. In a few other situations, it produced the opposite predicted effect
such as in Hypothesis 3 or 8. It raised Republican partisan affiliation for women more
than men, for instance. Additionally, it polarized female evaluations across the board in
their appraisal of presidential candidates.
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The failure of gender itself to exhibit its anticipated effects in the results has two
possible explanations. The first response is that the interactive relation failed to manifest
because one misconstrued the proper nature of the authoritarian dynamic. If one places
more emphasis on the results of the partisan hypotheses, then one understands that
authoritarianism is more about order and security through consonant group identities than
through affiliation with dissonant entitative groups like the Democratic Party that values
tolerance. In this way, authoritarianism does not carry the same inference pattern. The
nature of authoritarianism in politics would be more to structure inter-group politics than
intra-group politics. Gender organizes how one sees political questions, but its effects
would be overshadowed by the weight of partisanship and authoritarianism depending on
the party in question. One anticipates gender would have been more relevant if
authoritarianism and partisanship had not already compressed intra-group political
preferences.
Misconstrued Variables: Partisanship
The last point segues into the second explanation. This explanation concerns the
understanding of the strength of partisanship and how it influenced outcomes. In the logic
of the casual pathway model, one concludes that the failure of gender to manifest its
effects as expected is that other variables eclipsed its influence. In this case, one did not
properly anticipate the role of partisanship in preference formation. Partisanship carries
gendered themes. The nature of these overtones depends on the party in question.
Partisanship could have stayed the influence of the sex variable, and acted as the main
variable for gender through its robust influence on decision-making. One knows that
partisanship, as an over-arching identity, has the reach to alter deeply held beliefs and
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constituent identities. In this way, it could have informed one’s individual notions of
gender prior to hypothesis testing. Partisans would then display the unvaried gendered
perspective of one’s party instead. This reasoning accounts for why the variable for sex
rarely demonstrated significance in Hypotheses 3 through 6, but it does not account for
the instances when it was significant.
The influence of partisanship over individual decision-making potentially stayed
the influence of an authoritarian disposition, too. One must cast partisanship as the
misconstrued variable in Hypotheses 3 through 8 if one regards the results of Hypotheses
1 and 2 as trustworthy. Partisanship is likely the reason why authoritarianism did not
manifest as expect. It is possible that the influence of authoritarianism is captured in
partisanship as party elites have sorted on issues of authoritarianism like they have on
issues of gender. If so, one did not properly account for the conditional effect of
partisanship in Hypotheses 3 through 8. This explanation seems like a plausible
interpretation. Partisanship is the most important, consistent predictor of political
preferences. The impact of partisanship on inter-group behavior may have stayed the
impact of authoritarianism and gender. Thus, one did not observe any significance of the
two variables let alone an interactive relation. After all, one did not witness the predicted
interactive relation at all outside Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The basis of this explanation rests on the idea that one downplayed the potency of
partisanship. The exploration of the emergence of modern partisanship in the American
political development section demonstrated how the party cleavage absorbed
authoritarianism and gender into the ideology of each party. The chasm between policy
positions of each party makes it difficult for partisan elites to compromise. Instead, each
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party stakes oppositional policies. One assumed that authoritarianism and gender still had
potential to influence decision-making within parties as well as between them despite the
influence of partisanship. However, it is possible that strength of partisanship has already
induced most members of the electorate to sort on matters of authoritarianism and gender
despite their sex or authoritarian leaning. Sorting would explain why one observed
authoritarianism and gender to be insignificant in most cases. It is most apt to explain the
insignificance of gender. Despite differences between men and women, the gendered
differences between the parties are more consequential to an individual’s preference
formation. In this way, one expects men and women alike in a party to share the same
gendered outlook with one another.
The same logic applies to authoritarianism. The parties may differ in their
compositions of authoritarians, but partisans in a highly contentious political environment
follow the authoritarian preferences of elite cues in spite of their own authoritarian
predispositions. The authoritarian cleavage matters between parties more so than within
parties. Conversely, sorting has produced distance between parties. Authoritarianism
might operate as articulated in the literature review, but the conditional effect of
partisanship is now powerful enough among partisans to produce conformity in
preferences across the spectrum of authoritarians in their ranks. In this way, the strength
of party affiliation and its effects on inter-group relations do not vary much between the
sexes or along the authoritarian spectrum.
The only segment of voters who appear not to follow this line of reasoning are
authoritarians in the Democratic Party. Here the mismatch between prevailing antiauthoritarian values of Democratic partisanship and one’s authoritarian inclinations are
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too powerful to reconcile as witnessed with regard to social polarization (Hypothesis 5),
partisan polarization (Hypothesis 6), and support for taxing millionaires (Hypothesis 8).
The authoritarian Democrat’s authoritarian predisposition overrides the influence coming
from partisanship. One would expect this outcome within the casual pathway model. One
must qualify the application of the causal pathway model when component variables all
exert influence in the same direction.
The casual pathway model as a predictor of individual decision-making needs
additional stipulation in a situation where parties are highly sorted. This oversight led to
the faulty assumptions underlying Hypotheses 3 through 8 despite an emphasis placed on
the insight of social identity theory in the literature review. One should have foreseen
social pressures exerting a greater effect on individual decision-making. The alignment of
variables in a polarized environment allows partisanship to most heavily influence
outcomes, and sabotage predicted relations. Partisans will follow elite stances as long as
those stances do not wildly clash with their authoritarian dispositions as was the case with
authoritarian Democrats. Party affiliation also explains why non-authoritarian Republican
women were more partisan than men in Hypothesis 3. Gender matters in this explanation
as female Republicans are supporting a party associated with masculinity and
authoritarianism. The choice is conscientious given the option to sort, and they own it.
This improperly theorized role of a contentious partisan environment also
explains the haphazard results of the economic hypotheses. One remains uncertain of the
actual relationship of gender and authoritarianism with regard to economic ideology due
to inconsistent and contradictory results of Hypothesis 7 and 8. It is possible to still detect
a trend emerging from the two sets of results. The first is that party affiliation matters to
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the results. One concludes that affiliation with the Republican Party conditioned the
effect of authoritarianism and gender. Neither variable was significant. It is probable that
Republican economic ideology is ubiquitous enough that preferences do not vary much
among adherents.
On the other hand, authoritarianism influences economic ideology in the
Democratic Party. In Hypothesis 7, authoritarianism produces sentiments to regulate
business. However, it reduces support among Democrats for taxing millionaires in
Hypothesis 8. Both results should not manifest at the same time in a highly partisan
context. It appears most likely that the results vary due to the nature of the dependent
variable. The regulation of business is a cold, programmatic variable, and lacks the
trappings of social conflict. The taxation of millionaires is a social issue as much as it is
an economic issue in the logic of social identity theory. If so, the outcome of Hypothesis
8 for Democrats still contradicts expectations. In addition to the contradictory results for
Democrats for Hypothesis 5 and 6, one must conclude that the conception of
authoritarianism was misconstrued. Authoritarianism was not the general tendency to
conform to any entitative group as predicted.
Final Thoughts
On the whole, the results of these tests demand one revise the use and
consideration of models articulated in this inquiry. The onus falls foremost on the concept
of authoritarianism given the nature of this inquiry. Authoritarianism produced limited
results, and often these results manifested against expectations. One reconsidered how
authoritarianism and gender had already influenced partisanship prior to the hypothesis
tests to account for the failure of an interactive relation to manifest. This reconsideration
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still portends poorly for the model of authoritarianism. While it neither sabotages nor
supports the conception of authoritarianism through the tenets of a need for certainty and
group identity outright, the balance of probability still rests against this conceptualization.
One expected some demonstration of its inference pattern in the partisan hypotheses if
authoritarianism actually structures association with entitative social identities like party
affiliation. The presence of an interactive relationship in the cultural preference scales do
not marshal in favor or against the conceptualization either. Those two hypotheses did not
activate salient identities. Neither do the economic ideology hypotheses, but authoritarian
Democrats still took the Republican stance of not taxing millionaires in Hypothesis 8.
Additionally, authoritarianism activated support for the party of authoritarianism, the
Republican Party, in the partisan hypotheses 3, 5 and 6.
One must adduce that authoritarianism does not induce groupism with any
entitative group given the influence of partisan identities. Instead, authoritarianism
induces conformity through entitative identities if the group has the appropriate structure
to it. The cohesion of the Republican Party, with its hierarchy and unity of purpose, fits
this description. The Democrats, with their leveling tendencies and tolerance for dissent,
do not fit the description. This rationale would explain, for instance, why Republicans
become stronger partisans as they become stronger authoritarianism whereas Democrats
do not. Consequently, it explains why the interactive relation between gender and
authoritarianism did not materialize outside the cultural preference hypotheses where
partisanship was not salient. The effect of authoritarianism is conditional on the party
affiliation from sorting, and partisanship likely overrides individual gender cues within
each party. In this way, the relation between variables were not properly hypothesized
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despite the continual acknowledgement of the importance of partisanship throughout. A
relation between authoritarianism and gender likely exists insofar as both are bifurcated
by parties, but the original thesis is not the norm outside matters of idealized social
arrangements and abstract cultural preferences.
This rationale partially explains the negative results of the economic ideology test,
as a result. It is possible that elite positioning and cue-taking in the mass electorate are
conveyed well enough to individuals across the range of the authoritarian spectrum that
one does not observe a difference in preferences. The ability of elites to give cues to the
mass electorate on ideological economic positions makes the disentangling of
authoritarianism and partisanship difficult. Johnston demonstrates that engagement
significantly increases the uptake of economic positions from elites among authoritarians
(2018, 227). It is probable to assume that authoritarians are already more engaged than
non-authoritarians.
The effect of partisanship to override other consideration then was not properly
stated herein. Authoritarians may absorb elite cues better than non-authoritarians;
however, the cohesion of the Republican Party is strong enough that non-authoritarians
are able to perceive and register the party’s position on economic ideology. On the other
hand, it cannot explain why authoritarian Democrats behaved as expected. These
respondents sought slightly higher regulations on business than non-authoritarian
Democrats, but also opposed taxing millionaires. They also had warm affection toward
the Republican Party while being cold toward their own party. The body of evidence in
social identity theory militates against such a conclusion. One will need additional testing

DiMariano 216

on policy issues to better understand the conditional nature of party affiliation on
authoritarianism and its interactive relationship with gender.
One caveat to the dismal conclusions presented so far is that the data for them
come from the 2016 election. The 2016 election was as polarizing as it was acrimonious.
However, one could argue that the cleavages of authoritarianism and gender had not yet
fully developed. The Trump presidency and the Me-Too movement made the divide
between the sexes and across the authoritarian spectrum much more salient. It is possible
to argue that the initial results found in this inquiry are encouraging considering the
interactive relation between gender and authoritarianism was already manifesting to a
degree before the 2016 election. The same hypotheses and the same experiments may
yield more significant results if one uses the 2020 ANES data when it becomes available.
In this way, one would have more cause to keep or discard the reflections posited for the
failure of the hypothesis tests.
The question of datasets raises more points to address. One presents two more
methodological issues to diagnose. First, the ANES, while it offers a broad range of
questions to operationalize, only offers questions in a polite, sterile manner. This
formality did not hinder testing the thesis within the topic of cultural preferences or
partisanship, but it did hinder testing the thesis within the context of economic issues. It
was argued that economic questions gain currency when placed in the context of social
conflict. However, the broadest question to closely matching this logic was for
Hypothesis 8 with the taxation of millionaires. A different data set or changes to the
ANES could resolve this issue by offering more economic questions written to evoke
social considerations.
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Second, a change to the ANES or future datasets could also add further questions
to better uncover the nature of the authoritarianism. This paper posited that
authoritarianism was a dynamic, and one was able to test for authoritarian predispositions
using the CRV scale. However, the CRV scale is only valid for white Americans, which
limits the study of a crucial concept to one population. The study of conformity must
develop to meet the demands of the present moment. This inquiry attempted to rise to that
challenge by forcefully theorizing authoritarianism as a psychological compulsion
towards conforming. The inclusion of the need for closure as the impetus for one’s
predisposition may have been too ambitious overall, but authoritarianism did prove to be
statistically significant in many hypothesis tests by itself. If the need for closure excels at
explaining the compulsion for conformity, the variable has the benefit of having a 15question to measure this impulse across ethnic categories (Luttig 2018). Future research
should include both the CRV scale and the 15-question scale to measure the need for
closure to compare their validity, and propel the collective understanding of
authoritarianism forward.
To conclude, an understanding of authoritarianism remains elusive. The human
mind is a black box, and it may remain impossible to definitively ascribe reasons for the
compulsion to conform. However, this dissertation conceptualized a model of
authoritarianism given the most recent understanding of it in the literature. To this end,
one investigated the role of gender in the authoritarian dynamic. Gender norms and social
roles influence how individuals view themselves and their place in society. One
anticipated gender to interact with the authoritarian dynamic to influence political
preferences. One expected an interactive relation to be the norm in this regard due to the
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unique development of affective partisanship, and the absorption of gender and
authoritarian cleavages into the party system. The initial results herein bias against this
understanding of the relation between gender and authoritarianism. It appears to be the
case that gender and authoritarianism do interact as anticipated absent overt partisan
consideration. In this way, one should conduct more tests with a broader range of
dependent and independent variables.
The influence of partisanship derailed the conceptualization of authoritarianism as
a process of conformity around any entitative group identity. One emphasized the
conclusions of Luttig and the logic of casual pathway models while simultaneously
underrating the logic of social identity theory and the established potency of affective
partisanship in modern politics (2017). Partisanship is a strong social identity. One did
not error in evaluating its effect on inter-group behavior, but did not properly account for
it in the logic of the hypotheses. Thus, the absence of the predicted effect of
authoritarianism and gender among partisan inter-group behavior damages the notion that
authoritarianism is a central, internal phenomenon of group sublimation irrespective of
the character of the group. One must further condition expectations on the group identity
in question.
However, the implication of gender in the authoritarian dynamic still furthers
one’s understanding of the psychology of it. While partisanship damages the conception
of authoritarianism used in this inquiry, gender reveals that authoritarian preference
formation does not rely solely one’s authoritarian disposition. In the case of Hypotheses 1
and 2, gender mediated the preferences of men and women over the authoritarian
spectrum. Hypothesis 1 did not explicitly activate gender identities, either. Even so,
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explicit matters of gender can cause authoritarian preferences to diverge as Lizotte
demonstrated (2019). Thus, it lends credibility to the notion that considerations of
personal identity direct authoritarian impulses on some level. Further experimentation
will be required to establish the extent to which authoritarians relies on group identities to
determine their political preferences, and the conditions under which their preferences
manifest. The scattershot results provide opportunities to modify hypotheses to continue
probing matters of social identity in relation to the authoritarian dynamic.
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